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European Crises of Public Power from Weimar until
Today
Poul F. Kjaer and Niklas Olsen
Once again, Europe finds itself in the middle of a crisis. In public dis-
course, the ongoing crisis has foremost been considered as an economic
crisis, or a crisis of a largely technical nature due to failed governance
within the Eurozone. However, the still unfolding refugee crisis and the
widespread challenges to the state of law and parliamentary democracy,
which have emerged in many European settings in recent years, indicates
that the crisis trajectory cannot be understood in purely economic or
technocratic terms. Accordingly, this volume takes a different approach
to the understanding of the current crisis. First, it reconstructs the com-
monalities and differences between this and earlier major European cri-
ses from the interwar period onward. Second, it reconceptualizes these
European crises as primarily crises of public power and authority. Third,
it offers an interdisciplinary framework for analysing and understanding
the phenomenon of crisis more generally.
The guiding point of this volume is that modernity and crises are co-
original. As initially pointed by Georg W. F. Hegel and reinforced by
scholars as different as Jürgen Habermas, Herbert Marcuse and Reinhart
Koselleck, the breakthrough of modernity in the latter half of the eight-
eenth century also marked the emergence of the crisis phenomenon.1
Societal crises, as well as narratives and analysis of crises, are, in other
words, inherent to the history of modern Europe. This insight has, how-
ever, been blended out in mainstream understandings of the current cri-
sis trajectories.2 This volume therefore counters the profoundly ahistori-
cal perspectives that dominate contemporary crisis discourses by system-
atically contextualizing and explaining the dynamics and characteristics
of the ongoing crisis within the framework of, and with reference to,
previous European crisis experiences. The volume presents a particular
take on the crisis phenomenon in Europe, by providing a long-term his-
torical, sociological, as well as a ‘conceptual history’-informed take on
crises in twentieth-century Europe from the Weimar Republic and the
interwar period through the 1970s crisis to the ongoing crisis of the Euro,
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the European integration project and European society as such. It pro-
vides a historical and conceptual link between the interwar crisis and the
crisis of today, while highlighting that the 1970s crisis was, in many
ways, a prelude to the ongoing crisis.3 Thus, the volume asks how the
crisis experience of the interwar period informs our thinking about crisis
today, and, to what extent, the catastrophic consequences which emerged
from the breakdown of the Weimar Republic might be repeated. As such,
the volume advances a warning from history by highlighting that the
chaos of Weimar is not as far away as one might have thought only a few
years ago.4
At a more concrete level, the central thesis of the volume is that the
crises focused upon are interconnected, in so far as many of the issues
and conflicts characterizing the previous crises are reemerging in the
current crisis. Economic and social turmoil was surely inherent to all the
major crises of twentieth and twenty-first century Europe. However,
purely economistic takes on the crisis phenomenon need to be comple-
mented by a stronger focus on the political and legal preconditions that
paved the way for these crises, as well as on the more fundamental ero-
sion or, in some cases, outright collapse of social order which marked
large segments of interwar Europe and characterizes crisis-ridden coun-
tries such as Greece and Spain today. Against this background, a second
thesis of the volume is that the root cause of both the interwar and the
current crises was political rather than economic, and that these crises
must be understood as crises of public power, order and authority. The
essence of public power, as distinct from private power, is that it pro-
vides a generalized and legally-constituted framework of collectivity
based upon both a formal constitutional setup and a social praxis which,
through the rule of law, ensures the realization of a fairly unitary set of
norms throughout a given society.5 A recurrent theme of the volume is
that both prior to and during the crisis under scrutiny, such unitary
norm-based frameworks were substantially challenged and undermined
by political movements opposing the existing normative grid of society.
In line with this, the volume illuminates how such ideological contesta-
tions tended to gain strength and intensity in times characterized by
profound structural transformations of society, causing a discrepancy be-
tween the unfolding of social processes and the institutional frameworks
that have been established to stabilize such processes normatively.
Focusing on how notions of public order and authority have been
severely challenged and, in many instances, undermined, the volume
reconstructs how the crises unfolded, how they were experienced, and
what kind of responses the specific crises in question provoked. In doing
so, the volume draws on the rich ‘crises literature’ developed mainly
within the critical theory tradition to outline a conceptual and sociologi-
cal framework for understanding what societal crises are. By concrete use
of and reference to central scholars associated with critical theory, such as
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Franz L. Neumann and Hugo Sinzheimer, the volume seeks to bridge the
gap between humanistic, legal and social science approaches to the sub-
ject matter. Moreover, at a theoretical and methodological level, the vol-
ume combines structural and sociological explanations and approaches
with insights from conceptual and intellectual history, drawing also on
analytical devices from scholars such as Reinhart Koselleck and Niklas
Luhmann. It is well known that both scholars developed their work with-
in different traditions than—and at times in opposition to—critical theo-
ry.6 Notwithstanding this, there are, arguably, many commonalities in
the respective approaches, and they can be fruitfully combined in the
analysis of the European crisis. In particular, Koselleck’s conceptually-
oriented analysis of the emergence of modern political language and its
key concepts (such as that of ‘crisis’) and Luhmann’s idea that issues of
crisis and societal integration in the modern world must be understood in
the light of the functional differentiation of society, seem to be not only
compatible with, but also to enrich the analytical ambitions of critical
theory, by opening other paths to the study of language, society and
politics, as well as the relation between them.
On a more general level, combining insights from critical theory, func-
tionalist sociology and conceptual history, this volume aims to provide a
dialectical perspective on the relationship between ideological articula-
tions and the structural transformations unfolding in society. These ideo-
logical articulations are considered normative in their core and are ob-
served in both their progressive (e.g., in relation to democracy, human
rights and emancipation) as well as reactionary (e.g., antidemocratic and
antimodernist) variants. In addition, they are viewed as both reflections
and factors of societal change. Against this background, the book pro-
vides frameworks for analysing how, in different societal contexts—char-
acterized by specific structural problems and contradictions—ideological
articulations influence structural transformations over time and vice versa.
As will become apparent, these frameworks allow for a combination of
descriptive and normative approaches to the subject matter. Also in this
sense, the ambition of critical theory becomes visible in so far as critical
theory since Immanuel Kant has been based upon the idea that produc-
tive articulations of normative endeavours must be done with reference
to the structural setup of society, while, at the same time, such articula-
tions possess the potential to alter the structural setup of society over
time.7
The present volume adds crucial perspectives to the vast amount of
books on crises that have appeared in recent years. Most of these books
are monodisciplinary and monothematic (e.g., they look exclusively at
the financial crisis, the crisis of the public sphere or the crisis of democra-
cy).8 In contrast, this volume cuts across different problem constellations
and presents a broad range of analyses of how societal crises emerged
and evolved in the European context from the interwar period until to-
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day from an interdisciplinary perspective. The volume opens with two
chapters that develop a conceptual and temporal framework for thinking
about societal crisis, identifying what societal crisis are, how they unfold
over time and what implications they have for democracy in the present
and the future.
David Runciman’s central concern is the ability to pin down the time
frame of crises: When do they begin and when do they end? Discussing
the concept of crisis in relation to that of democracy, he defines a crisis as
a situation characterized by fundamental threat and fundamental choice,
which implies the need to take fundamental decisions. At the same time,
he highlights the difficulty in pinning down crises, asking the question as
to whether crises emerge when a fundamental danger occurs or at the
moment that fundamental choices have to be made. In a similar vein, he
discusses the particular experiential and perspectival dimensions of cri-
ses, as well as the issue of ubiquity, arguing that crises semantics tend to
suffer from inflation, in so far as it is invoked time and again, thereby
diluting the concept of crisis. This was particularly the case from the
1960s onward, in so far as semantics of ‘events’ and ‘catastrophe’ have
increasingly lost out and been replaced with crisis semantics. Runciman
further discusses this development in relation to an increased accelera-
tion of societal time and a compression of temporal frames of crises,
which implies a higher level of contingency and unpredictability of soci-
etal developments.
Observing a profound lack of scholarly inquiry into the significance
and practice of the concept, Janet Roitman examines the particular stakes
of crisis. She does so by reflecting on the status of the concept as a ubiqui-
tous qualifier of contemporary historical conditions. Instead of providing
a fixed theory or definition of crisis, she examines the role and function of
the term in the construction of narrative forms. How does the term crisis
serve as a place from which narrative accounting can begin? How does
crisis serve as a narrative device, which establishes certain events as mo-
ments of truth? How is crisis mobilized to engender conditions of action,
serving to constitute a particular form of ethics or mode of critique? Prob-
ing these questions, Roitman unveils how crisis has come to serve as a
non-locus which enables claims concerning access to history and knowl-
edge of history. Against this background, she compels us to put less faith
in crisis by asking more critically how we produce meaning and history
through the concept.
Following the section devoted to conceptual and temporal frame-
works for thinking about societal crisis, a section of three chapters fo-
cuses on the crisis experience of the interwar period, and on how these
experiences were negotiated in intellectual thinking in this period. Focus
is, in particular, on how ideologies of antimodernism and liberalism were
negotiated and came to challenge democratic forms of public power in
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the Weimar Republic, in Eastern and Central Europe, as well as within
transnational networks spanning Western Europe and the United States.
John P. McCormick provides a re-evaluation of the Weimar writings
of Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss, specifically, their intellectual efforts to
replace, as the ground of political authority, Enlightenment rationality
with, respectively, ‘political theology’ and ‘Biblical atheism’. Schmitt and
Strauss each insisted that Enlightenment rationality was unravelling into
a way of thinking that violently rejected ‘form’ of any kind, as fixated
myopically on human things and lacking any conception of the external
constraints that condition the possibilities of philosophy, morality and
politics. Consequently, so McCormick argues, they considered Enlighten-
ment reason a threat to ‘genuine’ expressions of rationality and a danger-
ous obfuscation of the necessity of political order—of the brute fact that
human beings stand in need of being ruled. Finally, McCormick points
to—and warns against—the ways in which contemporary enemies of lib-
eral democracy share Schmitt’s and Strauss’s anxieties over Enlighten-
ment values and likewise seek to develop genuinely authoritarian alter-
natives to liberal state theory.
In a similar vein, Balázs Trencsényi explores the radicalization of po-
litical style in Europe in the interwar period. His focus is on how intellec-
tuals in Eastern and Central Europe launched a new image of modernity
and crisis, which emphasized the rupture of development and a liminal
period which threatened the community with dissolution, but also car-
ried with it the promise of renovation. While Trencsényi links these dis-
cursive features to the broader ideological framework of ‘antimodernism’
which had a powerful appeal all over Continental Europe throughout
this period, he shows how intellectual élites in Eastern and Central Eu-
rope constructed a distinct local discourse about the crisis of the Western
civilization as a possibility for non-Westerners to redeem a supposedly
youthful East from the declining West and alter the perceived hierarchy
between the two regions. Finally, Trencsényi reflects on the complex
afterlife of the crisis discourses that were launched in interwar Eastern
Europe, pointing, among other things, to the recent promise by Viktor
Orbán to build an ‘illiberal’ Hungarian state.
Drawing on perspectives from the interwar period to the current fi-
nancial crisis, Niklas Olsen illuminates the making of the contemporary
consumer figure in twentieth-century Western European political
thought. His argues that the meaning, role and status ascribed to the
consumer today is, to a great extent, a product of semantic reconstruc-
tions of the figure, which was performed by liberal academics and politi-
cians with the aim of reconstructing liberalism in times of crises. His
contribution focuses specifically on how, in the 1930s, the British econo-
mist William H. Hutt coined the notion of ‘consumers’ sovereignty’ in an
attempt to remedy certain malfunctions that he identified in classic liber-
alism. The result was an updated version of liberalism, based upon con-
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sumers’ sovereignty and a scheme of government intervention, which
aimed to ensure a more equal, just and productive society, and to solve
the ‘crisis of liberalism’. Moreover, Olsen traces how liberal thinkers since
1945 have advanced a concept of the consumer which disconnected
ideals of economic efficiency, utility and growth from those of democra-
cy, equality and moral behaviour. This disconnection, he argues, should
be seen as a contributing factor to the still ongoing economic crisis that
became visible from 2007 onward.
In the following section, historical sociological and sociology of law
approaches are invoked in order to provide structural explanations for
the emergences of societal crises. The three contributions in this section
focus on the relationship between the political and economic dimensions
of society with particular attention being paid to how the failure of stabil-
ising this relationship with the help of legal instruments was a central
cause of both the Weimar and the ongoing crisis trajectory.
Chris Thornhill develops the thesis that the central dimension in the
construction of nations was the integrative function of political, economic
and social rights. Social rights were mainly introduced through corporat-
ist measures based in labour law, which thereby became part of the fun-
damental inclusionary structure of society. From Thornhill’s perspective,
the Weimar Republic was a paradigm case of the attempt to establish a
unified nation through reliance on rights including social rights. Both the
political constitution of the Weimar state and the corporatist economic
and social rights based constitution of the economy, however, remained
half-evolved and were factually not capable of handling the normative
intentions associated with them. The consequence was a move toward
‘hyperpoliticization’, in which public power and public interests were
dismantled and substituted with the advancement of private interests by
powerful economic groups. Thornhill characterizes this development as a
move from inclusionary to exclusionary corporatism, which he sees as a
quite typical example of the problems associated with national inclusion.
In contrast to prevailing theories, he does not see Weimar Germany as
representing a highly distinctive Sonderweg (special path), but rather as a
paradigmatic case of the failure of national inclusion strategies.
Departing from Hugo Sinzheimer’s seminal Weimar text The Crisis of
Labour Law (Die Krisis des Arbeitsrechts) of 1933, Ruth Dukes picks up the
baton from Thornhill by exploring how the notion of conflict has evolved
within labour law. In the Weimar context, a highly conflictual relation
could be observed between labour law and the private law (bürgerliches
Recht) framework guiding the wider economy. This conflict was exacer-
bated by the Great Depression and the policies of the late Weimar Repub-
lic, effectively leading to a breakdown in the capacity of labour law to
serve as a framework for protective and emancipative measures. This
conflict constellation, Dukes argues, has reemerged in recent decades
through policies aimed at breaking down the ability of labour organiza-
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tions to serve as frameworks for stability and for the protection of em-
ployees. Since the heydays of Thatcherism and the subsequent New La-
bour and Third Way era, the conflictual relationship between capital and
labour has been underemphasized. Instead, a ‘divide and rule strategy’
has been imposed in order to prevent the (re)emergence of a unified
representation of labour interests. According to Dukes, this development
has greatly increased the vulnerability and sense of insecurity of large
segments of the citizenry in the Western world.
Poul F. Kjaer examines the close link between the emergence of soci-
etal crises and the evolution of intermediary institutions in their corporat-
ist, neocorporatist and governance variants in the European context.
Intermediary institutions, he argues, assume a strategic location in soci-
ety, in so far as they are central sites of social integration as well as dis-
integration. The ‘turn to corporatism’ which unfolded throughout inter-
war Europe implied a move toward a short-circuiting and dismantling of
the legal infrastructure through which the relationship between public
power and the rest of society was structured. The result was a process of
mutual decay and disintegration of the normative and institutional
underpinnings of both the economy and the political system. The neocor-
poratist reconstitution of society which unfolded at both the national and
the transnational level of Western society in the immediate post-WWII
era was aimed at rectifying this development. The ‘turn to governance’
which, as a response to the crises of the 1970s, started to unfold from the
late 1970s onward has, however, implied a return to many of the issues
known from the interwar period. Also in today’s society, Kjaer argues, a
(re)privatization of public power contributing to an increased erosion of
its integrity can be observed.
The gradual shift from a focus on the crisis of the interwar years to the
contemporary crisis in the previous section is reinforced in the next sec-
tion, which takes issue with the crisis of the rule of law within the EU, its
member states and beyond.
Christian Joerges reconstructs the intellectual lineages of the ordolib-
eralist tradition from Weimar Germany to the Euro crisis. Ordoliberalism
became come il faut in the post-WWII period where it was regarded as a
legal theoretical response to the disaster of Weimar. Today, ordoliberal-
ism is, however, mainly associated with the austerity policy advanced by
the German government within the framework of the Euro crises.
Joerges, nevertheless, argues that ongoing policies in relation to the euro-
crises have little to do with ordoliberalism. The policy response to the
Euro crises is, instead, characterized by discretionary and delegalized
managerialism. The transnational executive machinery which has been
established as a reaction to the Euro crises largely operates outside the
realm of the rule of law. It is, according to Joerges, a framework which is
devoid of any inherent normative foundation, and, as such, it threatens to
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undermine the integrity of the EU legal order and thereby the integration
project.
Jan-Werner Müller also illuminates Europe’s ‘rule of law crisis’ within
the EU and its member states. Using Hungary as the most striking exam-
ple, he focuses in particular on the determined destruction of the rule of
law advanced by the present and previous governments of member
states such as Hungary, Poland and Romania in the past half decade.
Müller analyses the reasons and consequences of the particular political
choice made by the EU to frame the developments within these countries
as a ‘rule of law crisis’. He argues that the term rule of law crisis seemed to
be a pragmatic option for the EU policymakers, but that it has made it
difficult for European actors not only to understand the crisis as a serious
political conflict, but also to intervene in what is going on. According to
Müller, the rule of law approach fails to capture the political essence of
the populist movements and governments which aim to undermine core
EU values by offering a conflictual story of good versus evil engaged in a
final battle. The consequences of the situation might be that the supposed
‘rule of law crisis’ becomes permanent, so that the EU comes to house a
group of countries in which fundamental values are continually violated.
Hauke Brunkhorst follows suit by advancing the thesis that the finan-
cial crisis and the interconnected Euro crisis have mutated into a crisis of
parliamentary democracy. This is the case within—as well as beyond—
the borders of Europe. At the heart of the crises, Brunkhorst observes a
conflict between the notion of legal formalism, as advanced by Hans
Kelsen and others in the interwar period, and Schmittian legal dynamism
which transformed law into a mere façade of power politics. Over the
past decades, he argues, legal formalism has lost out both in Europe and
throughout the globe, and it has increasingly been replaced by informal
practices of decision-making which bypass democratic institutions. In
this process, the public sphere has increasingly lost its link to institution-
alized democratic processes, and, in the words of Nancy Frazer, it has
become a weak public sphere. According to Brunkhorst, a re-animation
of democratic politics is what is needed.
In the final section, left- and right-wing political reactions to the ongo-
ing crisis are examined, thereby highlighting the potential consequences
and responses which might emerge from it.
William Scheuerman illuminates conceptual features in recent debates
about the place of extralegal political action in the context of societal
crises. He departs from a distinction between the ‘top-down’ extralegality
of European executive actions during the Euro crisis and the ‘bottom-up’
call for extralegal action by left-wing political movements in the face of
supposedly dire crises. Scheuerman demonstrates how left-wing political
movements justify action outside the law and how these justifications
often reflect specific theoretical arguments in defence of illegal popular
disobedience to government. More specifically, he shows that both the
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‘top-down’ and the ‘bottom-up’ calls for extralegal action are based upon
similar claims about the limits of legality in the face of crisis situations, as
well as strikingly parallel models for how political actors should be ex-
pected to conduct themselves. However, he also points to key normative
differences between executive-level extralegality ‘from above’ and popu-
lar forms of ‘extralegal’ protest from ‘below’, suggesting that defenders
of executive level extralegality should be expected to face a higher bur-
den of proof than those engaged in civil disobedience from ‘below’.
Mikkel Thorup examines crisis perceptions on the contemporary anti-
Muslim right. He uncovers the premise of right-wing violent imaginaries
by dissecting how themes of crisis, treason, internal enemies, European
decline and its culmination in a civil war appear in the writings of con-
temporary right-wing anti-Muslim writers. He further reflects upon what
it means for thinking about crisis, societal decline, culmination, and solu-
tion when these themes are framed within a civil war narrative. A central
argument of his chapter is that the contemporary anti-Muslim right
frames the crisis as a crisis of modernity, which is related to a politicized
experience of loss and defeat from the French Revolution onward. They
are furthermore informed by the specifically modern idea that it is choice
and not destiny that determines the future. Finally, Thorup argues that
the crisis discourse on the far right is linked to the broader governmental
crisis in contemporary Europe, and that it has the potential to undermine
the hitherto dominant ideas of modern Europe as advanced within en-
lightenment and critical theoretical thinking.
The volume ends with a brief conclusion which sums up the findings
and outlines possible pathways for further research and political engage-
ment. Contemporary Europe, it is argued, is at a crossroad, and a funda-
mental reconstitution of its institutions and normative underpinnings is
needed.
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What Time Frame Makes Sense for
Thinking about Crises?
David Runciman
There are a number of fundamental difficulties involved in defining the
scope of crises. These difficulties derive both from the ambiguity inherent
in the term, and also from its current overuse to describe a wide variety
of different political, social and cultural phenomena. These factors are
related: crisis is a difficult concept to pin down not just in spite of its
growing ubiquity as a label for all sorts of different kinds of events, but,
in part, because of its growing ubiquity. In particular, there is a problem of
deciding what marks the start of a crisis and what marks the end of one:
in other words, the question of time frames. This can be seen in relation to
the recent financial crisis (the one that ostensibly started in 2008, though
there are good reasons to dispute that, in many senses, it started long
before). We are now—eight years on—living in an environment that is
routinely described as postcrisis, yet also as containing the ongoing legacy
of the crisis, including the possibility of further iterations of the crisis. If
nothing else, this is evidence of how hard it is to get time frames fixed
when discussing crises: Is it really over or not? However, this is not just a
recent problem. It derives from the historical experience of crisis in both
Europe and the wider world across the twentieth century.
This analysis has something in common with Reinhart Koselleck’s
classic account of the concept of crisis, its historical development and its
resulting ambiguities. ‘The concept remains as multi-layered and ambig-
uous as the emotions attached to it,’ Koselleck wrote.1 He argues that the
fundamental ambiguity lies between the idea of crisis as an acute mo-
ment of choice or bifurcation of possible futures (as in ‘the crisis of the
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disease’), and crisis as an ongoing state of uncertainty or potential peril
(as in ‘the crisis of Western civilization’). In one case, crisis has a focal
point in time; in the other, it is expansive across time and can even be
annexed to the notion of the end of times. Koselleck identifies three pri-
mary sources for the modern conception of crisis: it comes from medi-
cine, where the emphasis is on crisis as a turning point; from economics,
where crisis can mean both an acute breakdown and also an ongoing
malfunction of the system; and theology, where crisis tends to be de-
ployed in eschatological terms and contains within it the notion of imma-
nent or even permanent transfiguration. Together, these different sources
feed into contemporary political uses of the term, which often alternate
between or combine various ideas of crises as both short- and long-term
phenomena, raising immediate, as well as enduring, challenges. Crisis,
Koselleck writes, ‘can be conceptualized as both structurally recurring
and utterly unique’.2
My account here shares this focus on the fundamental temporal ten-
sion in the idea of crisis. But I develop my argument beyond Koselleck in
a number of ways. First, he was interested in how the concept evolved
over the modern period up to the early- to mid-twentieth century. I am
interested in how it has evolved into the twenty-first century. This means
that where the primary political reference point of crisis for Koselleck is
revolution, I am interested in crisis in democratic settings where revolu-
tion is a remote possibility: the recent crises of the established Western
democracies have not carried with them a serious prospect of revolution-
ary upheaval in the traditional sense. So, I will be writing about crisis
against a backdrop of democratic stability, which poses a particular set of
challenges. Second, Koselleck’s primary interest is in the contrast be-
tween the ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ aspects of the idea of crisis, and
between its cosmic and more narrowly secular connotations. I am inter-
ested more specifically in how crises pattern themselves in our discourse
and our imaginations: their beginnings, their endings and their repeti-
tions. Koselleck does not much discuss the problem of framing in these
terms. Third, I am interested in how different temporal conceptions of
crisis react on each other: that is, in how long-term perspectives shape
our conception of the short term, and vice versa. My argument is that a
distinctive feature of the contemporary understanding of crisis is the
interplay and mismatch between different time frames, which creates
particular problems for thinking about our long-term future.
I want to begin with three background difficulties that I take to lie
behind any attempt to fix the time frame of a crisis. The first is definitional.
It is possible to come up with a broad, catchall definition of what we
mean by the word crisis in a way that accommodates its inherent ambigu-
ity. A crisis might be defined as a situation characterized both by funda-
mental threat and fundamental choice. Each needs to be present for it to
count as a crisis. So threat without choice—for instance, in the case of an
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asteroid on a fatal collision course with earth—does not qualify as a
crisis, since the scale of the threat precludes meaningful choice (though a
choice about how to respond in such fateful circumstances—preparation,
resignation, liberation?—could still constitute a crisis situation). Choice
without threat is also insufficient—a decision about what to do with an
unexpected financial windfall is not in itself a crisis, unless the difficulty
of making that decision produces a sense of threat (option paralysis lead-
ing to lost opportunities, for instance). Choice plus threat are necessary,
and both have to be serious. What is meant by serious? It is hard to be
precise, but a serious choice does not have to rule out the possibility of
inaction. Some crises may force a choice between doing something and
doing nothing—as Thomas Paine wrote of the revolutionary crisis of the
early 1790s, ‘there remained no choice but to act with determined vigor
or not to act at all’.3 But inaction needs to be a decision: in situations of
crisis, mindless drift no longer remains an option.
A definition like this accomplishes something, but it does not take us
very far. It leaves unresolved the question of whether crisis is to be iden-
tified with the acute moment of threat/danger/choice or with a more
entrenched or intractable situation. It could be either and it could be both.
Equally, this definition does not help with the knowing of when to mark
the beginning or the end of crises. Does the crisis start with the danger or
with the choice? Does it end when the danger has passed or when the
choice has been made? Choice and threat are unlikely to coincide: threat
is likely to predate choice, and also sometimes to outlast it. But it does not
follow that choice represents the acute moment of crisis and threat, mere-
ly the ongoing condition: it could be the other way round. Take the finan-
cial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath: it is arguable that the moments of
threat have been the most acute—particularly the week following the
collapse of Lehman Brothers when the entire world economy was at
risk—whereas the choices have been more enduring (in the sense that
they keep needing to be made, particularly by policymakers maintaining
a regime of cheap money to prop up deflating economies). Crises are also
different from wars in this respect, though wars produce crises and are
often identified with them. Wars have distinct beginnings and endings.
Crises do not. For instance, WWI was undoubtedly an epic crisis, made
up of a whole series of interlocking and overlapping crises. But it would
be a mistake to identify the crisis of the war with the duration of the war
itself. The crisis—depending on how it was experienced and from what
perspective—was either longer or shorter than that; or both.
This leads to the second background difficulty of fixing the time frame
of a crisis. I will call this problem experiential: the time frame of any crisis
may look very different, depending on who is experiencing it. The crisis
that lead to WWI—the July crisis as it is often called—started earlier, as
experienced in Belgrade or Berlin than in London or Washington. Some
people are closer to the crisis than others, which means it strikes them
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quicker. In relation to the recent financial crisis, it could be argued that
policymakers experienced it sooner than the public, but also got past it
sooner. For those close to power, the focal point of the crisis might well
have been late 2008, when the threat, as they perceived it, was most acute;
or, in the case of the Euro crisis, late 2011/early 2012, as government bond
prices most dramatically diverged. But, for the publics of Western de-
mocracies, the crisis may have been experienced very differently. Most
were unaware of it in 2008 and only discovered it at one remove, since its
most serious effects were unfelt away from centres of power (when the
British Chancellor Alistair Darling, in a newspaper interview in the sum-
mer of 2008, described the economic situation as ‘the worst economic
crisis Britain has faced for 60 years’, this came as news to many people,
who had not recognised it; over time, however, they saw that Darling
was right).4 In many ways, this situation has now been reversed. A large
number of ordinary citizens are still conscious of an ongoing economic
crisis (the squeeze on wages that the British Labour Party has tried to
name ‘the cost-of-living crisis’), while their politicians are telling them
that the crisis is passed.
The third background problem here I will call perspectival, which is
related to the problem of divergent experiences of crisis, but is distinct
because it includes the perspectives of people who have not experienced
the crisis at all. The time frame for thinking about crises may be very
different for those who are experiencing the crisis firsthand compared to
those who are looking at the crisis from the outside. In blunt terms, the
further one is from a crisis the shorter it is likely to appear, because the
absence of immediate experience makes it tempting to mark the begin-
ning and end of the crisis by using arbitrary or fixed moments in time,
whereas experience teaches that crises cannot be measured in this way.
So, as seen from the outside, crises are often identified with wars or other
time-limited events, and demarcated by declarations of war and by peace
treaties. Those closer to these events know that the crisis does not neces-
sarily end when the treaty is signed. Distance here can be understood in
simple geographical terms: the further away, the shorter the crisis looks.
So, for instance, the recent crisis in Ukraine, however it ostensibly ends, is
likely to be perceived as longer-lasting for those in or near Ukraine than
for those much farther removed. However, there is no equivalent correla-
tion between magnitude and distance when perspective is viewed in tem-
poral terms. We stand at varying distances from past crises. But how near
they appear to us is not simply a function of how long ago they hap-
pened. In some ways, the economic crises of the 1930s appeared more
distant as seen from the 1960s than they do today, because in the 1960s it
was possible to believe that the conditions that gave rise to them were
past, whereas today we are more aware of how those conditions can
persist or recur. Of course, in experiential terms, the 1960s were closer to
the 1930s than we are today because there were many people alive then
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with personal memories of the Great Depression, whereas there are rela-
tively few such people alive now. This is why the experiential and the
perspectival need to be distinguished.
These difficulties—definitional, experiential and perspectival—lie be-
hind any attempt to pin down the time frame for thinking about crises.
But I want to identify three further problems that seem particularly perti-
nent when considering the idea of crisis in a contemporary context. They
specifically concern the question of how we experience crises at their
onset, and how hard it is to know whether to take them seriously—
indeed, how hard it is to know whether the onset of the crisis is real or
not. I will identify these difficulties as the problems of ubiquity, unpre-
dictability and (democratic) durability.
Ubiquity: one fundamental difficulty with pinning down the concept
of crisis in contemporary discourse is its increasing overuse to describe a
very wide range of events and circumstances, many of which turn out in
retrospect not to look much like crises at all. There is a tendency to call
any political or economic disturbance or upheaval a crisis, ranging from
elections to scandals to fleeting economic dislocations.5 When a politician
resigns, it is a crisis; when the stock market falls sharply, it is a crisis;
when international tensions rise, it is a crisis. There is, in other words, an
inflationary effect in the ubiquity of the term: by being applied to so
much, it ends up being worth relatively little. In some respects, this is
nothing new. Alexis de Tocqueville described, and mocked, the tendency
to treat every election as a crisis in a chapter of Democracy in America,
which he titled, with deliberate irony, ‘The Crisis of the Election’. Tocque-
ville noted the ferment that accompanied all American elections—the
sense that everything was at stake and the wrong choice would plunge
the country into ruin—and he also noted how quickly the ferment
passed.6 The choice, once made, soon came to appear a superficial one
after the election was over, only for the charade to be repeated next time
around. Tocqueville knew what was primarily responsible for this infla-
tion of language: newspapers. No newspaper ever willingly forgoes the
opportunity to turn a drama into a crisis. Koselleck describes similar
effects at work in Germany in the later nineteenth century, when crisis
became what he calls a ‘catchword’ for any political disturbance and ‘the
frequent changes of chancellors after Bismarck’s fall rapidly led to an
inflationary use of the term “Chancellor crisis”’. (Koselleck also remarks
that contemporaries noticed this inflationary effect and diagnosed a long-
er-standing institutional crisis behind it: a crisis of political superficial-
ity.)7
These inflationary effects have been greatly accelerated during the
past century, when uses of the term crisis have become ever more fre-
quent and more widespread, particularly since the 1960s. From that point
on, alternative vocabularies for talking about political change start to go
into abeyance. One example is the terminology of events (événements) to
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describe dramatic or unexpected political happenings. This terminology
coexisted with the language of crisis for much of the nineteenth and a
large part of the twentieth century (as, indeed, it had been the predomi-
nant term during the eighteenth century). It constituted a rival Franco-
phone discourse to compete with an Anglophone or Germanic one, and it
carried specific Enlightenment connotations of disruption to established
patterns without any commitment to inflated or eschatological signifi-
cance. Its decline coincides with the decline of French as a universal
language of politics and political science. Its last ‘hurrah’ was probably
the worldwide use of the term les événements to describe the student
uprisings of 1968. No one (outside of France) much uses the language of
‘events’ to describe current uprisings or conflicts. It is not ‘the Ukrainian
events’. It is ‘the Ukraine crisis’.
A similar story can be told at the other end of the scale about the
relative decline of the term catastrophe to describe what we now tend to
call crises. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, catastrophe re-
tained a meaning close to crisis to denote a break-point in historical evo-
lution accompanied by the serious threat of disaster. Revolutions, for
instance, were routinely described as catastrophes as well as crises. During
the twentieth century, its use evolved to offer a contrast with the tempo-
ral dimension of crisis, as in this line from Herbert Marcuse: ‘The actual
situation of capitalism is characterized not only by an economic or politi-
cal crisis, but by a catastrophe of the human essence’.8 Now catastrophe
tends to be limited to the description either of personal disaster or of
epochal or environmental calamity.
The result of the inflationary use of the term crisis is to add an extra
element of uncertainty to the events that it has come to describe. At
almost any given moment in twentieth and early twenty-first century
democratic discourse, it is possible to find talk of crisis, including talk of a
‘crisis of democracy’. This is true of periods that we now associate with
relative stability (at least as compared to what was to come after them):
the 1920s, the 1950s and the 1980s. In other words, if you time-slice a
functioning democracy at a particular point, there will be people running
around saying the sky is falling. Democratic freedoms, as Tocqueville
noticed, include the freedom to panic needlessly. Most of these crises, in
retrospect, no longer look like crises to us; they look like examples of
‘crying wolf’.
However, this cannot be the whole story, since not all crisis talk turns
out to be inflated. Significant numbers of crises prove to be genuine, not
only as seen at the time but in retrospect: that is, both the threat and the
choice turn out to be real. This is true of the crises of the 1930s, the 1970s
and the 2000s. There truly are some wolves out there. It is usually not
difficult to know that a crisis is serious once it is properly underway—the
financial crisis of 2008 was unambiguously a real crisis within days of the
Lehman bankruptcy—just as it is not difficult to recognise a genuine
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Broadway hit once it is up and running. The real difficulty is knowing in
advance where the significant crises are likely to come from. This is the
problem of unpredictability. It is very hard to filter from within the surfeit
of crisis talk the specific crisis talk that deserves our attention. The 2008
crisis illustrates this. There was—as there always is—quite a lot of crisis
talk in the run up to 2008, focusing on the perceived shortcomings of
democracy, its failures in the aftermath of the Iraq war, the challenge of
falling voter turnout and growing disengagement with politics: all of
which might be summed up as ‘crisis of legitimacy’ talk. But the crisis
that broke in 2008 turned out to be of a different kind altogether—it was a
crisis not of legitimacy but of liquidity. This crisis has subsequently exac-
erbated many of the problems that were identified before 2008—the per-
ceived crisis of legitimacy has not gone away, and, if anything, it has
worsened as the economic consequences of the 2008 crisis have started to
bite politically. However, the financial crisis of 2008 was one that almost
no one saw coming. In this respect, the surfeit of crisis talk is often a
distraction when it comes to identifying which crises are real. This is
why, despite always being on the lookout for crises, we are still so often
surprised by them.
There is another difficulty: once a crisis is underway, what most often
becomes clear is the nature of the threat; what can remain unpredictable
is the nature of the choice. In particular, what remains hard to fathom
even as a crisis is unfolding is when the choice is being made. During
major crises, forks in the road are sometimes only apparent long after
they have been passed, which does not make them illusory but does
make them hard to judge in real time. Take the example of the very real
political and economic crises that marked the 1970s and are often amalga-
mated into a single, ongoing, global crisis covering almost the entire
decade. The peak of the crisis, as seen at the time, lasted from 1973 to
1975, a period that covers the Oil Shock, Watergate, the onset of the
Indian emergency, stagflation, industrial unrest and widespread political
scandals. The decisive shift looked like it only occurred at the end of the
decade, with the election first of Margaret Thatcher, then of Ronald Rea-
gan, along with the Iranian Revolution, the elevation of Pope John Paul II
and other conspicuous turning points.9 But, in retrospect, the fork in the
road was from 1976 to 1978, when centre-left governments in Britain and
the United States moved toward new forms of fiscal discipline and dis-
tanced themselves from labour movements.10 It is a historically-complex
question to determine how apparent this was at the time to politicians
and policy-makers who were, for the most part, improvising and mud-
dling through. But it is apparent with the benefit of historical perspective.
Finally, there is the fact of democratic durability. The knowledge now
exists at this stage in the historical development of modern democracy
that established democracies (as opposed to new or fragile ones) can
survive even the worst of crises. There are wolves out there; yet notwith-
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standing our democratic habit of ‘crying wolf’, the real wolves get seen
off, too. Western democracy survived the 1930s and the 1970s and the
2000s. It has, thus far, survived everything that has been thrown at it.
Inevitably, this serves to diminish over time the sense of existential threat
posed by crises that get dressed up as existential threats. What can also
get diminished over time is the sense of fundamental choice. One reason
that established democracies have survived the past hundred years is
that they have proved their adaptability, which includes an ability to
adapt toward arbitrary forms of rule in a crisis, and then to adapt back
afterward. This is especially notable during wartime. One of the crucial
lessons of the First World War was that democracies can experiment with
autocracy in ways that autocracies cannot experiment with democracy.11
This lesson has been repeated over the past century: in a crisis, democra-
cies are simply more flexible than rival systems of governments (in large
part, because their leaders are better able to face up to their mistakes,
albeit not always in public). Democratic adaptability blurs the idea of
fundamental choice because it is never clear how fundamental the choice
has been: Was it simply temporary improvization or was it evidence of a
structural shift? This is further complicated by the fact that (as illustrated
by the example of the 1970s) structural shifts often come in the form of
temporary improvizations.
All these features of democratic life—the ubiquity of crisis talk, the
unpredictability of crisis situations, the confusing quality of democratic
improvization—were on display before, during and after the crisis of
2008. We did not move from an absence-of-crisis talk before 2008 to a
surfeit of crisis talk once it was underway: there was plenty of crisis talk
before 2008, but we were invariably worrying about the wrong sort of
crisis. Democratic adaptability kicked in almost immediately, with im-
provized and frequently autocratic solutions (subsequently rubber-
stamped by ad hoc democratic procedures), which succeeded in rescuing
the sinking ship of the financial sector. The notion of fundamental choice
was hard to grasp, because, although the entire crisis was dressed up as
an existential one (Nicolas Sarkozy warned at the height of the Eurozone
crisis in 2012 that the continent was on the brink of returning to the dark
days of the 1930s), the existential moments of choice never quite came
into view.12 As a result, the crisis has both been resolved in a piecemeal
fashion and yet remains unresolved because of the piecemeal nature of
the solution. It is for now unclear whether a structural shift in the organ-
ization of democratic capitalism is being masked by political improviza-
tion or being avoided by means of it.
It is possible to posit upon the basis of this analysis three types of
questions that arise in crisis situations. First, how serious is it? Second,
how are we going to get out of it? Third, is it part of a pattern? They
correspond to the short-, the medium- and the long-term perspectives on
crisis. At any given moment, we want to know whether we should take
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crisis talk seriously. Once enough time has passed to establish that the
crisis is serious, we want to know what to do about it. Once we have
enough distance to compare the crisis to past crises, we want to know
whether this one is likely to be any different. Another way to put this is to
say that the three time frames treat past crises in three different ways:
from a time-slice perspective, past crises are an irrelevance since all we
can hear is the noise of now; from a comparative perspective, past crises
are a useful resource because they can provide pointers toward potential
solutions; from a cyclical perspective, past crises are a reassurance and an
invitation to complacency because they suggest nothing is as bad as it
seems. Day to day, the experience of the 1930s had little impact on the
panicky immediate responses to 2008; month to month, the evidence of
what happened in the 1930s helped policymakers avoid some of the
worst mistakes of their predecessors; decade to decade, the fact that de-
mocracy survived the 1930s makes it easier to believe that democracy can
survive anything, which renders structural change more difficult because
the incentives are muted.
This analysis is deliberately schematic—the reality is clearly more
complex and nuanced than this—but it does allow for one important
conclusion to be drawn about democratic crises. These different ways of
viewing crisis do not merely coexist in a given crisis situation; they go
together. Indeed, they feed off each other. In other words, they are not
rival perspectives, but mutually-reinforcing perspectives. Most straight-
forwardly, ubiquity is related to unpredictability: the noise of crisis talk
makes it harder to spot a real crisis and to register its shape as its unfold-
ing (the recognition that the crisis is real does not stop the crisis talk; if
anything, it accelerates it). But, perhaps more significantly, both the ubiq-
uity and the unpredictability of democratic crises connect to the fact of
democratic durability. There are two aspects to this. First, the surfeit of
crisis noise in democracies is one way of avoiding the buildup of pressure
points in the system: it is a way of letting off steam. For instance, there
was a striking contrast in the response to the overlapping crises of the
1970s between the democratic and nondemocratic parts of Europe. On
the democratic side, crises were talked up, often exaggerated and occa-
sionally treated as terminal; on the nondemocratic side, talk of crisis was
suppressed. Yet it was in the places where the crisis was overplayed that
the system survived; where it was underplayed, the system eventually
collapsed.13 Second, the distracted quality of the democratic response to
crisis goes along with the adaptability of democratic systems in general,
since the lack of a focal point for democratic crises is consistent with the
experimental quality of democratic life and its ongoing restlessness. The
historical evidence of democracy in crisis suggests that the most acute
moments of danger are diluted by the open-endedness of democratic
politics: there is always something else to worry about. Democratic pub-
lics are often jittery and impatient; democratic institutions are subject to
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multiple, overlapping sources of authority; taken together, these disper-
sals of concentrated political attention mean that crises have difficulty
taking hold of the entire system. Democracies do not simply make moun-
tains out of molehills; they also make molehills out of mountains.
This was one of Tocqueville’s fundamental insights into the character
of a successful democracy: the short-termism of democratic politics
creates long-term advantages because it means that no crisis is ever al-
lowed to reach its moment of truth (and, therefore, its moment of ulti-
mate danger). Attention to the immediate problem at hand helps disag-
gregate an existential crisis into a series of more manageable problems.
The worst-case scenarios are forestalled by never being encountered in
full. However, this aspect of democracy also has its own serious disad-
vantages. The first is that short-term time horizons and improvized re-
sponses mean that the resolutions of democratic crises are themselves
fragile and liable to fall apart. The same forces that serve to break up the
crisis—distraction, restlessness, improvization—also serve to break up
the solutions. Second, once the long-term advantage of short-termism
becomes apparent—that is, once the durability of democracy reveals it-
self over time—it can also become self-defeating. As I said earlier, the
reassurance of the long-term story of modern democracy can generate its
own form of complacency: the lesson that nothing is as bad as it seems, or
that no crisis is as big as it looks, will eventually get in the way of the
short-term jitteriness on which it depends. Modern democracies are ca-
pable of panic and smugness at the same time. The short-termism of
democratic politics produces, over time, a sense of its own invulnerabil-
ity. That was the essence of Tocqueville’s diagnosis of American democ-
racy and its inherent flaw.
The crisis of 2008 and beyond conforms to this pattern as well. The
adaptability and flexibility that got us through the worst of the crisis also
got in the way of longer-lasting solutions. Part of the reason that the crisis
is still with us is that democratic experience prevented it from getting bad
enough to trigger structural change. The lingering sense of complacency
emanating from the crisis is the product of a pattern in which the worst is
predicted but never arrives. Yet it is possible that the repetition of this
pattern will eventually prove its own undoing, since there is always a
risk that the worst has merely been delayed, rather than prevented. It is
certainly possible that the worst of the crisis that began in 2008 is yet to
come; or perhaps that some new, entirely unexpected crisis will arrive
that was unanticipated precisely because the temporising solutions to the
crisis of 2008 got in the way of any longer-term perspective. The way to
sum up these difficulties is to say that a short-term perspective is not
inevitably connected to the longer-term advantages of democracy. It may
be that a longer-term perspective is required to rescue us from an over-
dependence on short-term adaptability. However, in twenty-first century
democracies that longer-term perspective is increasingly hard to achieve.
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By way of conclusion, I want to look at ways in which the short- and
long-term perspectives on crisis in democratic societies might be at odds,
rather than in alliance. If this is true, then there are reasons for thinking
that the pattern of crisis—threat, adaptation, recovery, forgetfulness—
that we have seen over the past hundred years is not going to last much
longer.
One kind of divergence between time frames has become clear in the
aftermath of the 2008 crisis: the speed of the response relative to the
slowness of the resolution. It is striking how fast politicians and policy-
makers had to react in the heat of the crisis. Often, it was a question of
hours, rather than days or weeks, for the key decisions to be made.14 This
stands in marked contrast to the length of time it has taken for the effects
of these decisions to play themselves through. Many Western economies
are still stuck in conditions of austerity—encompassing a squeeze both
on wages and on welfare—that was, in part, a consequence of the rapid-
fire response to the immediate threat, with governments taking on large
obligations that then require extended periods of retrenchment to un-
wind. There is, of course, considerable political and economic disagree-
ment about the extent of the constraint under which Western politicians
are operating. Nonetheless, there remains a striking mismatch between
the acuteness of the threat that the crisis posed and the drawn out nature
of the choices that have been imposed as a result. This goes back to the
point that I made earlier about differing experiences and perspectives of
crisis: quick choices and extended commitments are an uneasy mix of
time frames.
This mismatch has some potentially deleterious consequences for de-
mocracy. One is the squeezing out of electoral time frames. Crises have
always posed a challenge for electoral democracy, in that they do not
operate to the rhythms of the electoral cycle. Sometimes, elections come
too soon, making executive action difficult; sometimes, they come too
late, making popular endorsement of emergency measures elusive. The
2008 crisis in the US displayed aspects of both sides of the problem—the
general election barely weeks into the crisis constrained the freedom of
manoeuvre of elected representatives (though not of the incumbent presi-
dent, George W. Bush, who had the advantage of not being up for re-
election); four years was then a long time to wait for the popular endorse-
ment of Barack Obama’s decisions in the early days of his presidency. (In
contrast, the electoral cycle in the US worked against the crisis that fol-
lowed the crash of 1929 in a different way, because it was four years until
the public’s rejection of Herbert Hoover’s response could be given full
expression.) However, there is a wider sense in which the crisis of the
past few years has significantly exacerbated this problem: politicians who
announce that they have only hours to save the banking sector/the Euro/
the economy, yet require decades to restore them to health, leave public
opinion and electoral democracy looking squeezed.
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The interconnectedness of global politics in the twenty-first century
puts a premium on the speed of response to any crisis and also on the
complexity of any possible solution. This creates a further mismatch be-
tween the freedom of manoeuvre demanded by elected politicians and
the restraint that they require of their voting publics. The ever-greater
imperative for delegation of authority in an emergency—much of which
then passes out of the hands of elected representatives and into the hands
of unelected central bankers and other officials—fuels popular mistrust
of democratic politics and the rise of rejectionist or obstructive populist
alternatives. We see this at work in Europe today. It is a chicken-and-egg
situation: crisis produces a disconnect with the time frames of electoral
politics; this disconnect generates new electoral alternatives that feed off
the discontent; their presence makes it harder for politicians to secure the
authority to act, which places a yet greater premium on emergency exec-
utive action, so fuelling further mistrust. It is a very difficult cycle to
break. Wishing for the crisis to get worse—that is, bad enough to realign
the mismatched expectations of politicians and the voting public—in or-
der to get better is playing with fire.
A separate problem of mismatched time frames relates to the time-lag
effects of certain kinds of threats that we face in the twenty-first century.
The pattern of the past century that shows the timeliness of democratic
adaptation to crisis situations—timely in the sense that adaptation tends
to take place just in time, when other alternatives have been exhausted—
depends on the capacity of certain crises to cut through the noise of crisis
talk, producing a sense of perspective. Once it becomes clear that a crisis
is sufficiently serious—as is the case in wartime or under conditions of
widespread economic failure—democracies are good at making the nec-
essary adjustments. But this depends on the experience of crisis being
both accessible and communicable. It is not clear that this pattern maps
onto the threat posed by climate change and other environmental chal-
lenges. There, it seems likely that some action will have to preempt any
widespread experience of the situation as a crisis. If we wait until the
situation is bad enough to be seen as a crisis, it may be too late. The
twentieth-century pattern of short-term adjustments producing long-
term durability will not work if we need to make our short-term adjust-
ments in the light of an anticipated long-term threat. Faith in democratic
adaptability to meet the challenge of climate change—particularly the
assumption that democratic societies always adapt when they need to,
but not before—may, therefore, be a big mistake. This faith is part of the
narrative of growing complacency that I identified as one possible conse-
quence of the knowledge that we now have of democratic durability. The
knowledge that Western democracies have come to possess that they can
survive whatever the world throws at them could yet prove their fatal
flaw.
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Finally, there is the challenge of the new information technology. One
striking feature of the past thirty years has been that the transformative
effects of new forms of communication on society and the economy have
not been matched by similarly dramatic changes in how we do politics.
There is a mismatch between the pace of technological change relative to
the pace of political change, set against a backdrop of democratic stabil-
ity. Recent crises of politics, such as the Eurozone crisis, have had a
technological dimension but have not had an explicit connection with the
most dramatic ways in which our lives have been altered over the same
period (social networks, for instance, have played relatively little role in
crisis politics). In other words, we have had a revolution but it has not
been a political one. The continuing impact of the new information tech-
nology therefore stands at one remove from the cyclical upheavals of
intermittent crises.
So far, the information technology revolution has produced either po-
litical scandals—often caused by the failure of politicians to understand
the new forms of scrutiny to which they are subject—or structural shifts
that have taken place beneath the radar of crisis politics. The revelations
of Edward Snowden are symptomatic of this: the event itself was a scan-
dal but what it revealed was a barely noticed move to forms of surveil-
lance that pose a fundamental threat to some of the basic categories of
democratic politics, including privacy and personal identity. What we
have not had so far are crises of the new technology. Indeed, it is hard to
imagine what such crises might entail. Technological failure—the threat
of systemic collapse—would be potentially catastrophic, but also beyond
the adaptive capacity of democratic systems of government. The sheer
speed of the new technology—high-frequency trading being a conspicu-
ous current example—tends to defy democratic understanding. Yet, in
the absence of a crisis of the new technology, it is hard to see how politi-
cal change will be brought into alignment with its transformative effects.
The time frames of technological change and political response are fun-
damentally out of kilter. The crises that are yet to come will not necessari-
ly address this problem; they may make it worse.
One final remark: all time frames are relative. In this chapter, I have
talked about long-term perspectives to denote insights drawn from the
past two centuries of democratic politics. But, in broader historical
terms—never mind in cosmological terms—two hundred years is the
short run. The historical experience of democracy may be far too brief to
draw meaningful long-term lessons. It may also be about to come to an
end.15 The language of crisis does not seem sufficient to capture this kind
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The Stakes of Crisis
Janet Roitman
WHAT IS AT STAKE?
On 20 January 2009, upon having been sworn in as the forty-fourth Presi-
dent of the United States, Barack Obama stood on the Washington Mall
and proclaimed, ‘We are in the midst of crisis’. Obama’s claim to crisis
characterized a moment in history, so as to mark off a new age, or a
‘journey’. This journey is historical in so far as it pertains to an economic
and political conjuncture. And yet, after giving an inventory of the histor-
ical facts of crisis—homes lost, jobs shed, businesses shuttered—Obama
added a qualifier: ‘These are the indicators of crisis,’1 he said, ‘subject to
data and statistics. Less measurable but no less profound is a sapping of
confidence across our land—a nagging fear that America’s decline is in-
evitable, and that the next generation must lower its sights.’ He then
concluded: ‘This is the source of our confidence—the knowledge that
God calls upon us to shape an uncertain destiny’.
Such knowledge in the face of uncertainty implies that the historical
crisis entails, or perhaps constitutes, a transhistorical journey, being, as
he insisted in his closing words, a matter of hope and grace:
With hope and virtue, let us brave once more the icy currents and
endure what storms may come. Let it be said by our children’s children
that, when we were tested, we refused to let this journey end, that we
did not turn our back, nor did we falter; and with eyes fixed on the
horizon and God’s grace upon us, we carried forth that great gift of
freedom and delivered it safely to future generations.
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Crisis is a historical event as much as it is an enduring condition of life
and even the grounds for a transcendent human condition.
Obama sought to convey to the American public that the crisis could
not be reduced to an ensemble of socioeconomic indicators because these
conditions of life entail an experience of crisis. His secular narrative of
human history is conjugated with a Christian narrative of witnessing.
And yet it echoes secular accounts in the social sciences that attempt to
relate the ways in which history can be characterised as crisis and the
ways that social life can be said to be ‘in crisis’. But the question arises: If
crisis designates something more than a historical conjuncture, what is the stat-
us of this term? How did crisis, once a signifier for a critical, decisive
moment, come to be construed as a protracted historical and experiential
condition? The very idea of crisis as a condition suggests an ongoing state
of affairs. But can one speak of a state of ‘enduring crisis’? Is this not an
oxymoron?
This chapter is a reflection on the status of the term crisis as the most
common and most pervasive qualifier of contemporary historical condi-
tions, and even of ‘history’ itself.2 However, in what follows, I am not
concerned to theorise the term crisis or to produce a working definition of
it. Rather than essentialize it so as to make better use of it, I seek to
understand the kinds of work that the term crisis is or is not doing in the
construction of narrative forms. Therefore, I am not concerned to show
how contemporary uses of the term are wrong and hence argue for a true,
or more correct meaning and usage. As will be made clear below, crisis
serves as the noun formation of contemporary historical narrative; it is a
non-locus from which to claim access to history and knowledge of histo-
ry.
For clarification, I turn to the late German historian Reinhardt Kosel-
leck, author of perhaps the only conceptual history of crisis, which thus
serves as the authoritative historiography.3 Koselleck provides one illus-
tration of the emergence of ‘history’ as a temporal category. He maintains
that, by the end of the eighteenth century, crisis is the basis for the claim
that one can judge history by means of a diagnosis of time. This claim and
this judgement entail a specific historical consciousness, which posits his-
tory as a temporality upon which one can act. As I will clarify below, and
following from what Koselleck deems the modern practice of temporal-
ized concepts, in the social sciences, crisis is conceived as a historical
concept: it is taken to be both a particular entry point into history (a
means to know what phenomena are truly ‘historical’) and as a means to
reveal historical truth (as a turning point or epistemological impasse). In
other words, in the social sciences, when history is taken to be immanent to
social relations, crisis serves as the term that enables the very elaboration of what
we call history.
It is important to note that I take Koselleck’s conceptual history of
crisis to be indicative of the practice of the concept of crisis. His account of
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how crisis achieves status as a historico-philosophical concept illustrates
the practice of the premise of crisis, or how it serves a set of interlocking
determinations: what counts as an event, the status of an event, the qual-
ification of history itself, and the basis of narration. I therefore refer to
Koselleck’s conceptual history on two registers: as the orthodox
historiography of the term, and as an account that itself partakes of a
conventional practice of historiography. This conventional practice of
historiography presupposes criteria for what counts as an event and
premises as to what can be narrated—or the means to distinguish be-
tween ‘a properly historical account of reality and a nonhistorical or ahis-
torical or antihistorical account’.4 My point is not that crisis is false or
merely a constructed basis for narration; my aim is to raise questions
about the status of the concept of crisis as a founding term for the elab-
oration of ‘history’ per se—what is posited as the ultimate locus of signifi-
cance.
In its practice, as we learn from Koselleck, crisis is figured as judge-
ment: judging time in terms of analogous intervals, and judging history
in terms of its significance. One can then ask, inspired by Koselleck and
yet putting the question to him as well: What is the burden of proof for
such judgements? By way of response, I consider how crisis evokes a
moral demand for a difference between the past and the future, such that
the very apprehension of history is defined by the negative occupation of
an immanent world: What went wrong? Crisis is at the basis of social and
critical theory in so far as it signifies the dissonance between morality and
progress, knowledge and human interests, or the limits of intelligibility:
critique and crisis are cognate terms. Crisis thus serves the practice of
unveiling latencies; it is a distinction that transcends oppositions and
dichotomies. In this sense, there is not ‘crisis’ and ‘noncrisis’, which can
be observed empirically; rather, crisis is a logical observation that gener-
ates meaning in a self-referential system, or a non-locus from which to
signify contingency and paradox.
Ultimately, I invite the reader to put less faith in crisis, which means
asking what is at stake with crisis in and of itself. Crisis is a term that is
bound up in the predicament of signifying human history, typically serv-
ing as a transcendental placeholder in ostensible solutions to that prob-
lem. It is a primary enabling blind spot for the production of knowledge.
Making this blind spot visible means asking questions about how we
produce significance for ourselves. At the least, it means asking how we
produce ‘history’. At most, it means asking how we might construct ac-
counts without discerning historical significance in terms of ethical fail-
ure. An answer to this question requires, as an inaugural step, considera-
tion of the ways in which crisis, as an enabling blind spot for the produc-
tion of knowledge, entails unremitting and often implicit judgement




The very etymology of the term crisis speaks to the requirement of judge-
ment. Its etymology originates with the Ancient Greek term krinô (to
separate, to choose, to cut, to decide, to judge), which suggested a defini-
tive decision. With significance in the domains of law, medicine and
theology, by the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, the medical signification
prevailed. Associated with the Hippocratic school (Corpus Hippocratum)
as part of a medical grammar, crisis denoted the turning point of a dis-
ease, or a critical phase in which life or death was at stake and called for
an irrevocable decision. Significantly, crisis was not the disease or illness
per se; it was the condition that called for decisive judgement between
alternatives.
Reinhart Koselleck’s conceptual history describes a decisive shift in
the semantics of crisis, transpiring between Hippocratic medical gram-
mar and Christian exegesis. Not surprisingly, one did not replace the
other: in the elaboration of Christian theology, with reference to the New
Testament and alongside Aristotelian legal language, krisis was paired
with judicium and came to signify judgement before God, which Kosel-
leck characterises as possibly the unsurpassable signification of crisis in
the course of its conceptual history, thus indicating how the secular term
partakes of a Christian theological grammar.5 Through the history of its
conceptual displacements—involving the elaboration of semantic webs
as opposed to a linear development of substitutions6—the term crisis
comes to entail prognosis, which increasingly implies a prognosis of time.
Koselleck’s account of this semantic shift is part of his œuvre on the
emergence of the European concept of history and the ways in which its
associated historico-political concepts (e.g., progress) thematize time.7
With the temporalisation of history—or the process by which, since the
late eighteenth century, time is no longer figured as a medium in which
histories take place, but, rather, is itself conceived as having a historical
quality—history no longer occurs in time; rather, time itself becomes an
active, transformative (historical) principle.8 This is more than just a nov-
el manner of defining and representing history per se. The historical per-
spective, which allows for the identification and judgement of a temporal
situation, is itself taken to have a temporal quality, making the truth of
history contingent, not given once and for all. This now familiar point is
based upon the assumption that time is constantly being produced and
that it is always new: the future is fundamentally open.9
But this constant production of the new, or of new time, is not without
the production of new pasts. In order to incorporate new experiences into
one’s own history—inspired by awareness of an elsewhere and by the
very idea that one constructs history—one must be able to conceive of the
past in terms of its radical or fundamental difference. Crisis comes to sig-
nify the marking out of ‘new time’ in so far as it denotes a unique, immanent
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transition phase, or a specific historical epoch. The somewhat odd practice of
the retrospective recognition of the past as new—an epoch can only be
recognized as such (i.e., in its ‘true significance’ for history) ex post facto—
distinguishes this ‘epochal consciousness’ and the philosophy of history
of the late eighteenth century.
Crisis, as a historical concept, refers to the retrospective effects of
events and to their constitutive presuppositions.10 For this epochal con-
sciousness, crisis is a criterion for what counts as ‘history’.11 While typical
to an eighteenth-century philosophy of history and a corresponding con-
ceptualisation of history in terms of progress, this epochal consciousness
is nevertheless very familiar to us; it is in keeping with common contem-
porary usage of the term as a turning point, or as an iterative, periodizing
concept. In this instance, crisis is defined as both entirely specific—be-
cause it defines a historical epoch—and as structural recurrence—be-
cause it establishes and fulfils the notion that historical change takes
place in analogous forms.
This illustration of the temporalization of history, or the emergence of
‘history’ as a temporal category, demonstrates how the term crisis,
through semantic displacement, becomes the basis for the claim that one
can judge history by means of a diagnosis of time. Koselleck likewise
maintains that both this claim and this judgement entail a specific histori-
cal consciousness—a consciousness that posits history as a temporality upon
which one can act. For this historical consciousness, crisis is a criterion for
what counts as ‘history’; crisis signifies change, such that crisis ‘is’ histo-
ry; and crisis designates ‘history’ as such. In this way, crisis achieves the
status of a historico-philosophical concept; it is the means by which histo-
ry is located, recognized, comprehended, and even posited. And because
the concept of history, in and for itself, requires a referent from which
movement, transformation, and change—historical change itself—can be
posited, crisis, as a freestanding historico-philosophical concept, takes the
role of a transcendental referent.
What we forget when invoking this scholastic sense of the term is its
theological genealogy, reinstated by Koselleck,12 and which entails ex-
pectations for world-immanent history.13 But what is expected of histo-
ry? History, in its immanence, becomes a problem of meaning. In other
words, the emergence of crisis as an historical concept occluded practices
of prophecy in favour of practices of prognosis, thus raising the issue of
the burden of proof for meaning in history, and for the meaning, or
significance, of history itself. Through the invocation of the term crisis as
a historically unique transition phase which marks an epoch, historical
experience is likewise generalised as a logical recurrence. Judging time
(sorting change from stasis, perceiving intervals) and judging history (di-
agnosing demise or improvement, defining winners and losers) is a mat-
ter of prognosis. And such prognosis depends upon the stabilisation of ‘a
single concept limited to the present with which to capture a new era that
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may have various temporal beginnings and whose unknown future
seems to give free scope to all sorts of wishes and anxieties, fears and
hope’.14
THE MORAL DEMAND
The very notion that one could judge historical time—that it presents
itself to us as an entity to be judged—and that history is defined by a
teleology of justice—that there are winners and losers, errors and victo-
ries—conjures an extraordinarily self-conscious mode of being. The
emergence of this particular form of historical self-consciousness is the
subject of Koselleck’s first book, Critique and Crisis, in which he presents a
conceptual history of the mutual constitution of those two cognate con-
cepts: critique and crisis.15 His aim is to illustrate that this historical self-
consciousness is related to what he defines as a specifically modern atti-
tude toward politics.16
Koselleck puts forth the counterintuitive argument that, over the
course of the eighteenth century, a novel distinction was formulated be-
tween morality and politics, which allowed for what he terms the ‘exclu-
sion of morality from politics’17 or the emergence of a distinct realm that
constitutes ‘society’ and which, being invested with Natural Law, marks
off a self-proclaimed ‘moral society’ from politics. This disassociation
between political and moral authority is generally—and uncritically18—
assumed to be an actually occurring ‘great separation’, which is qualified
as ‘the crisis’ that marked off new time, or secular history. This notional
separation between morality (conscience) and politics (the state) has con-
sequences for manners of positing social change, which comes to be
understood as transpiring via rational persuasion and the telos of reason,
and thus from outside the institutions of the state. Thus, Koselleck illus-
trates the conversion of the Masonic Lodges and the Republic of Letters
from ‘enclaves of internal exile’ in the realm of the absolutist state to
‘centres of moral authority’ in eighteenth-century France. In the political
transformation of these moral societies, claims to ‘political legitimacy
[grow] out of moral innocence’19—a statement about politics that rings as
a truism to our twenty-first-century ears, perhaps most recently in Barack
Obama’s inauguration speech.
Of course, one can put many questions to Koselleck’s portrayal of
these debates: Does he not assume both the efficacy and historical ade-
quacy of ‘the Enlightenment’ as a political project? Does he not assume a
premodern versus modern distinction? Does he not portray the distinc-
tion between morality and politics in absolute terms, which is a fallacy?
Doesn’t his conceptual history partake of a teleological understanding of
historical development? And does he not affirm a misleading—and even
Orientalist—divide between modern historical consciousness, on the one
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hand, and a theological Middle Ages incapable of history, on the other?20
These questions are well-founded. Nonetheless, if not taken as truth cor-
respondence theory of history, Koselleck’s illustration sheds light on the
various fault lines that gave rise to a form of political utopianism based
upon the juxtaposition between immortality and innocence, or between
what is thought to be a corruption and what is taken as natural. And, as I
noted earlier, his account is indicative of the practice of the concept of crisis, or
how the premise of crisis serves a set of interlocking determinations:
what counts as an event, the status of an event, the qualification of histo-
ry itself and the basis of narration.
The triumph of reason through the pure authority of private verdicts
over both politics and the state entails a notion of historical progress that
is necessarily a form of moral progress, posing the ultimate challenge of
emancipation. Self-rule, as an ethical principle, is generalized as a public,
political demand, based upon the assumption that ‘inner freedom’ is real-
ised in the external world. This principle amounts to the plainly incon-
gruous demand for ‘a complete and total liberation of human beings
from human rule’.21 What would be the burden of proof for such a de-
mand? Koselleck notes that this burden of proof, as produced through
reason, would have to be free of logical self-contradiction. By the end of
the eighteenth century, the grounds for such proof had shifted from natural
law to the historical future:
The transformation from personal rule into rational custodianship may
be empirically demonstrated: such an expected, contested, and antici-
pated liberation of human beings from human subordination, in other
words, their redemption within history or the negation of alienation.22
This European challenge, he argues, became a world historical chal-
lenge.23
Koselleck’s general point is that political utopianism entails a philoso-
phy of history: the morally just and rational planning of history coincides
in a hoped for future, and the achievement of that future requires an
interpretation of the relationship of the present to the past. He asks, as
noted in the previous section of this chapter, what history itself might be,
if it is established from the distance of time. And his reply is that it is a
matter of a moral demand for a difference between the past and the
future.24 And, for Koselleck, this demand—or the positing of a transcen-
dent that accommodates the idea that humanity can devise its own desti-
ny—produces ‘crisis’, and it does so in two ways.25 First, it is a philoso-
phy of history that allows one to posit the very possibility of a ‘break’
with the past. His central thesis is that, with the French Revolution, the
conviction that conclusions about the past are necessary to an under-
standing of the future is challenged by the idea that the future is indis-
cernible. The Revolution thus represents a new mode of consciousness of
history as crisis.26 Second, and equally novel, is the practical mode of
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social action that this historical consciousness entails: one can act ‘on’
history to transform it, which, for Koselleck, denotes a distinctly modern
way of postulating the relationship between theory and practice.27
The concept of critique, as understood by the end of the eighteenth
century—that is, not as criticism of the state or of political policy, but as a
judgement of the validity of institutions and concepts themselves—de-
fines this manner of understanding the relationship between theory and
practice. As an alleged universal standard of judgement, through the
exercise of reason to resolve historical contingency, critique engendered
what Koselleck sees as a form of ‘hypocrisy’ because the depiction of
political crisis as the logical outcome of historical progress obscures the
contingent political significance of such critique.28 In this sense, perpetual
critique—of oneself via moral conscience and of the world against a stan-
dard of reason—is coterminous with a perpetual state of crisis. Critique
makes the future ‘a maelstrom’, says Koselleck.29 In other words, the
constant quest to authenticate the supreme authority of reason transpires
through the perpetual process of critique, which is based upon the idea of
duty toward the future and motivated by faith in the yet-to-be-discov-
ered truth. Crisis invokes a moral demand for a difference between the
past and the future. And this critical historical consciousness—or the
specific, historical way of knowing the world as ‘history’—discerns sig-
nificance in terms of ethical failures: ‘What went wrong?’30
THE BLIND SPOT
With reason as our judge, we are consumed with the problem of estab-
lishing the validity of claims to critique, which makes faith in deliverance
the uncertain terms of our historical self-consciousness. Of course, the
grounds for human progress have been subject to suspicion for several
centuries. Historical narratives produced by ‘Enlightenment rationalists’
themselves displayed the form of irony associated with a self-critical
awareness and an ethics of scepticism.31 And by the end of the nineteenth
century, despite faith in technological progress, the search for general
causes in history, or a philosophy of history, was deemed by many a
forsaken enterprise. But what is obscured in denunciations of the notion
of historical progress and the disavowal of noncontingent grounds for
judgement is the way in which the temporal understanding of theory and
practice remains contingent upon the concept of crisis. The concept of
crisis is bound to its cognate ‘critique’ and is established, as a concept,
through the very widespread, but strange, idea that history could be
alienated in terms of its philosophy—that is, that one could perceive a
dissonance between historical events and representations of those events.
Of course, contemporary modes of immanent critique take into ac-
count this problem of presuming a dissonance between history and a
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philosophy of history, or simply between history and representation.32
The very critique of reason, which notes that there are no epistemological
or philosophical foundations for securing rationality beyond its contin-
gent or partial manifestation—or no Archimedean point of observation
and validation, no position from which to transcend history33 —is itself a
rational critique, or ‘performative contradiction’ arising from self-referen-
tiality. With the generalisation of this reflexive disposition, the problem
of self-grounding, or the legitimation of theories in terms of the very
distinctions (e.g., rational versus irrational) that permit their elaboration,
leads to infinite regress. This dilemma of self-grounding and legitimation
is taken to be the ‘crisis of modernity’34 defined by the problem of mean-
ing (‘lost meaning’) and alienation—the grounds for critical reason re-
main the fundamental source of crises for modern society.
And when the grounds for critical reason migrate to the even more
unstable lands of partial and local truths, crisis is not solved. To the
contrary, the concept of crisis is a prime mover in, for example, poststruc-
turalist thought: while truth cannot be secured, it is nonetheless per-
formed in moments of crisis, when the grounds for truth claims are sup-
posedly made bare and the limits of intelligibility are potentially trans-
gressed. Thus, epistemological crisis is defined as a ‘crisis over what
constitutes the limits of intelligibility’,35 inspiring scholars, including
me,36 to take crisis as the starting point for narration. Following the work
of Michel Foucault, we assume that if we start with the disciplinary con-
cepts or techniques that allow us to think ourselves as subjects—that
enable us to tell the truth about ourselves—then limits to ways of know-
ing necessarily entail epistemological crises.37 From this point of view,
subject formation transpires through crisis: that is, crisis, or the disclosure
of epistemological limits, occasions critique, and potentially gives rise to
counter-normativities.38 Crisis signifies a discursive impasse and the po-
tential for a new form of historical subject. Crisis is a means to transgress
and is necessary for change or transformation. In keeping with this, be-
cause reason has no end other than itself, the decisive duty of critique is
essentially to produce crisis—to engage in the permanent critique of
one’s self, or to be in critical relation to normative life—which is a form of
ethics and a virtue.39
Meaning, significance, and truth are, of course, problems—it seems
that they constitute our condition of crisis and are addressed by reflection
on the possibility for critique. But this category of crisis, so integral to the
production of new forms and the very intelligibility of the subject, is
never problematized, despite its cognate and historical-semantic relation-
ship to critique. Apparently, for scholars past and present, attention to
the problem of the grounds for critique has eclipsed the seemingly less
imperative question of the grounds for positing crisis. This is curious:
Why should crisis, as a category, be so self-evident? How is it that the
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grounds for critique became the defining problem of epistemology while
the grounds for thinking the human condition in terms of crisis did not?
Unable to establish the noncontingent grounds from which to claim
critique, truth is necessarily immanent, and critique is consigned to the
constant unveiling of latencies.40 The latter have been characterized in
terms of invisible relations, false consciousness, ideologies, naturalised
categories, or normalization. Even when the criterion for truth is no long-
er defined in terms of the logic of noncontradiction, or internal consisten-
cy, critique is thought to occur through paradox: through the purging of
contradiction and paradox; through the commitment obstinately to dem-
onstrate the paradox of power, or the necessary exclusions (the Other,
nonsovereigns) that expose the foundations of power to be contingent
suppositions.
But if current scholarship claims to no longer place faith in reason as
the basis for validity, a critical perspective is nevertheless achieved
through second-order observation—that is, observing observations from
a standpoint that is observable. As Niklas Luhmann has demonstrated
consistently, this is not a matter of empirical observations, but rather a
matter of logical observations, which are distinctions and which are
meaning-constituting. Crisis is just one distinction. Significantly, this
practice of observation, or distinction, does not proceed from binaries or
oppositions. For example, my own claim is that it cannot be the case that
there is crisis/noncrisis, both of which can be observed. Rather, ‘crisis’ is a
distinction that transcends oppositions between knowledge and experi-
ence, or subject and object; it is a distinction that generates meaning
precisely because it contains its own self-reference.41 As Luhmann notes:
‘What can be distinguished by means of these distinctions will become
“information”’.42
That is to say, from my point of view, the term crisis establishes second-
order observation; it is not an object of first-order observation.43 This
external reference for judgement in a necessarily self-referential system—
or a distinction that generates and refers to an ‘inviolate level’ of order
(not crisis)—is seen to be contingent (historical crises) and yet is likewise
posited as beyond the play of contingency, being a logical necessity that
is affirmed in paradox (the formal possibility of crisis).44
Without doing justice to the depths of Luhmann’s work, suffice it to
underscore the point that, in a world that is posited as an immanent field
of observations, one is necessarily in a self-referential system which is
unavoidably paradoxical.45 That is, if we take ourselves to be without a
position from which to observe society in its totality, there can be no
universal principles, but only self-referential principles, which are un-
avoidably paradoxical. Habitually posited as a logical contradiction, par-
adox is a foundational sign for an order without an origin. In other
words,
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all knowledge and all action have to be founded on paradoxes and not
on principles; on the self-referential unity of the positive and the nega-
tive—that is, on an ontologically unqualifiable world.46
Without recognition of these conditions of paradox, standards for evalu-
ating social conditions produce descriptions and judgements in terms of
pathology—as deficient but not as merely paradoxical.47
Crisis is an enabling blind spot for the production of knowledge.48 It is
a distinction that, as least since the late eighteenth century, and like all
latencies, is not seen as an enabling paradox, but, rather, as an error or
deformation—a discrepancy between the world and knowledge of the
world. But if we take crisis to be a blind spot, or a distinction that makes
certain things visible and others invisible, it is merely a priori. Crisis is
claimed, but it remains a latency; it is never itself explained because it
requires the further reduction to other elements, such as capitalism, the
economy, politics, culture, subjectivity. In this sense, crisis is not a condi-
tion to be observed (loss of meaning, alienation, faulty knowledge), it is
an observation that produces meaning. More precisely, it is a distinction
that secures ‘a world’ for observation or, in Obama’s terms, the grounds
for testing.49
WHAT WENT WRONG?
William Rasch sums up our dilemma concisely:
We have become distinctly suspicious of transcendental attempts to
construct inviolate and panoramic levels of vision labeled God, Reason,
or Truth. Yet, because of political or moral commitments, we are equal-
ly disinclined to relinquish ‘critical’ perspectives from which we pre-
sume not only to see the world as it is but also to utter judgments about
its inadequacy.50
Even if a critical perspective is relegated to provisional ends, and thus
applies itself to ‘bearing witness’ to difference and partial interests, these
exclusions (the Other, the nonsovereign) are apprehended in terms of
negative integration.51 The reflexive stance, which recognises the contin-
gency of its observations and accounts for the ways in which the observer
itself constructs its object of investigation, has similar implications. This
means that the various disciplines of the social sciences are no longer
defined by their object of inquiry: sociology is, for the most part, no
longer the positivistic study of ‘society’. In the place of disciplinary ob-
jects, we have constitutive questions.52 The obvious constitutive question
is framed in terms of the conditions of possibility for a given situation,
practice, institution, et cetera. The less obvious but equally pervasive con-
stitutive question is ‘What went wrong?’
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The claim to crisis is structuring: by positing crisis, certain questions
can be asked, while others are foreclosed. To return to Obama’s declara-
tion on the Washington Mall, the referenced ‘historical crisis’ was the
subprime mortgage market for which, answers to the question ‘What
went wrong?’, have been located either in the systemic nature of capital-
ism (the business cycle, the falling rate of profit) or in the moral failings of
speculative finance capital (producing ‘bubbles’ of false value). These
interpretations do not consider the ways in which the crisis itself is not
intrinsic to a system or the result of a teleology, but is, instead, a distinc-
tion that produces meaning. Thus, for example, the massive devaluation
of real estate values (and not their ‘natural’ tendency to diminish) re-
sulted in a tide of home foreclosures, which was seen as the natural result
of an insufficiently collateralised debt market. However, the decision by
the banking industry and the American government to define economic
conditions in terms of crisis at a particular moment was motivated by ques-
tions regarding interbank loans and guarantees for bank debt. Naming
this situation ‘crisis’ implies that what was once perfectly intelligible and
construed as productive (debt is a credit) is now taken to be without basis
and construed as a negative value form (debt is a toxic asset).
Answers to the question ‘What went wrong?’ are devised according to
the ‘is-versus-ought’ distinction inherent to paradox. This means that post
hoc analyses in terms of crisis necessarily entail an assumed teleology
based upon alleged ‘moments of truth’. Crisis is mobilised in narrative
constructions to mark out such ‘moments of truth’, which are defined as
turning points in history, when decisions are made or events are decided,
thus establishing a particular teleology. They are frequently also defined
as instances when ‘the real’ is made bare, such as when a so-called finan-
cial bubble has seemingly burst, thus divulging alleged ‘false value’
based upon speculation and revealing ‘true value’, or the so-called funda-
mentals of the economy. As a category denoting a moment of truth in
these ways, and despite presumptions that crisis does not imply, in itself,
a definite direction of change, the term crisis implies a certain telos—that
is, it is inevitably, though most often implicitly, directed toward a norm.
Evoking crisis entails reference to a norm because it requires a compara-
tive state for judgement: Crisis compared to what?
In the case of subprime mortgages, such analyses entail assumptions
about how ‘the market’ should function and conjecture about how devia-
tions from ‘true’ market value were produced. These analyses do not
account for the ways in which value produced by specific financial prod-
ucts results from an assemblage of markets, or coordinated modes of
evaluation and calculation.53 Such coordination is not merely the product
of the law of capitalism or the efficient market; it arises from specific
technical practices, such as underwriting, accounting, and risk manage-
ment, allowing debt to be figured as a fungible asset in the first place. To
say that capitalism or the market is ‘in crisis’ presumes a prior state of
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affairs in which prices reflected true value (when would this be for the US
housing market?), and that capital and labour were allocated properly
(when would this have been obtained in the United States?). Reference to
a ‘financial crisis’ with respect to the subprime mortgage market only
serves to unify the disparate modes of evaluation that are essential to the
coordination of specific chains of valuation and calculation, which merit
systematic study.
This is a point of reflection for claims to a ‘sovereign debt crisis’ in
various European states—and most obviously in Greece today. Asking
‘What went wrong?’—and thus acceding to the crisis narrative—leads, in
a nutshell, to condemnation of fiscal irresponsibility and the imposition
of austerity measures. Other questions related to the production of value
in the Eurozone are not articulated. For instance, the ways in which the
Eurozone functions much like a gold standard system and is thus struc-
tured to preclude inflationary measures or devaluation as adjustment
mechanisms, leaving default or deflation/austerity as the only options,
has not been much debated. Moreover, ‘Greek debt’ is the product of the
global banking system, enabled by the effective adoption of the strong
German credit rating (with the adoption of the Euro) and the consequen-
tial massive appeal of Greek sovereign bonds for European banks, which
led to extremely effective wealth production. Mark Blyth explains this
process and notes that, even when sovereign bond yields converged,
if you swapped out your low-yield German and Dutch debt and re-
placed it with as much PIIGS [Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and
Spain] debt as you could find, and then turbocharged that by running
operating leverage ratios as high as 40 to 1—higher than your US
counterparts—you would have one heck of an institutionally guaran-
teed money machine. . . . As such, the more risk you took onto your
books, especially in the form of periphery sovereign debt, the more
likely it was that your risk would be covered by the ECB, your national
government, or both.54
Indeed, the subprime mortgage market and related secondary markets
were structured such that leveraging and hedging practices embraced
risk. Instead of systemic and ethical failure, we had pragmatic practices
of wealth creation and a specific decision to claim crisis so as to recapital-
ise the private banking system by means of public funds.55
In eliding the study of these pragmatic practices, reference to ‘crisis’
can only identify the historical significance of the contemporary situation
in terms of systemic and ethical failures.56 But this does not mean that
crisis claims and crisis narratives are mere representations, to be com-
pared to more accurate terrain. They are distinctions that locate contra-
diction and paradox so as to establish the grounds for the ‘is-versus-
ought’ of critique. In lieu of devotion to reconciling such paradox, one
might prefer to consider what it would take to ‘reconcile ourselves to the
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inevitability of antinomies’.57 It would follow that the aim is not to invali-
date crisis or to critique the term as inaccurate or merely symbolic. There
is no reason to claim that there are no ‘real’ crises. Rather, the point is to
observe crisis as a blind spot, and hence to consider the ways in which it
regulates narrative constructions, the ways in which it allows certain
questions to be asked, while others are foreclosed.
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The Crisis of Modernity—Modernity
as Crisis
Toward a Typology of Crisis Discourses in Interwar East
Central Europe and Beyond
Balázs Trencsényi
THE FACES OF CRISIS: SPATIAL, TEMPORAL, SOCIOCULTURAL
The interwar period witnessed a general radicalization of political dis-
course all over Europe. Among others, this was linked to a shift in the
image of history, as an evolutionist vision gave way to a range of models
that stressed discontinuity, cyclicality, and re-enacted the past. A key
topos in this new image of history was crisis, emphasizing the rupture of
linear development, and denoting a liminal period which not only threat-
ened the community with dissolution, but also carried the promise of
regeneration. In a way similar to the metapolitical function of the crisis
discourse in the Enlightenment, memorably analysed by Reinhart Kosel-
leck,1 this discourse served the delegitimization of political order—albeit
now with a contrary political function: grosso modo, the liberal democratic
political order was undermined by conservative revolutionaries as the
reference to crisis eventually became a weapon of a symbolic—and, in
some cases, real—civil war. Given the traumatic experiences of the region
both during and after WWI, it is not surprising that, in the interwar
period, the genre of ‘crisis literature’ became one of the most characteris-
tic venues of self-expression for Central and Southeastern European intel-
lectuals. But it is important to point out the inherent ambiguities of this
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discourse: crisis brought the threat of dissolution, but it also offered a
possibility of regeneration. The loss of self-confidence present in the
Western European core, which these intellectual élites had been so eager
to follow throughout the ‘long nineteenth century’, catalysed a specific
local discourse about the agony of Western civilization as a ‘chance’ for
non-Westerners to subvert their subordinate position.
In East Central Europe, this ‘crisis discourse’ had a number of analyti-
cally separable, although, in many ways, interrelated, functions. First, it
was often connected to symbolic geographical models, contrasting the
‘overrefined’, ‘artificial’, ‘declining’, and the like, Western civilization to
the ‘virile’, ‘youthful’, ‘expansive’ East. Second, crisis could be perceived
as a liminal phase between two different world orders, most often imply-
ing a transformation from the era of individualism to a new period of
collectivism. Third, the crisis discourse could also be used to describe the
situation of certain social groups, institutions and social relations, such as
the crisis of the bourgeoisie, of the intelligentsia, of democracy, of the
village, of the family, and so on.
The sources for these East Central European discourses of crisis were
multifarious. In the early 1920s, the impact of Oswald Spengler was vis-
ible in all cultures of the region. The local readings of Der Untergang des
Abendlandes (The Decline of the West)2 were usually marked by a certain
ambiguity. Eastern European authors considered their high culture to be
linked to the West and thus to be hit by the crisis, but, at the same time,
they often argued that their society was definitely not as overrefined as
the West, and thus the temporal lag between them opened up a possibil-
ity of turning ‘the Decline of the West’ to the advantage of the Eastern
Europeans. Significantly, this was also in line with Spengler’s own pre-
diction about the rise of the Russian East at the expense of the ailing
West. Other key sources to this discussion were the writings on the rise of
mass society and the crisis of the élites (José Ortega y Gasset, Miguel de
Unamuno, Robert Michels), the crisis of rationalism (Henri Bergson, Ed-
mund Husserl, Nikolai Berdyaev), and, in particular, the crisis of the
intelligentsia (Julien Benda).
Along these lines, the most obvious Eastern European application of
the crisis discourse was the counterposing of the aged and declining West
to the youthful East. However, the definition of the two poles of this
counterposition could be varied. The projects for the revitalization of
Europe were context-bound, as representatives of Slavic cultures com-
monly defined the rising East as Slav, while others put the emphasis on
other categories, such as contrasting urban/industrial and rural/peasant
nations. Even within the same culture, this discourse could be framed
very differently. For instance, the Bulgarian literary historian and Slavist,
Boris Jotzov could argue that the Slavs were the race of the future,3 while
another Bulgarian, the neo-Hegelian philosopher Janko Janev, appropri-
ated the German Völkisch discourse and linked Germans and South-Slavs
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as the two most authentic European cultures.4 An interesting third option
within the Bulgarian discourse, directly related to the debate on Spengler,
was formulated by the philosopher Spiridon Kazandzhiev, who argued
that Bulgarians were not yet developed enough to have a crisis of the
Western type, and therefore they could still proceed with an organicist/
evolutionary modernization.5
Another modality of the crisis discourse, which had particularly
strong repercussions in the region, was linked to the politicization of
religion. Catholic or Orthodox traditionalists, such as the Hungarian Piar-
ist priest and cultural philosopher, Gyula Kornis, or the Serbian clergy-
man, Justin Popović, converged in criticizing Western civilization where
the loss of faith in God and the expansion of materialism undermined all
solid points of reference and cast modern man into permanent despair.
Representing a powerful political tradition all over the region, agrar-
ian populism also articulated itself through a crisis discourse contrasting
East and West. In contrast to the protagonists of a Conservative Revolu-
tion, however, the agrarian populists put more emphasis on the socioeco-
nomic relations, contrasting the industrialized Western European core
and the rural peripheries. They argued that the crisis was, to a large
extent, due to the misunderstanding of this relationship on the part of the
local liberal nationalist élites (and also their socialist opponents), who
argued for the need to catch up with the West by imposing industrializa-
tion and ‘pseudo-Western’ urban modernity to the detriment of the rural
classes, who were kept in quasi-feudal dependence. What they suggested,
instead, was focusing on the specific social interests and mentality of the
smallholder peasants, who combined private property with the lack of
exploitation (since they worked on their own land).6 All this could be put
into a regionalist argument, stressing the common need of Eastern Euro-
pean rural nations to reject the West, although many of the agrarian
populists can still be considered to be selective Westernisers in the sense
that they looked at the democratic Northern and Northwestern European
small states characterized by a highly productive farming agriculture and
cooperativism (such as Denmark and the Netherlands) for inspiration.
As mentioned previously, the second broad framework of the crisis
discourse involved projecting the crisis on a historical continuum. Thus,
crisis could be described as a transitional historical phase pregnant with a
new spiritual world order. The Romanian cultural philosopher Lucian
Blaga, drawing on Expressionist aesthetics and theories of cultural
morphology, announced the coming of a new ‘dogmatic age’, akin to
Berdyaev’s ‘New Middle Ages’, which would restore belief and meta-
physical order.7 In a similar vein, the Hungarian cultural philosopher,
Béla Hamvas, formulated a neotraditionalist doctrine, inspired by Julius
Evola and René Guénon, turning back to the ‘axial age’ of world religions
for inspiration, and seeking to restore a prehistoric metaphysical ‘Tradi-
tion’ as a way out of the crisis of orientation.8 It is important to stress,
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however, that these metaphysical traditionalisms did not necessarily
have radical political implications. In fact, both Blaga and Hamvas were
adherents of a relatively moderate nationalist agenda and considered
totalitarianism to be a false solution for the metaphysical dilemma faced
by modern man.
The discourse of crisis was often turned to question the entire modern
nation-building project. On the whole, the topos of a mistaken path, a
negative Sonderweg, had been omnipresent in the ideological debates of
interwar Eastern Europe. We encounter it, for example, in the conserva-
tive historian Gyula Szekfű’s extremely influential Three Generations, de-
scribing the ‘distortion’ of the Hungarian liberal nationalist project due to
its imitation of Western patterns, which had resulted in the collapse of
‘historical Hungary’ in 1919–1920.9 The Bulgarian literary historian Bo-
yan Penev’s analysis of post-1878 social and cultural developments had
similar overtones, as he stressed the incoherence of the cultural élite
caused by competing cultural fashions coming from different European
directions.
Finally, the crisis discourse could also refer to the dissolution of social
coherence and the identity crisis of certain social groups. The most com-
mon version of this was linked to the question of élites. While going back
to local debates on the role of the intelligentsia in transmitting Western
modernity, the interwar discussion was, to a large extent, formatted by
the Western European authors of ‘élite theories’, ranging from the more
essayistic José Ortega y Gasset and Miguel de Unamuno to the more
systematic Vilfred Pareto and Robert Michels.
The most obvious common denominator of these debates in East Cen-
tral Europe was the crisis of ‘national mediation’: the double failure of the
intelligentsia to digest external influences before transmitting them to the
common people and their incapacity to format the essence of the popular
culture as a basis of high culture. To this, many analysts added a crisis of
social roles and values, with the intelligentsia being unable to sustain the
cultural and social mediation. This criticism was formulated by thinkers
such as the Bulgarian psychologist and social philosopher Athanas Iliev,
the Romanian political theorist Constantin Rădulescu-Motru, and the
Hungarian follower of Völkerpsychologie, Sándor Karácsony. For instance,
Karácsony talked about the dysfunctional social existence of the ‘sophoc-
racy’ (i.e., the intelligentsia), disconnected from the lower classes, but also
unable to function as a spiritual élite.
As the understanding of crisis was extremely multifarious, the pro-
posed ways out were also quite divergent, depending on the local social
and political context and the ideological commitments of the author. The
main common motif of all these suggestions in the period was the craving
for a new spiritual élite which would be able to reinvigorate the social
and cultural ‘blood circulation’—linking past and future, East and West,
low and high culture, peasantry and urban élite, individualism and col-
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lectivism. One possible version of this was linked to the discourse of
ethno-pedagogy, involving the creation of a cultural matrix based upon
popular culture which could be institutionalized as a new high culture.
Here, the definition of the new élite was specifically linked to that group
which was able to discern the ‘hidden essence’ of the popular tradition
and to turn it into a new and more authentic version of high culture than
the ‘imitative’ Westernism of the previous generations.
A dramatized and radicalized version of this discourse contrasted the
insensitive masses (often framed in the key of Ortega’s ‘revolt of the
masses’) with the tragic genius who saw the way of regeneration but
could not realize it in the face of mass indifference. This is the message of
the essays written by the Hungarian populist writer László Németh in
the late 1930s and early 1940s.10 While, in his earlier essays, he opted for a
more optimistic vision where the visionary individual was able to trans-
form his environment into utopian experiments, harmonizing Western
high culture with folk authenticity as well as socialism with individual
creativity. Gradually, with the dominance of totalitarian political ideolo-
gies in the region, his perspective became darker. In the early 1940s, the
contrast of the idealist individual and mass insensitivity prompted him to
recreate a national master narrative based upon the eternal tragic conflict
of the ethnically Hungarian prophets of authenticity and a false (and,
ethnically, usually foreign) élite serving the taste of the masses.11
Summing up, the ‘crisis discourse’ in East Central Europe had multi-
farious political implications. Although it could be formulated from a
liberal or a leftist perspective as well, as was the case with the reception
of Julien Benda’s La trahison des clercs, used for asserting the need to
reinforce one’s commitment to the endangered ‘European value system’,
its most common application was in the broadly conceived conservative/
antimodernist ideological camp where it was closely linked to the col-
lapse of the evolutionary vision of social development. A particularly
influential subgenre of the debate centred around the emergence of the
modern national project, when some of the most important intellectuals
of the period turned to re-assess, in an extremely critical way, the genesis
of their respective national canon and its problematical relationship to
the formative influence of the West. At the same time, since the topos of
crisis was not bound to any particular ideological offer, the crisis dis-
course also played a different role in different ideological contexts. In
general, adherents to the notion of a radical transformation (both in a
conservative and in a socialist direction) tended to use it as a critical
weapon; but, as soon as they achieved the coveted transfer of power, they
abandoned it and became apologists of the new authoritarian or totalitar-
ian regime. In contrast, other intellectuals held fast to it, and described
the rise of totalitarianism also as a symptom of the crisis of modernity.
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THE GENERATIONAL CRISIS DISCOURSE
A central element of the interwar discourse of crisis, cutting across actual
political divergences, focused on the ‘clash of generations’, pitting the
newly emerging dynamic potential élite against the corrupted ‘gerontoc-
racy’. For sure, this generational rhetoric could draw on a long history: a
key topos of romantic nationalism was youth (Young Europe, etc.), and
the subsequent paradigm shift of national liberalism was often framed in
these terms (Young Czechs); finally, at the turn of the century, there was
a proliferation of antipolitical youth movements as well as radical nation-
alist groups (Mlada Bosna, etc.), which all devised their mobilizing ideolo-
gy in terms of the clash of old and young. In the interwar period, all this
became even more influential, as it was coupled with the experience of a
global crisis of temporality: a fundamental rupture in time created by
WWI. Hence, in the early 1920s, the theme of generational conflict pre-
vailed in practically all of Eastern Europe. It became a central discursive
component of the conservative revolutionaries, when they proclaimed
the need to break with the corrupted recent past in order to restore a
deeper continuity with an earlier heroic past that had been marked by
high social coherence and cultural authenticity.
Beyond the common experience of WWI, a set of stylistic and ideolog-
ical elements contributed to the formation of political platforms in terms
of a generational agenda. One such component was the proliferation of
Expressionism as a cultural movement, which was also very sensitive to
the conflict of ‘fathers and sons’. Another factor was the lasting impact of
social Darwinist and biopolitical discourses that had emerged at the turn
of the century, which often stressed the need for biological ‘rejuvenation’
and the rights of uncorrupted youth over the decrepit and unproductive
older generation. A typical example is the discourse of the Yugoslav
‘young nationalists’ who established the organization Orjuna in the early
1920s, which continued the vitalist radicalism of the 1910s, turning it into
the direction of unitary Yugoslav nation building and serving as its shock
troops.
In the early 1920s, in various countries, a huge variety of political
projects framed themselves in terms of generational ideology. While it is
possible to discern both radical leftist and radical rightist tendencies, the
projection of a binary logic on these developments obliterates the consid-
erable discursive similarity between statements stemming from diametri-
cally opposed ideological camps. For the leftist option, a case in point is
the Bulgarian ‘September generation’ (symbolically linked to the Com-
munist uprising of September 1924). Its most prominent member was the
poet and essayist Geo Milev, who fused stylistic Expressionism and phil-
osophical vitalism with social radicalism. On the right, we can point to
the generational discourse of the Romanian anti-Semitic student move-
ment of the early 1920s, from which eventually the ‘Iron Guard’ emerged.
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It is important to note, however, that, in many cases, this ideological
polarization followed a relatively long period of coexistence when the
common antipolitical and anti-institutional rhetoric still kept people—
who later chose radically divergent paths—together.
The late 1920s and early 1930s brought a new wave of politicization of
the generational ideology. In most of the countries of the region, it was
roughly 1927–1928 that marked the taking-off point of the first postwar
cohort which distinguished itself from the ‘war generation’ shaped by the
Fronterlebnis (front experience). In contrast, members of the postwar gen-
eration had usually experienced the war only as children, and hence they
had an ambiguous relationship to it, remembering it, but not being able
to draw their symbolic legitimacy on it. Also, they came to maturity in
the mid-1920s in the context of a relative normalization and usually
turned to culture, instead of party politics and state building. In the long
run, however, this metapolitical position was also prone to assume direct
political connotations, often linked to political movements which chal-
lenged the institutionally established political forces.
Perhaps the most paradigmatic case of such a generational discourse
in the region can be found in Romania, where the ‘Young generation’ or
the ‘generation of 1927’ brought together a plethora of highly original
young intellectuals who later had a formative impact on their national
culture.12 The first articulation of this generation is usually linked to
Mircea Eliade’s Spiritual Itinerary,13 with its theme of the search for spiri-
tual experience as the agenda of the new postwar generation. The ensu-
ing discussion on the nature of the new generation occasioned a huge
number of discussions. Although there was a general antipolitical thrust
in most of the earlier statements, the party politics of the years following
WWI being rejected and blame being laid on the old élite for ‘missing the
chance’ of radical political and spiritual transformation of the country,
step by step various political forces also tried to use the generational
discourse to their advantage.
The transformation of an individualist metaphysical revolt into a vio-
lent political programme can be best observed in the writings of Emil
Cioran, who was at the periphery of the ‘young generation’ at the time of
its launching, being somewhat younger than its leaders, but who became
one of the most characteristic figures of his cohort in the 1930s. In his
essays written in the mid-1930s, and especially in his pamphlet on the
‘Transfiguration of Romania’, with its blending of existentialism and to-
talitarianism, we see him adapting a hypertrophic version of the genera-
tional discourse.14 He extended the ideology of generational conflict to
the entire nation-building project and launched the idea of ‘Romanian
Adamism’, involving the start of a real, ‘historical’ existence initiated by
the rejection of the ‘ahistoric-larval’ way of life of the previous genera-
tions.
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Other contexts also produced very lively generational debates in the
early 1930s. Similar to the Romanian in dynamism, albeit less differentiat-
ed, the Bulgarian discourse of the young generation was also linked to an
antipolitical agenda, rejecting party politics (revived between 1931 and
1934) and arguing for the need of a fundamental spiritual change. A case
in point is the former social democratic politician Dimo Kazasov, who
combined technocratic élitism with the discourse of an idealistic young
generation seeking to put an end to the corruption of the traditional party
élite.15 Kazasov’s rhetoric had a strong authoritarian tendency, but also
retained some residual elements from the leftist tradition and combined
it with a ‘Balkanist’ discourse of regional cooperation. This discourse had
strong links to the group of conspirators calling itself Zveno, which, in
1934, successfully instigated a coup d’état, although King Boris III even-
tually used the opportunity to impose a personal dictatorship.
In many ways comparable, members of the Albanian ‘young genera-
tion’ (Te rinjtë), emerged in the early 1930s with a modernist agenda in
which the national romanticism of the ‘old’ élite was rejected in the name
of a more dynamic understanding of nation and society. One of the key
figures of this group, Ismet Toto, compressed the programme of his gen-
eration into the lapidary alternative: ‘Switzerland or Afghanistan?’ Dif-
ferent members of the group had different visions of how to turn Albania
into a proper European state; but the ideological influences which they
appropriated were rooted in the same antimodernist turn prevailing
throughout Europe. Thus, mixing such components as Nietzscheanism,
Spenglerianism, vitalism, and geomorphology, they came up with an in-
tricate ideological mixture in their effort to mobilize their society. This
mixture is, perhaps, most striking in Toto’s writings. His nation-building
project had a strong eugenic aspect, and sought to mix the different re-
gional types of Albanians, even going so far as to advocate administrative
means to encourage marriages between them. While he was in favour of
Western modernity, he cited Nazi Germany and fascist Italy as paradig-
matic examples of dynamism, though he defended such classic liberal
values as the freedom of the press.16
In the case of the group around the Polish journal Bunt Młodych (Revolt
of the Youth), the vocabulary of generational mutiny was taken up by
young intellectuals who sought to rejuvenate the Polish right by taking
away from the nationalist Endecja the central place it occupied on the
right side of the political scene. They coveted great power status and
imperial ideology; from this perspective, the multi-ethnic composition of
Poland—provided that the leading position of the ethnic Poles was as-
sured—was seen as an asset, rather than a handicap, and a reason of
state, rather than ethnic nationalism, was seen as the greatest good. In
contrast, from the mid-1930s, one can observe the appearance of yet an-
other sort of generational discourse, with pro-totalitarian leanings. In
some ways, these authors followed in the path of the ‘new generation’ of
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the late 1920s. However, they entered the field when the aesthetic anti-
politics of the previous cohort had already been dissolved, and thus the
members of this group were marked by a much more emphatically politi-
cal self-identification. In fact, the generational discourse of the late 1930s
and early 1940s was often linked to a fascination with totalitarianism.
This is exemplified by such groupings as the Polish review Prosto z Mostu
or the Bulgarian Mlada Balgariya, which became adepts of radical nation-
alism.
NATIONAL ONTOLOGY AS A RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS
The interwar period saw the emergence of a new type of national dis-
course that rejected the previous positivist framework for defining the
nation. In some contexts, this discursive shift led to the formation of a
‘national ontology’, based upon the notion that nations have a specific
physiognomy which can only be grasped by metaphysical inquiry. These
constructions were intimately linked to the atmosphere of crisis: the ex-
perience of modernity leading to social and cultural disintegration, and a
feeling of the ‘fluidity’ of existence triggered a search for a framework
which could restore the identity of the nation, as it were, at an ontological
level. As a result, the classical historical and geographical references for
defining and describing the nation were replaced by a new set of catego-
ries seeking to grasp the ‘national Being’.
While this development was unprecedented, the chief components of
this ‘metaphysical turn’ were rooted in previous ideological configura-
tions. The various local versions of Völkerpsychologie, or psychology of
peoples, contributed to the linking of cognitive categories and the nation-
al taxonomy. Wilhelm Wundt was a common inspiration for many of the
ideologists, and his Leipzig chair served as an important hub for Eastern
European scholars at the turn of the century. While the original paradigm
of Völkerpsychologie and the French psychologie des peoples of Alfred Fouil-
lée were generally critical of ethnic nationalism and stressed the impor-
tance of cultural and linguistic assimilation, many of their Eastern Euro-
pean followers used this framework to define the nation in ethnocultural
terms, localizing national specificity in the most ‘authentic’ social layer:
the peasantry.
‘National psychology’ had already reached its peak in many of these
cultures in the 1910s, but, in its more syncretic versions, it continued to
have an impact on political discourse in the interwar period as well. The
main characteristic of this approach, which also limited its usefulness,
was the inductive method which it inherited from the empiricist psycho-
logical tradition. Representatives of this trend sought to gather various
manifestations of the national soul, and the outcome of this was often the
documenting of a mind-boggling plurality of stereotypes, often leading
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to incompatible codes of representation and transmitting the message of
an incoherent national character. Another implication was the subnation-
al regional diversification of psychic types, which was rather problematic
from the perspective of the homogenizing nationalism that became
prominent after 1918. A case in point can be found in the work of the
Bulgarian writer and political journalist Anton Strashimirov, who, in the
late 1910s, produced a number of character sketches of Bulgarians, with
emphasis on their regional differences, which sought to assert the ‘unity
in diversity’ of the nation, but also called attention to the mind-boggling
cultural, mental, and social diversity of the country.17
The pressing need to legitimize national projects at the end of WWI
and in its immediate aftermath saw a veritable boom in the production of
various approaches seeking to establish the ‘science of the nation’, rang-
ing from physical anthropology to geopolitics. An important source of
radical discourses of identity in the interwar period throughout East Cen-
tral Europe was provided by British, German and French geopolitical
literature, this discourse being intimately linked to the debates around
the post-WWI reshuffling of borders. The most common points of orien-
tation were Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellén, Paul Vidal de la Blache and
Karl Haushofer. Arguably, the most important East Central European
representative of this trend was the Serbian Jovan Cvijić. Linking geologi-
cal and ethnographical categories, Cvijić focused on the ‘Dinaric type’,
characterized by a patriarchal and heroic mountaineer mentality, un-
touched by Western decadence, as the central anthropological pattern of
the Balkan peninsula. This obviously squared well with the prewar ‘Ser-
bian Piedmont’ ideology that perceived the Serbs as the core of a future
South-Slavic state, and, in the 1920s, it could also be actualized in a
Yugoslavist template, arguing for a common South-Slavic geographical
space and popular mentality.
It was the spatial referential framework (of geopolitics and ‘geophilos-
ophy’) that the most radical versions of identity discourse in the interwar
period sought to connect to a new normative theory of the national com-
munity. While this aspiration to a ‘national philosophy’ was not new, as
it went back to Romantic antecedents which sought to find the philo-
sophical system most fitting to the national character, the projects of the
interwar period were radically different. An important factor was the
turning of the notion of style, a key concept of the Geistesgeschichte ap-
proach, into a central category defining national individuality, linking
aesthetic, historical and cognitive elements.
A good example can be found in the work of Lucian Blaga, who drew
mostly on German sources, such as Expressionism, Geistesgeschichte, the
philosophy of Ludwig Klages and the geomorphology of Leo Frobenius,
while, at the same time, searching to develop a specifically Romanian
philosophy. Blaga sought to define the national style, but, in his search,
he wanted to go beyond ornamentalism, and to identify the inherent
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metaphysical matrix of the nation. He constructed ‘Romanian-ness’ in
terms of village existence, which he depicted as a space of magic spiritu-
ality characterizing the worldview of a child. He contrasted this to the
disorientation of Western urban civilization, which had lost this concen-
tric framework of sacrality, and therefore existed in permanent crisis. In
this way, he was able to subvert the usual hierarchy, describing the seem-
ingly peripheral Balkan village as being closer to a metaphysical centre
than the Western European ‘core’.
This model had a considerable impact on the ‘national ontologies’ of
the ‘young generation’, who all venerated Blaga as one of the pioneers of
‘national philosophy’. In his essays of the 1930s and early 1940s, Mircea
Eliade linked national folklore and archaeology to his more general vi-
sion of traditional cultures which were characterized by a metaphysical
Weltanschauung. His key ideas in this context anticipated the analytical
categories of his future comparative history of religions: traditional cul-
ture built around a symbolic axis mundi, the importance of rituality, and
repetitive gestures of collective regeneration. Rather than entering histor-
ical time with the traditional means of sociocultural modernization, Eli-
ade invited the Romanians to preserve their relationship to suprahistori-
cal transcendence, thus fulfilling a universal mission as heralds of a new
collectivism based upon sacrality. Although for a considerable time he
adhered to an antipolitical position and rejected the violent factionalism
of Romanian public discourse, Eliade eventually opted for the localiza-
tion of this metaphysical regeneration in the ‘Iron Guard’.
In Hungarian culture, the drive to create a national philosophy was
equally powerful, but the available cultural resources were rather differ-
ent. The most elaborate national characterology was created by the phi-
losopher Lajos Prohászka.18 His interpretation of the Hungarian national
character was based upon the figure of the ‘outlaw’, which he contrasted
to the topos of the ‘wanderer’, which he described as the matrix of the
German character. Prohászka believed that, in contrast to the depleted
Western European cultures, the dynamic German and Italian characters
would create a new European cultural revival. While the author was
attacked for indirectly legitimizing pro-Nazi tendencies in Hungary, the
study was, in fact, written before 1933, and Prohászka was politically a
moderate conservative. It is, however, indicative of the blurred ideologi-
cal implications of his discourse that he referred to Germans and Italians
as the representatives of the two most important traditions animating
European culture, to wit, humanism and romanticism. Subsequently,
when the two totalitarian regimes manifestly turned against European
culture, Prohászka became radically antifascist, apparently without feel-
ing the need to revoke his previous philosophical arguments.
One of the discursive functions of national metaphysics was to confer
symbolic unity on a polity which had only recently come into being. A
case in point is the Yugoslav characterology of Vladimir Dvorniković. His
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intention was to create an integrative framework of identity for Yugosla-
via, in which the differences between Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, and Bos-
nians could be described in terms of regional varieties.19 To achieve this
goal, he fused references to Western theories of cultural morphology with
a symbolic geographical construction based mostly upon Cvijić’s writ-
ings and a liberal nationalist historical narrative. Consequently, in ideo-
logical terms, his discourse was ambiguous. On the one hand, he was a
proponent of modernization and compared the Sonderweg of the South-
Slavs caused by the experience of the Ottoman occupation to the more
organic development of the Western European nation-states; but, on the
other hand, he contrasted the declining Western civilization to the dy-
namic vitality of Southeastern Europeans.
Developing one of the most idiosyncratic discourses of national essen-
tialism, the Bulgarian Nayden Sheytanov coined a specific conceptual
language drawn on Romantic models. His principal work, The Great-Bul-
garian Worldview, sought to formulate a new framework of national iden-
tification in line with the profound ideological transformation in Europe
in the late 1930s. In his opinion, a new worldview was needed ‘in order to
determine the laws of the past and to proceed in tune with the contempo-
rary spirit’.20 Thus, Sheytanov’s aim was not only to devise a new politi-
cal ideology or historical interpretation, but to achieve something much
more fundamental—to recreate the national canon, from which a ‘Great-
Bulgarian ideology’ could stem. This ‘Bulgarian Titanism’ was to func-
tion as a religious system, in which the Bulgarians were defined as an
‘elect nation’ and the Balkans as the ‘holy land of Europe’.
On the whole, the proliferation of autochthonist discourses and na-
tional ontologies signalled the ‘alienation’ of the cultural and political
élites of these countries from the Western model and the questioning of
the previous cultural hierarchy based upon the desire of local élites to
‘catch up’ with the West. At the same time, these discourses could not
develop without a connection to Western intellectual sources. Thus, para-
doxically, they were the result of the intensification of cultural connec-
tions between Eastern and Western Europe, and bore witness to familiar-
ity with the latest Western trends which were focused precisely on the
issue of the decline of Western civilization. The various formulations of
‘national metaphysics’ can thus be considered characteristic of the intel-
lectual responses to the political and ideological crises ravaging interwar
East Central Europe. Stemming from a deep feeling of marginality and
frustration, they were also based upon an intensive dialogue with the
very Western cultural centres that they sought to subvert. While often
slipping into rather idiosyncratic formulations, they had a lasting impact
on the collective imagination of these societies, serving as a pool of
stereotypes and cultural references in moments of intensive debate on the
(geo)political orientation of these countries.
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THE LONG SHADOWS OF THE INTERWAR PERIOD
The crisis discourses analysed in this study fit into the broader frame-
work of antimodernism. Born out of the perceived crisis of modernity,
antimodernism is a neopalingenetic, revolutionary, transfigurative, fu-
ture-oriented alternative spirituality that pervades every realm of the hu-
man experience.21 Its main markers are authoritarianism, the cult of vio-
lence and (self-)victimization, cultural pessimism, organicism, and biopo-
litical exclusion. Importantly, it has a complex entanglement with mod-
ernism: it rejects political modernity, but also draws on it.
The antimodernist ideological tropes are usually associated with the
extreme right, but some elements (such as the rejection of the evolution-
ary vision of development or the stress on creative élites) were also
present in the radical leftist ideological subcultures. One could argue that
the Stalinist political project was as much rooted in an antimodernist
ideology as in a modernist one. This partly explains the survival of anti-
modernist references after 1945 as well. Antimodernism was an impor-
tant element of the legitimization of the postwar Communist regimes in
East Central Europe, asserting that bourgeois democracy was in a perma-
nent crisis and needed to be superseded by a new, more organic and
collectivistic ideology.
The interwar antimodernist tropes had a complex afterlife, present
both in the anti-Communist alternative (underground and émigré) sub-
cultures and also in the Communist ideological frameworks. A particu-
larly important context was ‘national Communism’, offering a selective
appropriation of some of these ideological tropes and discourses. In some
cases, national Communism also offered a possibility for former extreme
rightists to cooperate. Later on, the reintegration of antimodernist themes
was often facilitated by fellow traveller intellectuals searching for an al-
ternative legitimization of the regime in the 1970s and 1980s, as Marxism-
Leninism proved increasingly unable to rally any kind of popular sup-
port around the leadership. This is important to bear in mind also when
one looks at the post-1989 revival of antimodernist discourses in East
Central Europe, which were often depicted by Western observers as an
unexpected return of ideological zombies, or ‘skeletons in the closet’,
believed to be long dead.
This ideological continuity also contributed to what, on the surface,
seemed to be a radical change after 1989, namely, the return of the inter-
war tropes and discursive patterns to the centre of the public sphere.
Interwar cultural references had an aura of being an uncontaminated
cultural heritage, which led to the fervent reproduction, reedition, and
recanonization of many key authors of this period after the regime
change. The intensity of this revival, however, was different in different
contexts. Romania, where the discussion of the interwar canon, and emi-
nently of the work of the ‘young generation’ around Mircea Eliade, Emil
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Cioran and Constantin Noica, became central to the cultural life of the
1990s, is perhaps an extreme case, but, in all countries of the region, there
were important efforts to engage with the intellectual heritage of inter-
war conservatism, national metaphysics, and the crisis literature.
While, on the surface, the 1990s were dominated by a pro-European
consensus, fed also by the expectation of the institutional and economic
merger with ‘the West’, in the depth of these societies, the anti-Western
and antimodernist ideological traditions resonated well with the cultural
and political resentment caused by the process of unification. Ironically,
but not illogically, the pro-European consensus politics that seemed to
pervade the region evaporated after the accession process of these coun-
tries was successfully finalized. The first symptoms of this shift were
linked to the rise of antinomian politics, defining the political-ideological
opponent as a fundamental threat to the very existence of the national
community. Importantly, as the case of Hungary and Poland shows, the
ensuing ‘culture wars’ started well before the economic crisis hit these
societies in 2008-2009. However, while, in the mid-2000s version, the
struggle was usually internal and was often fashioned as a fight against
post-Communism, after 2008, new ideological modalities emerged,
which began to reassert national autarchy as a legitimate political and also
cultural strategy to fend off the negative consequences of the global crisis.
It is in this context that one needs to place the ideological contention
around the 2015 ‘migrant crisis’. Analysts have often pointed out the
ideological cleavage between the former Communist ‘Eastern’ members
of the EU, who tended to reject any sort of solidarity with the refugees in
the name of preserving their ethnocultural and religious purity, and the
other Member States. It is important to note, however, that, in the inter-
war period as well as currently, the East Central European crisis dis-
courses, no matter how much they stress their autochthonism and anti-
Western credentials, are actually themselves products of the Western po-
litical culture. As we can see, in the interwar period, it was precisely the
self-destructive modality of the Western political discourse that East Cen-
tral European radical intellectuals—such as Mircea Eliade, Emil Cioran,
László Németh and Vladimir Dvorniković—turned against the West,
constructing the global crisis as a liminal experience of their nation, carry-
ing the promise of reshuffling the global symbolic hierarchy in favour of
the materially backward but spiritually uncontaminated ‘peasant na-
tions’. Similarly, one needs to contextualize the calls for ‘illiberal democ-
racy’ on the part of Viktor Orbán and his advisors in view of the loss of
self-confidence and orientation of the European Union in the last couple
of years.
As in the interwar period, as well as during the last decade, the shak-
ing of a future-oriented vision of Europe triggered populist reactions
which translated the socioeconomic and cultural questions into the lan-
guage of exclusion. Therefore, studying the antimodernist ideological
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mobilization and crisis discourses in East Central Europe is relevant not
from the perspective of some sort of ‘exotic’ regional interest, but be-
cause, due the precariousness of political and social modernity in this
part of Europe, one can get a more direct and elementary grasp of the
challenges that the whole of Europe is facing, even if this is much less
obvious when one looks at Aarhus, Delft, Bergamo or Stuttgart, than at
Ózd, Craiova, Białystok or Lovech.
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Rational and Theocratic Authority in the Schmitt-
Strauss Exchange
John P. McCormick
This chapter revisits scholarly investigations, conducted over twenty
years ago, of the interwar writings of Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss; writ-
ings in which ‘theology’ played a major role in Schmitt’s and Strauss’s
criticisms of Weimar’s liberal democracy, and their respective critiques of
Enlightenment politics, more generally.1 Two decades ago, many pro-
gressive scholars, myself included, feared that, in the wake of the Soviet
Union’s collapse in 1989, a resurgent radical right in Europe might enlist
religion as a crucial component in their authoritarian causes. But we nev-
er imagined that these authoritarian threats would themselves become—
as they have to a remarkable extent—genuinely and thoroughly theocrat-
ic. I mention as just three examples: right-wing Christian movements in
the US, politically active Orthodox Judaism in Israel, and radical forms of
Islam in Europe and the Middle East. After more than twenty years’
reflection on the Schmitt-Strauss exchange, I believe that I now somewhat
better understand the stakes that ‘political theology’ raises for the theo-
cratic challenge to liberal democracy today. In this spirit, this chapter
reflects a personal-political enlightenment that I hope is worth sharing
with others.
* * * * *
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The conservative, and eventual National Socialist, jurist, Carl Schmitt,
famously asserts, in the Concept of the Political,2 that all genuine political
philosophies are pessimistic concerning human nature. By relying exten-
sively on Thomas Hobbes, a political thinker who strikingly illustrated
the violent behaviour of man to man in the absence of authority, Schmitt
clearly assumes that he has grounded his state theory on a sufficiently
pessimistic conception of human beings. Indeed, what could be more
pessimistic than a theory like Schmitt’s ‘friend/enemy thesis’, which in-
sists on the centrality of enmity to political life?
Yet, in his widely celebrated contemporary commentary on Schmitt’s
1932 book, the young Leo Strauss3 insists that Hobbes’s notion of man as
dangerous but educable—a notion that Schmitt never fully rejects—is not
sufficiently pessimistic to justify the kind of political philosophy that
both Schmitt and Strauss seek as an alternative to liberalism. I will argue
that Strauss, in the 1920s and early 1930s, sought a functional equivalent
to traditional theocracy—a Biblical atheism, as it were—that might serve
as a foundation of political authority in a simultaneously post-theistic
and post-Enlightenment age.4 Schmitt, as we know, sought an appropri-
ately fascist (if not yet Nazi) solution to what he deemed to be liberal
theory’s hopelessly contradictory principles, and liberal practice’s pain-
fully obvious inability to resolve the near civil war circumstances of the
late Weimar Republic.5
According to both Schmitt and Strauss, even though Hobbes deems
man ‘dangerous’ in circumstances where authority is absent, the Malmes-
bury philosopher affords the subjects of his Leviathan state significant
freedom of thought and action on the assumption that individuals, when
governed by a sufficiently strong state, can be prudent, educable, and
capable of rational, cost-benefit calculations that may prove conducive to
public peace and stability. Schmitt thinks he can correct these flaws in the
Hobbesian state by refounding it on collective—rather than individual—
grounds.
Strauss retorts that Schmitt’s reformulation still permits too much
freedom of conscience and behaviour for state subjects. In relying on
Hobbes, Schmitt may affirm the importance of ‘sovereignty’, but he es-
chews the necessity of, in Strauss’s word, ‘dominion’. If Schmitt were to
understand human evil in terms of ‘moral baseness’ or ‘sinfulness’, then,
Strauss suggests, Schmitt would elaborate a more comprehensive notion
of ‘ruling’ than Hobbes countenanced or Schmitt himself articulates.
Rather than correcting addressable flaws in Hobbes’ system, Schmitt, by
not clarifying his own view of human nature, still allows essentially liber-
al freedoms to persist as dire threats to both the stability of his neo-
Leviathan state, and to any substantive notion of the good life.
Given the sinful, morally base character of human evil, Strauss insists
that public order requires an authority more intrusive than the sovereign
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state—an authority that imposes a substantive vision of the good life that
cannot be derived from modern sources, whether they be early-modern
notions of natural right, or what he calls elsewhere ‘the execrable princi-
ples of 1789’. Strauss suspects that Schmitt, a renowned Roman Catholic
critic of liberalism, fundamentally agrees with him; despite what he ap-
pears to say to the contrary, Schmitt must believe that human beings are
inherently sinful.
A perspective that understands sinfulness as moral baseness asserts
that humans are driven to do wrong not by material deprivation or by the
desire to satisfy bodily appetites, as liberals would have us believe. Rath-
er, human beings take fiendish pleasure in doing precisely what they
know to be wrong; they take supreme gratification by committing evil, as
such. Statutory law associated with the modern Rechtsstaat cannot tame
humanity’s inherent sinfulness; nor can it cultivate the natural human
intuition of goodness that necessarily accompanies the base human de-
sire to violate it.
This chapter explores the place of educable versus sinful evil in the
respective efforts of Schmitt and Strauss to develop genuinely ‘authori-
tarian’ alternatives to liberal state theory in interwar Germany. Specifical-
ly, it addresses several of Strauss’s readings of Schmitt on the moral cum
theological status of the political: his assumptions concerning the extent
to which Schmitt actually endorses a notion of human evil as sinfulness
or moral baseness; his assertion that Schmitt deliberately hides the moral
dimensions of the political; and his mischaracterization of what Schmitt
deems to be the ultimate danger confronting the political in their age—
that is, whether Schmitt fears that the political will disappear altogether
or merely that it will be practiced ‘dishonestly’.
Much more than his disciples claim, Strauss shared deep affinities
with Schmitt’s agenda in The Concept of the Political. By affirming ‘the
political’, Schmitt celebrated the return of enmity as a harbinger of the
reassertion of authority, the prospect that, in the present moment, a new
postliberal world order might arise afresh.6 Only a few years before, in
1929, Strauss had expressed similar exhilaration at the return of sharp
distinctions among different groups of neighbours: the demise of the
commitment to ‘love thy neighbour’ at the heart of Enlightenment philos-
ophy, spelled, for Strauss, the return of moral affirmation and a revival of
quasi-Biblical authority. However, rather than a self-critical, quasi-
universal, Biblical tradition affiliated with the Hebrew prophets, Strauss
exclaims, somewhat alarmingly, ‘we must ask ourselves seriously wheth-
er perhaps the kings were right’.7 Strauss turns to the Biblical legacy to
reaffirm the harsh necessities of warfare and rule, rather than the univer-
sal morality philosophically developed by the assimilating liberals of the
German-Jewish Enlightenment.
Schmitt’s endorsement of National Socialism in 1933 makes clear the
kind of authoritarianism he sought as a replacement of liberalism—again,
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a suitable, if not first choice, alternative for the conservative jurist.
Strauss’ position, as conveyed by his writings of this era, is more elusive.
I will therefore try to sketch out the kind of authoritarian alternative to
liberalism, the kind of revived premodern, ‘regime as regimen’, that
Strauss was formulating in his writings before his emigration to the Unit-
ed States.
* * * * *
Schmitt intends The Concept of the Political to serve as a neo-Hobbesian
attempt to rescue the state in the midst of its twentieth-century crisis. To
Schmitt’s mind, liberal theory and practice has undermined the unity, the
integrity, of the state, and put European nations, particularly Germany,
back in circumstances similar to those that confronted Hobbes during the
English Civil War. Schmitt seeks to return to the sovereign state, the
monopoly over ‘the political’ that liberalism had wrested from it during
intervening centuries. Schmitt famously insists that the political corre-
sponds to the fact of human enmity—the factuality, the facticity, of the
eternal human propensity to make distinctions between friends and ene-
mies. The political pertains to the existential reality that humans resort to
mortal violence, lethal force, to make or sustain our friend/enemy dissoci-
ations, our ‘us-versus-them’ groupings.
According to Schmitt, the political sphere and the friend/enemy dis-
tinction stand independent of all other concepts and distinctions. The
political is distinct from the aesthetic, the economic, the moral, and the
theological spheres. Human enmity is simply beyond good and evil in
the moral realm; it exists independent of categories such as beautiful and
ugly in the aesthetic realm. The enemy is simply the embodiment of an
alternative, ‘different and alien’, way of being, one that, by virtue of its
inherent otherness, potentially threatens one’s own.8
For Schmitt, even though the concepts that constitute the various
spheres of human life stand independent of each other, they all may, at
some point, become political. If people were to raise the possibility, the
threat, of deadly force in pursuit of any of these other distinctions, these
other spheres would, in fact, convert into political spheres. If religious
distinctions, economic distinctions, even, theoretically, aesthetic distinc-
tions, develop into potentially mortal distinctions among groups, then
they are no longer strictly religious, economic or aesthetic, but now pri-
marily political.9 Thus, the political derives its content, its substance,
from the potential for life-threatening violence posed by various human
groupings, not from the specific issue over which that violence might be
deployed.
* * * * *
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Schmitt lauds the Hobbesian state for stabilizing human expressions of
the political in a historically unprecedented way: the sovereign state de-
fused civil wars, domestically, and the Westphalian state system man-
aged interstate conflict, internationally. Nevertheless, Schmitt concedes
that both the sovereign state model and Hobbes’s philosophical formula-
tion of it were flawed. They allowed the state to be undermined from
within. As individuals surrender their subjective judgement over the use
of lethal violence to the state, Hobbes granted them an ostensibly less
volatile subjective freedom: individuals are free to think whatever they
like, so long as they do not act, and especially do not resort to violence,
upon the basis of what they think.
Freedom of conscience is soon followed by economic rights: in pursuit
of commodious living, subjects have the right to engage in commercial
exchange with, rather than armed conflict against, their fellow subjects.
According to Schmitt, freedom of conscience and economic activity even-
tually threaten the state and upset the state-secured equilibrium of the
political: corrosive political dissent and disruptive class conflict are the
inevitable results of such freedoms.
Schmitt thinks that he solves these problems by replacing Hobbes’s
individualism with a revived and radicalized version of Aristotelian so-
cial solidarity: Schmitt revives, albeit in a morally neutral way, the notion
that human beings naturally gravitate towards some sort of commu-
nity—a notion that Hobbes, in many ways, sought to dissolve. The pre-
disposition of some groups of humans to live together according to spe-
cific ways of life allows Schmitt to postulate an unassailable collective
existence of humans congregated around these specific forms of life.
These spontaneously formed, fighting collectivities transpose to state
authority something more existentially vital and socially-binding than
the self-interested individuals who contract their way out of Hobbes’s
natural condition could.
But Schmitt wilfully resists any moral assessment of the particular
substance that brings a specific collectivity together; or, conversely, of the
particular grounds on which they fight other collectivities bound by
some other organizing substance. Schmitt will not even supply an ac-
count of the mechanisms, moral or not, that bring such people together to
begin with and that keep them together; that is, he ignores what we
conventionally understand as ‘politics’.
* * * * *
Leo Strauss detects something odd in Schmitt’s claim that the political
stands independent of other conceptual spheres, especially the moral
sphere. He cites Schmitt’s Political Theology, published a decade earlier, in
which Schmitt asserted that ‘the core of the political idea is the morally
demanding decision’.10 Indeed, in that earlier text, Schmitt emphatically
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affiliates the moral and the theological, with the political.11 Strauss attrib-
utes the ‘disharmony’ between the two texts, separated by a decade, to a
polemical intention on Schmitt’s part; a desire to keep hidden below an
amoral exterior a deeply moral motivation.
Strauss identifies a peculiar anxiety pervading the work: namely,
Schmitt’s fear that the political might disappear altogether, and his worry
that this disappearance would have catastrophic moral consequences for
humanity. If liberalism were successful in establishing a perpetually
peaceful world of commercial exchange, or Russia, a universal worker’s
paradise, then something morally valuable about humanity would be
lost. Strauss asserts that, for Schmitt, a world without anything sufficient-
ly important to kill and die for is a world in which nothing is important
or serious.
However formidable his critique, I submit that Strauss overstates cer-
tain aspects of Schmitt’s text: specifically, whether Schmitt really fears
that the political will disappear; and whether Schmitt’s separation of the
political from the moral is merely polemical—in other words, whether
Schmitt feels obliged to hide his moral intentions in the text. On the first
point, Schmitt provides ample evidence in both the main text of the Con-
cept of the Political and in the appended ‘Neutralisations’ lecture, which
Strauss himself cites, that liberal and Communist states, their universalist
ideologies notwithstanding, will continue to behave ‘politically’; that is,
they will continue acting in ways that both identify and mortally threaten
enemies. For instance, the way in which Schmitt describes French re-
vanchist behaviour in a crucial footnote of Concept of the Political, and
Russian geopolitical motivations throughout the ‘Neutralisations’ essay,
suggest that he believes that there is virtually no danger that the political
will disappear from the face of the earth.
On the second point, that Schmitt is consciously hiding the moral
status of the political, Strauss may be at a disadvantage for which he
cannot be criticized. Strauss could not know that there is a substantive
reason for the fact that Schmitt’s works from the early 1920s, like Political
Theology, are not ‘in harmony’ with the argument of the Concept of the
Political: he likely did not know that Schmitt had been excommunicated
by the Roman Catholic Church when he remarried without an annulment
in 1926.12 Upon the basis of this fact, it is quite plausible that Schmitt may
have been deliberately and sincerely trying to reorient his ideas accord-
ingly.
To be sure, moral presuppositions pervade Schmitt’s arguments in
favour of the political. But they may be unconscious and unintentional,
and they certainly do not concern the prospect of the political’s disap-
pearance. The moral question of the Concept of the Political is not that the
political will disappear: rather, Schmitt exhibits alarm that the allies and
the Russians are practicing the political from an overtly antipolitical ideo-
logical standpoint, which has serious consequences for how war is and
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will be conducted in the present and the near future. Since their adversar-
ies, especially Germany, are cast in an increasingly moralized light as
monsters, and not mere enemies, Schmitt argues, wars will be even more
vicious and inhumane than 1914’s WWI was.
In this light, Strauss may be correct in suggesting that Schmitt has not
completely abandoned morality. But I would cast the moral character of
the work differently than Strauss does, to wit: the state itself seems to
carry much greater moral weight for Schmitt in Concept of the Political
than does the possibility of killing that Strauss consistently emphasizes in
his comments. Therefore, one ought to press Schmitt on the question of
morality differently than Strauss did. One should ask, for instance: By
what standard, what criterion, other than a moral one, can Schmitt claim
that the political is better managed, domestically and internationally, by
the Hobbesian state and the Westphalian state system?
Again, Schmitt overtly claims that the political should not be evaluat-
ed or governed by moral notions of good or bad, better or worse—the
political should just be. In an ostensibly, morally neutral way, Schmitt
leaves these matters entirely to the judgement of the respective combat-
ants engaged in existential struggle. Then, why should he care whether
the political is operationalized efficiently or inefficiently, that is, in ways
that shed less, rather than more, blood? If his claim is that the early-
modern state system better institutionalizes the political than do nomad-
ic, feudal, or imperial arrangements—that ‘the state’ best quells civil war
at home and forestalls total war abroad—doesn’t this assume that less
killing is a good thing, that less killing is morally right? For that matter,
on what grounds does Schmitt imply that a victorious combatant should
permit their defeated opponent to ‘retreat back into their borders’?13 Why
shouldn’t the victor, on existential grounds, pursue the vanquished until
the latter are eliminated, indeed, exterminated?
If this is an accurate depiction of the latent moral underpinning of
Schmitt’s book, then the ‘order’ provided by the state clearly takes nor-
mative precedence over the facticity of the political in Schmitt’s estima-
tion. On these grounds, Schmitt ought to affirm—morally—the Hobbe-
sian state, which secures morally good outcomes, over the political, which
may manifest itself in the most atrocious ways, most notably, through
genocide. In the text, Schmitt expressly prefers less, not more, blood,
contained rather than total war; but his definition of the political qua
political sets no limit on lives expended or blood spilled when collectiv-
ities act on the friend/enemy distinction.
* * * * *
To return to the issue of human nature in Strauss’s critique of Schmitt
with which I began these remarks: the ultimate question is not whether
Schmitt’s political stands upon a moral basis, the question is what kind of
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moral basis? Strauss’s still penetrating critique prompts us to ask: Does
Schmitt, whether Schmitt the Catholic moralist of Political Theology, or the
surreptitious/unconscious moralist of the Concept of the Political, have a
sufficiently pessimistic view of human nature to overcome liberalism?
Strauss appears uncertain whether, even in the earlier, explicitly Catholic
work, Schmitt agrees with counterrevolutionary Juan Donoso Cortés,
that humanity is morally base, inherently sinful, and hence in need of, to
employ Strauss’s words, dominion, of rule, as such.
In Political Theology, Schmitt does not—indeed, he intimates cannot—
fully endorse the Spaniard’s argument for the moral baseness of human-
ity because he identifies such a position as heresy—and, perhaps, he
remarks, insanity. Even if Schmitt concedes that human beings are sin-
ful—flawed, corrupted—in these early Weimar works, the incarnation of
Christ, for him, explicitly attests to the fact that human beings are part
divine. Because they are part divine in nature, they are capable, under the
right circumstances, and with appropriate guidance, of choosing to do
what is good, what is right.
In Concept of the Political, it is no longer Catholic orthodoxy that pre-
vents Schmitt from adopting the standard of moral baseness, but rather
the fact that, following Hobbes, he has now formally divorced the catego-
ries of moral virtue/moral baseness from politics altogether. As Strauss
asserts, since Hobbes has no notion of human evil as arising from ‘sin’,
from an inherent human desire to transgress the boundaries of what is
known to be morally right, Hobbes—perhaps much like Christianity it-
self—grants too much freedom of conscience to the subjects of his Levia-
than state.
Ultimately, Strauss and Schmitt diverge quite drastically on this ques-
tion of conscience and its relationship to the human need for ‘being
ruled’. Conscience, as I will explain further in the following section, is a
target for Strauss; unlike The Law, in a theocratic sense, conscience is an
irredeemable source of philosophical degradation and political anarchy.
It possesses no inherently good moral content and it encourages promis-
cuous nonobservance of the law.14 For Schmitt, on the other hand, con-
science can—and should—maintain a place of prominence in moral phi-
losophy, so long as it, in his early Catholic writings, remains subservient
to the authority of transcendental divinity (made flesh in political
form).15 This freedom of conscience remains in Schmitt’s secular endorse-
ment of Hobbes’s state, which prescribes and proscribes little belief or
behaviour that does not directly affect ‘public peace’.
From Strauss’s interwar perspective, either to be a Christian, or to be a
Hobbesian is ultimately to be a liberal. For instance, in Strauss’s early
engagement with Paul de Lagarde—an arch-German-Christian national-
ist, authoritarian and anti-Semite—Strauss locates a fundamental spiritu-
al individualism at the core of his thought; an individualism at odds with
Lagarde’s counter-Enlightenment aspirations. To drive the point that, in
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Strauss’s estimation, Christianity and the Enlightenment were inextri-
cably bound, in a now notorious letter to Karl Löwith penned a year after
his critique of Schmitt, Strauss speaks of ‘the cross of liberalism’, and his
preference for ‘the ghetto’, over any effort to crawl to such a cross.
In this context, Strauss elucidates, in a manner that no doubt shocked
Schmitt, just how ‘liberal’ Schmitt’s compartmentalising of the theologi-
cal, moral, and political in the Concept of the Political is. Moreover, if
Schmitt refused to attribute abject moral baseness to mankind in Political
Theology from a decade before, then his overtly Catholic position was
already protoliberal, despite the fact that Schmitt affiliated the moral, the
theological and the political in that work. Strauss presses Schmitt to af-
firm that human beings are morally base because they will inevitably find
reasons to commit wrong even when their immediate physical needs are
met and when their security is guaranteed—especially when they suffer
only the limited control of a night watchman, Leviathan state. In his
commentary on Concept of the Political, Strauss challenges Schmitt to con-
cede that human beings are in need of ‘being ruled’ more fundamentally
than Schmitt articulates in that work.
In a letter following up his commentary on Schmitt’s thesis, the young
Strauss continued to pursue Schmitt on the issue of human evil, moral
baseness and the necessity of dominion, of ‘rule’ as such. Clearly sensing
Schmitt’s hesitation, Strauss asks Schmitt point blank whether ‘the ulti-
mate foundation of the Right’ does not, in fact, require a foundational
belief in ‘the natural evil of man’.16 In the letter to Löwith, mentioned
previously, composed only months after this correspondence with
Schmitt, Strauss elaborated his own sense of what constituted the funda-
mental ‘principles of the Right’, principles that even a now triumphant
Nazism should not discredit: Strauss identifies these as ‘authoritarian,
fascist, imperial principles’.17
Strauss’ subsequent works from the 1930s illuminate the full thrust of
his critique of Schmitt, and help us better understand what Strauss means
by the ‘principles of the Right’ and the human need to be ‘ruled’.
* * * * *
In Strauss’ books on Maimonides of 1935 and Hobbes of 1936, Strauss
attempts to retrieve, philosophically and historically, something like Is-
lamic, Jewish or Platonic theocracy for a post-Enlightenment age. Only
theocracy, or a substantive equivalent thereof, these works suggest, effec-
tively governs the vulgar, subdues the proud, and facilitates human per-
fection in the manner aspired after by premodern classical philosophy
and monotheisms of The Law. Christian theology, and its Enlightenment
heirs, Strauss continues to insist, are not sufficiently authoritarian, in a
specific sense, to accomplish any of these goals.
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In Philosophy and Law, Strauss, quite astonishingly, suggests that the
contemporary starting point for refounding theocratic political authority
would be a form of atheism. Strauss attributes a specifically ‘Biblical’
quality to the forthright, conscientious, and courageous atheisms es-
poused by Nietzsche and Heidegger. Here, as late as 1935, long after
Heidegger’s Rektoratsrede, Strauss praises ‘the probity’ of Heideggerian
existential philosophy. Especially, in affirming the precariousness of hu-
man existence, the ‘primordial’ experience of human finitude, Strauss
locates in this atheism affinities with the Hebrew Bible.
Genuinely, Biblical religion embraces the fearfulness and precarious-
ness of human life when it affirms God; it does not, as does Christianity,
turn to God with the hope of escaping such experiences; that is, with the
anticipation that such primordial fear might be alleviated. Therefore, ac-
cording to Strauss, when Nietzsche and Heidegger reject God, they do so
in a singularly Biblical way. Nietzsche and Heidegger valiantly reject the
Epicurean impulse toward safety and security exhibited by unreflective,
conventional Enlightenment atheism. Strauss insists that the Epicurean
impulse toward security undergirding both Christianity and the Enlight-
enment is inherently corrosive of both the philosophical pursuit of truth,
and of any political order capable of both taming human evil and culti-
vating human perfection.18 In this spirit, Philosophy and Law sharpens
Strauss’s criticism of the Christian authoritarians, Lagarde and Schmitt,
whose work he had engaged over the previous decade.
While Strauss notably refrains from criticising Heidegger in the work,
Strauss dismisses Lagarde as a mere Christian Averroist and derides
Schmitt as a simple political theologian: the first uses religion artificially,
instrumentally in the service of a nationalist state; while the latter seeks to
elevate a sovereign state above society, thereby maintaining its separa-
tion from society, and, hence, leaving free, rather than regulated, the
realm of ‘culture’. In other words, these German-Christian authoritarians
conceive only of state and nation, they cannot imagine a political regime
that imposes a thoroughgoing regimen of social life. In this light, Strauss
contrasts the ideas of Lagarde and Schmitt with the thoughts of Farabi
and Maimonides:
Islamic and Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages are ‘more primi-
tive’ than modern philosophers because they are guided not, like them,
by the derived idea of natural right, but by the primary, ancient idea of
law as a unified, total regimen of human life; in other words, because
they are pupils of Plato and not pupils of Christians.19
Strauss again invokes Plato and ‘the total regimen of human life’ in his
Hobbes book of the following year. Strauss elevates Plato over Aristotle
for treating ‘the most important subjects’—namely, ‘the just, the beauti-
ful, and, above all, the good’—not abstractly, ‘but with the greatest accu-
racy’.20 Here, he cites The Republic and The Laws. Only a modern approxi-
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mation of such regimes that regulate the ‘most important subjects [with]
the greatest accuracy’, with the greatest specificity about what is good,
can fully and appropriately replace liberalism.
I direct the interested observer to pages 125–26 of the Hobbes book,
where Strauss quite eloquently and poignantly describes how ill-
equipped, emotionally and psychologically, he believes the average hu-
man being to be for the kind of freedom bestowed upon him by Hobbes
and subsequent modern ‘enlighteners’.21
* * * * *
To return, then, to Strauss’ criticism of Schmitt in his commentary on the
Concept of the Political: a state, like Schmitt’s neo-Hobbesian state, that is
agnostic with respect to the moral, theological, aesthetic, and the like—
that is, a state that leaves judgement and action over these spheres to its
subjects—does not exert sufficient political authority over what he dis-
missively calls ‘culture’ to forestall the civil war conditions that beset
Weimar Germany, and to prevent the twentieth century crisis of the state
in general. The standards of classical political philosophy and monotheis-
tic religions based upon Law, Strauss suggests, unlike their Christian-
Enlightenment successors (including Hobbes), taught that human beings
required a ‘regime’, in the sense of a regimen, that regulated each and
every aspect of their lives.
A true regime, unlike the Hobbesian state, does not merely identify
internal and external enemies, and satisfy the human desire for self-pres-
ervation; it instils habits of behaviour with respect to art, religion, eco-
nomics, and the like, conditioning the internal and external dimensions
of human life, such that human evil is suppressed and human perfection
made possible. In Strauss’s estimation, only such a regime in the sense of
regimen can rule a morally base humanity and make it possible for human
beings to live the good life. In this sense, Lycurgus’s Sparta, Plato’s Kal-
lipolis, theocratic Islam and Judaism stand on one side; Christianity and
liberalism stand on the other.
The Hobbesian state, even as reconstructed by Schmitt, allows ‘dan-
gerous but educable’ humanity to educate itself in so many supposedly
nonpolitical spheres that it remains fundamentally unruly, and hence
inherently dangerous. Echoing a phrase that Schmitt adopted from Dono-
so Cortés, when the latter derided liberalism for shifting all politics ‘onto
the plane of conversation’,22 Strauss declares that Schmitt’s critique of
liberalism occurs within ‘the horizon of liberalism’.23
In his Hobbes book of 1936, perhaps as a gesture to Schmitt, Strauss
backpedals slightly on the issue of whether Hobbes had a conception of
human evil as ‘sin’: the moral attitude against vanity, which Strauss came
to believe motivates Hobbes’s philosophical enterprise, he concedes,
bears residues of Christian critiques of the sin of pride. But, Strauss main-
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tains his earlier line of criticism by affiliating Hobbes with ‘Kant [and]
with the Christian tradition’, particularly on the centrality of ‘individual
conscience’ to his project.24 However, whether Hobbes, or Schmitt for
that matter, maintained a conception of sin is less important than the fact
that their notion of sinfulness is insufficiently radical to engender a politi-
cal solution concomitant with human nature; human nature in dire need
of being ruled, not by a state, but by a regime.
* * * * *
In his 1938 book The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes,25
Schmitt, now a discredited Nazi, returns to a theological, rather than
purely a secular, purely ‘political’, reading of Hobbes’s Leviathan. When
explaining the collapse of the Hobbesian sovereign state, which he still
considers to be the pinnacle of political theory and practice, Schmitt as-
signs to the ‘Jewish philosopher’, Spinoza, the central role in an esoteric
passion play.26 Schmitt posits Hobbes’s absolutist state as a ‘mortal god’
that was betrayed by Spinoza on behalf of ‘his own Jewish people’ with
dramatically detrimental consequences for Christian Europe.27
As Strauss dared him to do, but in ways that he could have scarcely
imagined, Schmitt now reaffiliates the moral, the theological and the po-
litical in his defence of Hobbes—with a vengeance. According to Schmitt,
the God-become-Man Leviathan state, came to earth in order to bring
peace and security to humanity. This mortal god asked its subjects, not
only to exchange obedience for protection, but also to believe, genuinely,
that ‘Jesus is the Christ’. Because he did so, Hobbes cannot be blamed for
turning the Leviathan into a morally neutral, and hence potentially op-
pressive, totalitarian state.
Perhaps in response to Strauss’s Hobbes book of two years before,
Schmitt takes great pains to demonstrate that the Leviathan created by
vulnerable human beings in the natural condition is more than simply
the sum of the wills and the fears of these newly submissive political
subjects. There is, Schmitt insists, a thoroughly theological, transcenden-
tal substance to the mortal god that cannot, as Strauss claimed in his
book, be neutralized merely by the fact that it was created by individual
conscience and individual consent.
Unfairly—in fact, quite cruelly—misusing aspects of the exiled
Strauss’s Spinoza book of 1930, Schmitt here blames that ‘liberal Jew’,
Spinoza, for initiating the fateful demise of God on Earth, the sovereign
state. Spinoza, who could not accept the doctrine of the incarnation, used
the qualified subjective freedom of conscience permitted by Hobbes to
turn particularist societal forces against the unity of what was fundamen-
tally a Christian state, all in the subversive interests of assimilating
Jews.28
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According to this narrative, Spinoza and the Jews effectively recrucify
divinity incarnate, the Leviathan state, on the cross of private conscience,
unleashing chaos and disorder on the Christian world in the form of the
Enlightenment, the age of revolutions, world wars, and even, at the deep-
est levels of the text, the mechanically oppressive and abusive Nazi state
itself.29 The Jews—not Hobbes, and certainly not Schmitt himself—the
Plettenberg jurist so reprehensibly intimates, are ultimately responsible
for the eventual emergence of the Third Reich.
After the war, even when the horrors of the Holocaust had been ex-
posed to the entire world, Carl Schmitt, who so enthusiastically sup-
ported the Third Reich, still, quite chillingly declared: ‘Really, the assimi-
lated Jew is the true enemy’.30 History, experience and prudence may
have compelled the mature Leo Strauss, in his postwar writings, to
change fundamentally his youthful criticisms of liberalism.31 Schmitt, for
his part, clearly proved impervious to learning of any kind.32
* * * * *
Contemporary theocratic enemies of liberal democracy share Schmitt’s
and Strauss’s anxieties over the simultaneous weakness and strength of
Enlightenment principles and practice. Many right-wing Christians, po-
litically motivated Orthodox Jews and fundamentalist Muslims abhor the
vision of ‘mere life’ seductively offered by Western capitalism and often,
arguably, imposed by Western imperialism. The rejection of sin constitu-
ent of the Enlightenment’s telos of human life—for example, personal
security, sexual liberation and consumer consumption—represents noth-
ing short of the rejection of God himself. It betrays monotheism’s under-
standing that the perfectibility of man is realizable only through obedi-
ence to divinely sanctioned law, which regulates every facet of human
life so as to turn believers away from iniquity and toward God’s will.
It is perhaps no accident that the most radical adherents of these vari-
ous fundamentalisms often engage in suicide missions that violently tar-
get institutions and persons associated with the free market, sexual per-
missiveness, and tolerance of difference (e.g., global trade centres, abor-
tion clinics, LGBT organizations and enclaves of immigrants or racial
minorities). In killing others, they express utter desperation over the
seemingly ineluctable progress of Enlightenment principles; in killing
themselves, they blatantly defy the primacy of self-preservation at the
core of Enlightenment legitimacy.
In Europe today, these motivations take a peculiar and dangerously
toxic form. Far-right movements often mix appeals to traditional Chris-
tian values with a cynical embrace of certain Enlightenment principles
such as liberty, equality and even women’s rights in efforts to target non-
Christian immigrants as enemies of ‘the nation’ or ‘our way of life’. Si-
multaneously, centre-right governments, increasingly neoliberal in orien-
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tation, pursue policies that disproportionately immiserate members of
these non-Christian communities throughout Europe—effectively deny-
ing them the fruits of Enlightenment progress that life in ‘the West’ so
chauvinistically promises. The interaction of these forces perpetuates a
vicious cycle in which intolerance and neglect encourage more radical
responses on the part of the oppressed, which then supposedly legitimate
more virulently exclusionary political programmes and policies from
ever more rightward-moving parties and governments. Just how far this
dynamic will go, we do not know.
The temptation to contemporary Europe posed by the young Schmitt
and the even younger Strauss is this: since authority cannot be legitimat-
ed upon the basis of Enlightenment rationality, ‘our own’ theologically
legitimated authority must prevail over foreign, non-European ones that
seek to infiltrate ‘our’ societies and overthrow ‘our’ ways of life. Europe
must resist both the premise and the conclusion of the Schmittian-Straus-
sian temptation: it must reject the proposition that the Enlightenment is
dead; and it must resist the attempt to formulate and impose new, but
nostalgic, forms of authority based upon a substantive ‘European’ vision
of the good life. The solution to the most recent crisis of Enlightenment
rationality in Europe is more—not less—enlightenment.
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Crisis and the Consumer
Reconstructions of Liberalism in Twentieth-Century
Political Thought
Niklas Olsen
The weakening of consumer credit laws has been identified as a central
factor which has contributed to the ongoing financial crisis. Policymakers
in the EU and the US have thus turned their attention to financial consu-
mer protection, adopting a range of policy measures to counter crisis-
related failures. The US financial reform overhaul established a new fed-
eral agency that was to be solely responsible for consumer protection, the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. At the same time, the European
Commission brought forward a policy package, including new supervi-
sory authorities, which changed the institutional design of financial con-
sumer protection in the EU.1
The weakening of consumer credit was allegedly caused by the idea of
the ‘sovereign consumer’. That is, the idea that all economic processes are
ultimately directed towards satisfying the wants of a critical and inde-
pendent consumer, who exerts sovereignty over the marketplace and
demands little government regulation. Since the sovereign consumer was
viewed as an agent, whose dynamic ruling of the market ensured not
only efficiency, wealth and entrepreneurship, but also freedom, democra-
cy and individuality, banks were allowed, if not obliged, to meet his or
her borrowing needs.2
But what are the origins of the idea of the sovereign consumer? How,
in which contexts, and by whom, was the idea created? What has been
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said about the sovereign consumer in the past, and how did the figure
come to play a key role in the present?
Exploring the history of the sovereign consumer, this chapter presents
three arguments: (1) The sovereign consumer is a phenomenon marked
by crisis, as the figure has not only contributed to the ongoing crisis, but
was also born of one, namely, the crisis of the interwar period; (2) The
history of the sovereign consumer is closely related to the history of
neoliberalism: the figure was invented by liberal free-market thinkers in
attempts to defend, to legitimize and to renew liberalism in the 1920s and
1930s, and it was widely disseminated by a new generation of liberals,
who sought to reconstruct liberal ideology after 1945; and (3) The sove-
reign consumer that was disseminated after 1945 is identical to the figure
which contributed to the financial crisis in the 2000s, but was different
from the one that was born of the crisis of the 1930s. In fact, a radical
change of the liberal sovereign consumer took place between the two
crises. This change concerned the degree of sovereignty and rationality
that liberals ascribed to the consumer, and the ways in which they related
the figure of the consumer to the ideals of economic efficiency and politi-
cal democracy.
THE EMERGENCE OF THE SOVEREIGN CONSUMER
The idea of the sovereign consumer was born in the interwar period.
However, the idea of the consumer as the pivotal point of the capitalist
economy can be traced back to Adam Smith, who, in The Wealth of Na-
tions, wrote:
Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the
interest of the producer ought to be attended to, only so far as it may be
necessary for promoting that of the consumer.3
Smith’s assessment, however, did not dominate classical economic theo-
ry, in which the producer was commonly viewed as the nexus of the
economy. Portraying the producer as a figure possessing special capabil-
ities and propensities when it came to creating economic growth, much
nineteenth-century economic theory thus focused on the instituting con-
ditions in which the entrepreneur-producer could boost the economy in
the best possible way.
The marginal revolution in the late nineteenth century contributed to
a shift of focus from supply to demand, unfolding as a scientific quest to
settle the laws of value and prices, to determine how, when, and why
consumers choose to use their money. In this quest, the marginalists pur-
sued mathematical utility in an endeavour to establish an idealized figure
of an economic agent, who acted with full information, complete rational-
ity and without obstacles in a market of perfect competition. In other
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words, they constructed a one-dimensional and mechanical consumer,
which came to inform mainstream neoclassical economics. This consu-
mer was increasingly confined as an object of study in the laboratory of
economists and thus detached from real-life observations.4
When American and European free-market thinkers in the early twen-
tieth century began to portray the consumer as a key agent in the econo-
my, they both relied on and departed from the neoclassical agent shaped
by the marginal revolution. Most notably, they did not ascribe the same
perfect rationality and predictability to consumers as the neoclassicists
had. In the view of the free-market thinkers, even if consumers acted
rationally upon the basis of the available information, few individuals
knew exactly what they wanted in the future or how to get it. Instead,
consumers expressed many and changing desires or needs and pursued
these in different ways. Notwithstanding this, or, rather, because of this,
free-market thinkers viewed an economy which forced producers to in-
vent new and better things to keep up with consumer favour, as an effec-
tive, prosperous, and, as such, rational system. Moreover, the free-market
thinkers took the consumer out of the laboratory and into the real world,
as they began to portray the figure as the key driver of capitalism and
liberal democracy. In this process, using the consumer to describe and
legitimize a particular economic-political order, they deeply moralized
the figure.
The Austrian-inspired American economist Frank Fetter was the first
free-market thinker in the twentieth century to connect consumers, capi-
talism and liberal democracy directly. In his 1905 book The Principles of
Economics, Fetter stated that the ‘consumers of products are the true pur-
chasers of labor, materials, and uses of agents’. Moreover, he made an
analogy between the market and the democratic form of government,
arguing that the market ‘is a democracy where every penny gives a right
to vote’.5 Fetter did not further elaborate on this comparison of democra-
cy and markets. However, his staging of consumers as key agents in the
capitalist economy, and his arguments concerning the effective, demo-
cratic and just nature of the market economy, was picked up by other
free-market thinkers, who reacted to the bad reputation that liberalism
had acquired in public political discourse in the early twentieth century.
Liberalism’s flawed reputation had its roots in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, when the ideology had gradually been associated with negative
developments and values, such as the exploitation of the working classes,
monopolism and egoism, and, after WWI, also with economic crisis. The
criticism intensified in the interwar years, when intellectuals and politi-
cians often described liberalism as a fragile project, one which was unable
to sustain a legitimate political order and effectively respond to the many
challenges posed by the modern world. In reaction, liberal ideology was,
in many contexts, modified and entirely abandoned in self-declared liber-
al milieus.6
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One crucial break with ‘classic liberalism’ was voiced as ideas of a
‘new’ and more ‘social’ liberalism, which became widespread from the
end of the nineteenth century, and later came to provide the foundation
for practical politics. Through a reconciliation with the new socialistic
and democratic forces, and based upon the conviction that the state
should provide its citizens with equal opportunities by offering social
services in areas of health, education, welfare and unemployment, social
liberalism aimed to create a community in which the individual could
unfold and contribute to the community.7
Free-market thinkers responded differently to the crisis of liberalism:
they sought to redraw ‘rather than to reformulate radically’ the principles
informing classic liberalism. Mobilizing in the wake of the Russian Revo-
lution, they especially aimed to explicate the virtues of liberalism and the
market vis-à-vis socialism and the planned economy, and they assigned a
key role to the consumer in this endeavour.
Crucial, in this respect, was the Austrian economist Ludwig von
Mises’ article titled ‘Die Wirtschaftsrechnung im Sozialistischen Gemeinwe-
sen’ (‘Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth’) of 1920,
which was followed up by the book Die Gemeinwirtschaft (Socialism) in
1922.8 In both texts, Mises argued that socialist systems had a calculation
problem due to their incapability to determine prices, resulting from the
fact that production is directed from a central authority and not by consu-
mer demand. In Socialism, referring to Fetter’s The Principles of Economics,
Mises claimed that ‘the lord of production is the consumer’ in liberal
capitalism and that ‘all production must bend to the will of the consumer’
in this system. He added:
From this point of view the capitalist society is a democracy in which
every penny represents a ballot paper. It is a democracy with an imper-
ative and immediately revocable mandate to its deputies. It is a consu-
mers’ democracy.9
In short, Mises defended and legitimized liberal capitalism by
(re)describing it as an economically well-ordered, rational and democrat-
ic system, as it rested on the demands of ordinary people and not on the
narrow interests of those in power of the centralized, planned economies.
In The Case for Capitalism from 1920, chief editor of the Economist,
Hartley Withers, had launched a criticism of socialism and a defence of
capitalism that was identical to that of Mises. ‘Capitalism’, Withers states,
‘puts the real power in the hands of the average consumer, and so suffers
from and rejoices in all the weakness and force, all the hopefulness and
despair, that are associated with democracy’.10 Against this background,
he concluded:
With regard to the consumer’s freedom, it [capitalism] beats State So-
cialism and Guild Socialism so hollow that they are hardly to be seen
on the course.11
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It is thus fitting that, in second edition of Die Gemeinwirtschaft, which
appeared in 1932 at the height of the calculation debate, Mises had in-
serted a sentence which referred the reader to the ‘striking remarks in
Wither’s, The Case for Capitalism’, alongside his reference to Fetter’s The
Principles of Economics.12
More generally, in the socialist calculation debate, free-market think-
ers increasingly portrayed the free consumer as the key agent of capital-
ism and liberal democracy in attempts to defend liberalism and attack
socialism.13 Against this background, they judged economic-political sys-
tems according to their capacity to fulfil consumer desires or needs.
This was also the case in the 1935 volume entitled Collectivist Economic
Planning, edited by the Austrian economist Friedrich A. von Hayek.
Among other things, in his afterword to the book, Hayek labelled a sec-
tion which discussed the problems of socialist calculation, the ‘Abroga-
tion of the Sovereignty of the Consumer’. Without elaborating on the
concept, Hayek asserted that it was an ideal ‘which few who realized
what it meant would readily abandon’.14 In the same year, German econ-
omist Wilhelm Röpke, who became a key actor in the fight for liberalism
against socialism, referred in passing to a ‘democracy of consumers’ in an
article titled ‘Fascist Economics’.15
Evidently, a language portraying the consumer as a key agent of capi-
talism and liberal democracy had been underway since the early twenti-
eth century and became widespread in the 1930s. However, this was not
the only notion of the consumer that was disseminated at the time, and it
was far from the most dominant one.
Having emerged as a figure in social-political discourse in the nine-
teenth century, the consumer was pushed to the centre of public and
political discourse in Europe and the US in the interwar years. In this
process, previously separate discourses of the consumer, for example,
within social politics and economic thought, were combined. This created
a universal category of the consumer, a figure now imbued with a plural-
ity of societal practices and virtues. Elevating the figure into a key figure
of modern society, many politicians, scholars and intellectuals described
the consumer as an agent capable of ensuring and enhancing economic
growth and political democracy. More specifically, and most pronounced
in the US, consumer choice and the act of consumption were portrayed as
features that were necessary to boost the national economy and strength-
en the democracies of Western countries against the threats of fascism
and Communism.16
However, the issue of how consumers could best contribute to eco-
nomic growth and democratic development within society was strongly
contested. The contestation to a great extent concerned the question of
whether consumers tended to thrive within free markets, or benefit from
a regulatory framework aimed at protecting the consumer from market
forces. The consumer debates not only divided free-market thinkers and
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socialists, but also exposed a split among liberals concerning how to deal
with the crisis of liberalism. This split was evident, for example, in rela-
tion to the New Deal. On the one hand, free-market thinkers embraced a
sovereign consumer steeped in the ideals of classical liberalism and in
line with the one launched in the realm of marketing where the figure
was often portrayed as ‘Voter’, ‘Judge’ and ‘Jury’, dictating what is pro-
duced on the market by his or her choices.17 On the other hand, the so-
called citizen consumer was launched by social liberal reformers as an
ideal that safeguarded the rights of individual consumers and acted on a
commitment to the common good. This ideal involved a conception of
the new American democracy as based upon consumers, who were gath-
ered in protection agencies and represented on all major advisory boards
and agencies. Linked to a social definition of citizenship, which incorpo-
rated consumer choice, the idea of the citizen consumer was connected to
frameworks of state regulation and social policy that aimed to remedy
market flaws, protect consumers from manipulative advertising, and
provide them with equal economic and social opportunities.18
In the 1930s, the consumer debates were joined by a number of liber-
als, who believed that laissez-faire had to be abandoned if liberalism was
to be saved from its contemporary crisis. In a European context, this crisis
was deepened by the upsurge of Communist and fascism, which drew on
very different ideas of how the ‘masses’ ought to be incorporated into a
legitimate and durable political system, and what role the state and the
individual should play in modern society.
In 1938, twenty-three liberal thinkers from several countries met at the
so-called Colloque Walter Lippmann in Paris to discuss the challenges to
liberalism. Besides the American journalist and intellectual Walter Lipp-
mann, the participants included, among others, Ludwig von Mises and
Friedrich A. von Hayek, economists Wilhelm Röpke and Alexander
Rüstow from Germany, and philosophers Raymond Aron and Louis
Rougier from France. At the meeting, they outlined an agenda, which
they labelled ‘neoliberal’, and which concerned ideological principles
and organizational activities aimed at creating liberal societal orders
based upon the rule of law, the price mechanism, and the role of the state
as an actor within a market economy. While the agenda came to a halt at
the outbreak of the WWII, some of the (neo)liberals, who had met in Paris
in 1938, resumed their ideological labour in the Mont Pelerin Society; the
transnational association of economists, intellectuals and businessmen
founded by Friedrich von Hayek in Switzerland in 1947, which is today
known as the cradle of neoliberalism.19
In the period from the 1930s to the 1950s, neoliberalism was ‘anything
but a succinct, clearly defined political philosophy’.20 Even if the mem-
bers of the neoliberal network agreed on the overall aim of developing a
liberal ideology based upon a free-market economy and notions of indi-
vidual freedom, they embraced different variants of liberalism. At the
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one end of the spectrum, Ludwig von Mises argued that a classical liber-
alism based upon individual property rights, free markets and minimal
government intervention would lead to a peaceful, prosperous and just
society. At the other end, figures such as the philosopher Karl Popper
embraced a more social liberal discourse, viewing state regulation and
distribution of the economy as essential to a liberal society.
In fact, in the 1930s and 1940s, several members of the neoliberal
network were deeply suspicious of nineteenth-century capitalism, asso-
ciating unregulated markets with two problems.21 First, recent develop-
ments had shown that capitalism not only brought about prosperity and
freedom, but also inequality and widespread poverty. In this respect,
these liberals endorsed various degrees of governmental economic regu-
lation and wealth redistribution. However, they had no intention of em-
barking on a system of socialist planning, as they held a free-market
system to be vital for a just society.
Second, the liberals in question had come to believe that markets were
not naturally made, but had to be created and maintained, since history
had shown that unregulated markets invariably led to the rise of monop-
olies and the misuse of human and environmental resources. In other
words, they were convinced that strong systemic frames were needed to
secure the workings of the price mechanism and the ability of the market
to bring about growth, freedom and justice (for the ordoliberal trajectory
of the neoliberal attempts to institute legal systems aimed at creating
market economies, see the contribution by Christian Jöerges, chapter 9 in
this volume). They therefore called upon the state to create and maintain
the free market. The key question was how to define the state’s positive
functions: How extensive should they be, and should they mainly focus
on creating an effective market or on mitigating its negative conse-
quences?
WILLIAM H. HUTT’S CONCEPT OF CONSUMERS’ SOVEREIGNTY
For the British economist William H. Hutt, who was a founding member
of the Mont Pelerin Society, the state’s functions were also the key issue to
be pondered in the 1930s. It was in this context that, in his 1936 book
Economists and the Public: A Study of Competition and Opinion, he elaborat-
ed on and, for the first time, explicitly named the sovereign consumer
figure by launching the concept of the ‘consumers’ sovereignty’.22
Economists and the Public contained many—at times conflicting—mes-
sages. In many chapters, Hutt reiterated arguments known from free-
market thinkers such as Frank Fetter, Hartley Withers and Ludwig von
Mises, giving the impression that his aim was exclusively to rehabilitate
laissez-faire liberalism and its proponents.
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In the first part of the book, he argued for the necessity to restore the
authority that liberal economists had allegedly once enjoyed in the public
debate.23 According to Hutt, economists had contributed to their own
downfall, as they had abandoned economic truth (i.e., the doctrines of
laissez-faire) in the pursuit of their personal interests and political ambi-
tions, thus causing what he understood to be a ‘crisis of public power and
authority’ (see the introduction to this volume) of liberal economics. His
solution to the ineffectiveness of the economic discipline was to form an
‘Association of Pure Economists’, whose members should focus only on
making objective statements and forsake all connections to politics and
business. Their task was to explicate and defend the market system, so
that the public would understand its rationality and virtues.24
In the second part of the book, Hutt argued for the necessity to restore
and maintain a free-market economy. It was in this context that, in a
chapter with the same title, he introduced the notion of ‘consumers’ sove-
reignty’. ‘The consumer,’ Hutt wrote, ‘is sovereign when, in his role of
citizen, he has not delegated to political institutions for authoritarian use
the power which he can exercise socially through his power to demand
(or refrain from demanding)’.25 To this, he added that the power as-
signed to the consumer is to be viewed as an expression of democratic
values in achieving ‘the social control which maximizes liberty and jus-
tice’.26 As such, Hutt made it clear that, next to making an argument
about market efficiency, his vision of ‘consumers’ sovereignty’ comprised
a set of social norms and political ideas that were central to liberal soci-
ety.
More precisely, according to Hutt, if liberal economics and free-mar-
ket thought were to regain public power and authority, it was necessary
to outline a new liberal political order that drew its legitimacy from no-
tions of democracy, freedom, and liberty. What, in his perspective, made
the principle of ‘consumers’ sovereignty’ a suitable basis for such an
order was its ‘superior ethical significance in liberty and freedom of
choice’, meaning that it gave consumers the choice between accepting
and rejecting a market offering, and thereby constituted an open system
that reflected people’s preferences.27
By giving consumers such great power in determining the allocation
of resources and the course of production, Hutt not only answered those
who criticized liberalism for its lack of a clear source and symbol of
societal order, he also launched a defence against the Marxist conception
of capitalism as a system merely enriching the owners of the means of
production. At the same time, he argued that the case for competition
also relied on the consent of producers, and that they ought to view a
societal order based upon ‘consumers’ sovereignty’ as far more attractive
than the available alternatives in the 1930s, as, in a market society, pro-
ducers are dependent on the many and divergent choices of the consu-
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mer and not on a web of constraints posed by the state or by the often
unidentifiable networks of power in a totalitarian system.
Hutt justified the supremacy of the consumer over the producer on
the grounds ‘that every individual is, after all, not only a producer but a
consumer—that every individual is not only subject but sovereign’.28 In
this context, echoing the parallel between consumer choice and the ballot
box first outlined by Frank Fetter, he extended the mechanisms of liberal
democracy to the market, ascribing the same measure of social validity
and a similar rationality ‘on the part of voters in an election and consu-
mers in a market place’.29 However, it was not ideals of economic effi-
ciency or wealth maximization that were at the core of Hutt’s notion of
consumer’s democracy, but the view that only minimal restrictions
should be placed on personal freedom. His ambition was to create a
system that leaves the individual free to adjust ‘his conduct in the way he
thinks will bring him the maximum of satisfaction of all kinds he can take
from society’.30 As this freedom not only concerned the actions of buying
and selling, but also, more broadly, how individuals choose to organize
and live their lives, it necessitated a willingness to tolerate the choices of
other individuals, so as to defuse the potential for conflict. ‘The case for
competition rests on this tolerance’, he emphasized, thus calling upon a
classical liberal virtue that was under growing pressure in the 1930s.31
Indeed, by merging notions of liberty, individualism and tolerance
with conceptions of legitimacy, sovereignty and power, Hutt was updat-
ing liberalism to the age of ideologies, and he evidently assigned greater
value and trust to the mechanisms of capitalism and liberal democracy
than communist and fascist ideologies did. Both of these ideologies
sought to deal with the ‘the rise of the masses’ through creating a suppos-
edly democratic unity of the people both by means of and within a total
state.32 Launching consumer sovereignty as part of the contemporary
battle about the meaning of democracy and the role of the market in this
context, Hutt sought to portray the market—‘and liberalism more gener-
ally’—as much more democratic than the so-called people’s democracies
proposed by communists and fascists. This involved an attempt to turn
the masses into sovereign consumers who dictated a well-ordered, effi-
cient and legitimate liberal-capitalist system. In this process, Hutt tapped
deeply into the consumer language that free-market thinkers had out-
lined in the first decades of the twentieth century.33 However, he not only
outlined a ‘thicker’ description of the consumer, but also unfolded a view
of the nature and dynamics of consumers and markets that was more
pessimistic than the one expressed by Fetter, Withers and Mises.
Most importantly, Hutt identified crucial limitations in the democratic
and liberating potential encompassed in the notion of consumers’ sove-
reignty. To begin with, discussing the formation of preferences among
consumers, he expressed doubts about the ability of consumers to know
what was in their own best interest. According to Hutt, instead of reflect-
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ing the individual’s unique being, ‘[o]ur tastes and desires have after all
been almost wholly imposed upon us by the teachings, the tastes and the
standards of those among whom we live’.34 In fact, Hutt added, due to
social traditions, and influenced by techniques of modern advertising,
consumers often bought utterly useless things.
Rejecting the idea that individuals are perfectly rational on the mar-
ketplace, Hutt placed himself in line with those free-market thinkers,
who drew attention to the limitations of free markets, and found it im-
possible to return to laissez-faire. One of the most influential American
representatives of these thinkers was the Chicago economist Frank
Knight, whose 1923 essay ‘The Ethics of Competition’ was often referred
to by Hutt and discussed in his Economists and the Public. Among the
many limitations that Knight identified in unregulated capitalism was
precisely that it was the surrounding cultural environments that for the
most part form human needs. ‘In fact’, he wrote, ‘human activity is large-
ly impulsive, a relatively unthinking and undetermined response to stim-
ulus and suggestion.’35
Sharing Knight’s concern about the lack of individual rationality, Hutt
nevertheless argued that the supreme norm of freedom outweighed this
deficiency of consumers’ sovereignty. In his view, individuals should be
free to choose, regardless of the quality of their choices, and he thus
portrayed consumer irrationality as an inevitable feature of what Knight,
in his essay, had labelled the ‘great’ and ‘competitive game’ of capitalism.
In addition, Hutt was hoping that time and experience would remedy
the irrationality of consumers. In this respect, he picked up on an idea
that was widespread among free-market thinkers, and which can be
traced back to the work of Carl Menger, the founder of Austrian Econom-
ics.36 Diverging from the marginalist calculus, Menger included the pos-
sibility of error in individualistic decision making, but also believed that
societal progress would, in various ways, enable individuals to under-
stand what their own needs actually were. Liberal thinkers, such as Hutt,
agreed with this belief. They, moreover, expected that errors and mis-
takes on the marketplace would result in increased consumer intelli-
gence, thus ascribing certain rationality to the capitalist system.
However, Hutt’s optimism was limited. He went on to argue for ‘edu-
cative restraints of freedom of choice’, which was to be undertaken via
government action in order to ‘protect the individual from the unforesee-
able results of his voluntary acts’.37 This was far from the only area of
state activity that he introduced in Economists and the Public. Most impor-
tantly, he identified two further (and more crucial) limitations to the
democratic potential comprised by the notion of consumers’ sovereignty,
namely, (1) that votes in the marketplace are not evenly distributed
among the population, due to the huge inequalities of income and wealth
in modern society; and (2) that unregulated competition creates condi-
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tions in which the price mechanism is undercut and resources are exploit-
ed in undesirable ways by business and other kinds of vested interests.
According to Hutt, free-market economists had, in fact, always been
aware of the various limitations of the market and had also outlined a
variety of measures to remedy them, but they had eventually failed to
use this knowledge in the pursuit of personal interests and political ambi-
tions, leading to this knowledge being discarded. However, the concern
for market deficiencies and the flaws that Hutt ascribed to the tradition of
free-market thought were more in line with contemporary social liberals
than with figures such as Fetter, Mises and Withers. So were the meas-
ures that he endorsed to address the flaws.
In order to level out the democratic playing field and remedy the
malfunctions of unregulated competition, Hutt thus presented a rather
comprehensive governmental programme. Besides public education, the
programme involved a minimization of the inequalities of wealth
through the drastic restriction of private inheritance, steeply progressive
taxation, and the removal of the sources of special privilege, including
labour unions and monopolies. As such, reinterpreting liberalism into a
doctrine that views substantial state intervention in the economy as nec-
essary to ensure functioning markets as well as justice and equality in a
modern society, Economists and the Public formed part of mainstream neo-
liberal discourse in the 1930s.
Like other neoliberals in the 1930s, Hutt reflected on the violation of
individual liberty that his societal visions involved and offered a valida-
tion for it. This validation was based upon the belief that complete free-
dom in modern society is both undesirable and utopian, and that re-
straints are legitimate if they are ‘inevitable’, ‘impartial’, and ‘impersonal’
in nature.38 But it also rested on the conviction that the possibility of
restoring the public power and authority of liberalism was inextricably
bound up with its ability to enhance justice, equality and security more
broadly in modern society. ‘It rests on a common-sense view of history,’
Hutt concluded about his concept of consumers’ sovereignty, ‘which sug-
gests that people will consent to be ruled only in a regime which can be
seen to give them equal rights and equality of opportunity’.39
Overall, Hutt aimed to establish a market economy based upon free
prices and competition, which was directed toward satisfying consumer
choice. However, he argued that markets and consumers were imperfect
and susceptible beings that had to be regulated and protected, respective-
ly. He assigned the state a substantial role in this context. By breaking up
monopolies, restricting advertisement activity, enforcing taxation and en-
suring social welfare activities, free and fair competition as well as basic
economic, political and social consumer rights would be secured. Even if
it was marked by tensions, Hutt saw consumers’ sovereignty as the best
solution to the contemporary challenges. In his eyes, it’s favouring of
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political democracy and social freedom simply constituted a better soci-
etal model than competing societal visions in the 1930s did.
THE SOVEREIGN CONSUMER RELAUNCHED AND RESHAPED
Among the many neoliberal thinkers in 1930s and 1940s who shared the
main positions outlined in Economists and the Public were key representa-
tives of the Chicago School, such as Henry C. Simons and Jacob Viner,
and their younger associates Milton Friedman and George Stigler.
However, in the period from the 1950s to the 1970s, Friedman and
Stigler were instrumental in taking the Chicago School and the project of
neoliberalism in a new direction. In this process, they turned key argu-
ments outlined in the work of neoliberal thinkers such as William H. Hutt
upside down, including his idea that markets and consumers must be
created and protected by the state. Friedman and Stigler thus vented a
high degree of trust in the efficiency and self-protective mechanisms of
markets and consumers, who they understood as sovereign, largely ra-
tional, and utility-maximizing agents. Moreover, they expressed a deep
scepticism toward governmental regulation and claimed that business
monopoly was no real problem for a competitive economy.
A passage in the opening chapter of Friedman’s Capitalism and Free-
dom published in 1962 illustrates the new view on the sovereign consu-
mer that he launched with Stigler:
The consumer is protected from coercion by the seller because of the
presence of other sellers with whom he can deal. The seller is protected
from coercion by the consumer because of other consumers to whom
he can sell. The employee is protected from coercion by the employer
because of other employers for whom he can work, and so on. And the
market does this impersonally and without centralized authority. In-
deed, a major source of objection to a free economy is precisely that it
does this task so well. It gives people what they want instead of what a
particular group thinks they ought to want. Underlying most argu-
ments against the free market is a lack of belief in freedom itself.40
Friedman and Stigler’s reinterpretation of the sovereign consumer is to
be understood against the background of changed societal contexts after
1945. Most importantly, the reinterpretation unfolded as a reaction to the
ways in which regulation was theorized and practised in postwar Ameri-
ca; it took place against the background of the profound transformation
of the economics discipline that took place in the 1950s and 1960s; and it
was shaped by new political contexts, such as the Cold War.
The postwar American political economy was characterized by a rein-
forcement of the socially-embedded managed capitalism and the regula-
tory framework that had been created in the 1930s. More specifically, in
the 1950s and 1960s, this regulatory framework developed into a compre-
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hensive system of independent federal commissions and agencies, which
oversaw the nation’s crucial infrastructure industries and were in charge
of setting prices, quality, and quantity standards, thus determining which
firms could enter or leave a market, what goods and services could be
offered, and how the goods and services were to be sold. All these and
other industry-specific and economy-wide agencies amounted to a far-
reaching regulatory system, which imposed conditions on market trans-
actions between either producers and consumers or firms and workers.41
The scope of the American regulatory system peaked in the 1960s and
early 1970s, aided by consumer advocates such as Ralph Nader, who
became famous for demanding aggressive state intervention to protect
Americans from dangerous consumer products.42
Similar to the New Deal reformers, consumer advocates such as Ralph
Nader and the supporters of the regulatory framework conceptualized a
highly vulnerable and susceptible consumer trapped within a malfunc-
tioning, manipulative and repressive capitalist system. A similar consu-
mer ideal was found in the flood of literature appearing in the postwar
period that heavily criticized the contemporary purchaser consumerist
culture for being individualistic, socially divisive and wasteful, and
which, moreover, claimed that consumer choice was deeply manipulated
by the power of advertising. Some of the most well-known contributions
came from social liberal critics, such as journalist Vance Packard and
economist John Kenneth Galbraith, both of whom sounded the alarm bell
warning against postwar consumption culture and politics with their re-
spective books The Hidden Persuaders (1957) and The Affluent Society
(1958). Both argued that certain actors on the market (consumer research
and advertising) tried to manipulate consumer desires and needs, and
Galbraith also contended that the new demands created by advertising
led to exuberance in private production and consumption that pushed
out public spending and investment.43 According to Galbraith, the result
would be private affluence and public poverty, and, next to government
protection of the consumer, he therefore called for comprehensive eco-
nomic regulation and redistribution.
While Galbraith represented typical views of markets and consumers
in the political realm, he found himself increasingly at odds with the
views on these issues among his colleagues in the American economics
discipline, which underwent a profound transformation in the 1950s and
1960s. Here, the discipline came to be characterized by neoclassicism as a
dominant framework, replacing the plurality of approaches characteris-
ing the interwar years. This included a growing faith in the workings of
free competition and the ideal of a utility-maximizing economic agent,
acting with full information and complete rationality to maximize indi-
vidual utility in a market of perfect competition.44
Scholars from the Chicago School such as Friedman and Stigler were
key figures in the transformation of the US economics discipline from
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interwar pluralism to postwar neoclassicism. They also played vital roles
in changing the Mont Pelerin Society in the 1950s and 1960s. From gather-
ing a heterogeneous group of intellectuals, philosophers and economists
studying the relations between market and state from many different
angles and embracing various visions of liberal society, under their lead-
ership, the Mont Pelerin Society was turned into an association of mainly
free-market oriented, neoclassical economists.45
It was against this background, and in reaction to the views on regula-
tion and consumers associated with figures such as Galbraith and Nader,
that Friedman and Stigler began to express a firm belief in the efficiency
and self-protective mechanisms of markets and consumers, and deep
scepticism toward government regulation. The context of the Cold War
was arguably important for the hardening of their beliefs, as the dis-
course of choice was linked to the struggle for democratic over totalitar-
ian values.46
Yet there were crucial differences in the ideals of the consumer and
the ways of relating capitalism to democracy in the work of Friedman
and Stigler. These differences speak to the further development of neolib-
eralism and the Chicago School in the 1960s and 1970s. On the one hand,
similar to early neoliberal thinkers such as Hutt, Friedman had referred
to the enhancement of equality, innovation and meritocracy that suppos-
edly result from freeing individuals as consumers on the market place.
Stigler, on the other hand, contributed to shaping a sovereign consumer,
which disconnected ideals of economic efficiency, utility and growth
from those of democracy, equality and moral behaviour. This consumer
was positioned at the centre of the Chicago School that later to manifest
itself in the 1970s.47
Stigler’s sovereign consumer was rooted in a strong belief in the util-
ity of the maximising nature of individuals and in a definition of econom-
ics as dealing with the relationship between ends and scarce means. This
involved a strict analytical focus on how individual preferences play out
in their choices between scarce means and ends, and on outlining the
principles that most effectively governs the allocation of scarce means
among competing ends. It also involved a view of distributional issues as
not falling within the category of economic analysis, as it was deemed
impossible to arrive at interpersonal comparisons of individual prefer-
ences and utility, which could form the basis of overall social welfare
distribution.
Against this background, aiming to outline the principles that most
effectively govern the allocation of scarce means among competing ends,
Stigler argued that individuals generate more efficiency and wealth as
consumers on the market than as agents entering and capturing govern-
ment bodies for individual utility. Moreover, he claimed that monopoly
was not a problem for a competitive economy, thus allowing markets to
be dominated by a few and very powerful firms. And while agency and
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initiative was handed over to the big players, consumer action was limit-
ed to that of reacting to price signals on the market in order to maximize
the value of the goods produced and secure efficiency and growth. Re-
duced to tools for economic efficiency, the sovereignty of consumers was
thus bounded. In addition, they were understood as a homogenous, me-
chanical and predictable mass, rather than as a heterogeneous group of
individuals with divergent qualities and preferences or basic social and
political rights.48
In the context of the crisis and breakdown of Keynesianism, the fea-
tures characterising the work of George Stigler and like-minded scholars
such as Chicago School scholar Gary Becker and public choice theorist
James Buchanan (both of whom served as presidents of the Mont Pelerin
Society) became increasingly prominent in the way in which economics
and politics were conceptualized and redesigned in the US and in West-
ern Europe. In the 1970s and 1980s, governments thus began to experi-
ment with economic liberalization policies such as privatization, deregu-
lation and reductions in government spending in order to enhance the
role of the private sector in the economy.
Two developments are especially relevant to the topic at issue. The
first is the formulation and application in the US of a particular model of
antitrust law, which pursued the new neoliberal ideals of economic effi-
ciency and aggregate wealth. While allowing a market dominated by few
and powerful firms, this model disregarded distributional issues and eth-
ical concerns relating to the societal position and rights of consumers.49
The second is the emergence of so-called ‘privatized Keynesianism’,
which transferred the debt burden to individuals—‘often low-income or
medium-income people, paying high interest-rates for their loans’—
whose spending became linked to unregulated derivatives markets.50 In
this process, government sought to foster and elicit a particular consumer
mentality, which aimed at persuading consumers to exercise sovereignty
by borrowing and spending, as well as trying to ensure that market insti-
tutions responded to and served this mentality. This political-economic
setup played a key role in the process that led to the financial crisis, as
consumers were incentivised to buy into a housing market that turned
out to be a pyramid scheme.51
In spite of new regulatory measures to protect consumers, this politi-
cal economic has not been seriously challenged or replaced. In many
countries, austerity is doggedly pursued to reduce government budget
deficits; banks which contributed to the market crisis were bailed out and
are back in the game; and consumers continue to be portrayed and ad-
dressed as sovereigns, although their sovereignty remains bound and
many have little money at their disposal. These elements are intrinsic to
the dynamics of capital at the beginning at the twenty-first century,
where economic growth is accompanied by extreme inequalities that
threaten to stir discontent and undermine democratic values.52
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The Constitutionalization of Labour
Law and the Crisis of National
Democracy
Chris Thornhill
Many sociologists have observed that the formation of modern societies
as nations was deeply linked to the integrative functions of rights.1 In key
respects, in fact, this common sociological intuition is correct. It is clearly
observable that the extension of societies into their modern national form
was substantially determined by the fact that these societies cemented
increasingly generalized layers of rights to integrate their populations.
To illustrate this, for example, the ideologues of national revolution in
the later Enlightenment originally saw the equal exercise of rights as a
path to a unified national society, and they promoted general rights in
order to supplant the patchwork of particular entitlements which had
underpinned pre-national social structure.2 The revolutionaries of
1789–1795 France began to construct nations by using universal rights to
eradicate rights founded in local distinctions of status or in corporate
distinctions of sectoral or professional affiliation, thus placing single citi-
zens, via rights, in a direct relation to the central organs of the political
system. Famously, just before the French Revolution, Abbé Sieyès de-
fined the nation as a people equal in rights.3 Jean Le Chapelier then con-
cluded, in his (in-)famous law against corporations (1791), that general
personal rights eliminated all corporate structures from society.4 Similar-
ly, in the American Revolution, the rights enunciated in the Federal Con-
stitution were immediately translated into justiciable rights. These were
then used, across the diffuse territories of the new American Republic, as
Chris Thornhill90
institutions that drew persons in different states and different social
spheres into an immediate relation to national law.5
The constitutional revolutions of the eighteenth century thus enunci-
ated a formal diction of national-legal inclusion through rights. This dic-
tion was subsequently translated into objective socio-legal reality
through two distinct processes of legal evolution, which were centred
both on a thickening of the rights and on an extension of national inclu-
sionary structures across society.
In the course of the nineteenth century, on the one hand, the national
construction of society relied on the growing circulation of private rights
and of some civil rights. For example, the growing generalization of pro-
prietary or monetary rights accompanied and refracted an expansion of the
economy, which progressively reduced the social prominence of persis-
tent local patterns of transaction, remuneration and distribution. Like-
wise, the rising importance of the rights of freedom of movement, labour and
contract meant that singular persons in society were able to detach them-
selves from localized corporations and trade associations, and society as
a whole was able to expand beyond its embedded localized limits. Soci-
eties were thus flattened into nations, forming relatively uniform envi-
ronments for their legal and political systems, as they began to include
and regulate the private exchanges of society through the medium of
rights.
In the course of the nineteenth century, on the other hand, some states
began to apply political rights as integrative institutions, and this also
acted to widen societies beyond their original pre-national form. Marx
was manifestly wrong in suggesting that, by the middle of the century,
states in Europe were well on their way to guaranteeing substantial bod-
ies of political rights to the persons that were subject to their authority.6
Very few states began seriously to make good on the inclusionary politi-
cal implications of the constitutional revolutions of the 1780s until
around 1870. Gradually, however, as national societies expanded their
internal inclusivity through private and civil rights, national political sys-
tems were confronted with societal environments which could no longer
be held together through local centres of authority. Most importantly,
they were exposed to social constituencies, which, increasingly released
from local motivational horizons, presupposed that acts of legal direction
should have generalized foundations and command some token of gen-
eralized support. As a result, in societies where rights-based expansion in
the private or economic domain was most advanced, political rights also
began to play a vital role in national inclusion and national formation.
The existence of a rudimentary political franchise, securing a substratum
of general support for the national political system, was established in
most major European states by about 1860.
Overall, therefore, the increasing promotion of rights and the increas-
ing construction of societies as nations were two sides of the same pro-
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cess of social inclusion. Societies evolved as comprehensive systems of
inclusion through the incremental solidification of different strata of
rights, and through the transformation of single actors in society into
holders, first, of generalized private and monetary rights and, second, of
generalized political rights.
If we observe the allocation of rights in this inclusionary perspective,
however, we can identify a dialectical problem at the core of modern
societies and modern states. Manifestly, the allocation of rights by emer-
gent modern states was a precondition for the inclusionary penetration of
the state into society. Simultaneously, however, the allocation of rights
also exposed national political systems to acute inclusionary pressures.
Rights always acted as instruments of nation building and national inclu-
sion. But they also acted, potentially, as destabilizing sources of crisis,
which, in some ways, obstructed the formation of national societies and
national political institutions.
This dialectical quality of rights was determined, first, by the fact that,
in the initial wake of the eighteenth-century revolutions, most societies
concentrated the process of national inclusion primarily into the medium
of private/economic rights, and, for many decades, they did not establish
hard political rights which reached deep into society. This disproportion-
ate emphasis on economic inclusion had a number of results. One conse-
quence of this was that, after 1789, many European societies began to
experience controversies in the system of economic rights, which they
lacked the political resources to moderate or resolve: many societies were
unable to react to the problems generated within the economy, in so far
as these problems could not be reduced to questions posed and resolved
in private law. By the middle of the nineteenth century, therefore, the
élites of most European societies were confronted with intensifying social
problems caused by their one-sided promotion of economic inclusion,
which threatened to spill disruptively into the political domain.7 One
further consequence was that the spheres of society organized through
private economic rights began, in the course of the nineteenth century, to
develop quite autonomous modes of political organization or political
self-organization. Notably, through the middle part of the nineteenth cen-
tury, many societies witnessed the rise of combinations and early trade
unions, which gradually translated economic imperatives into demands
for political rights. Other societies saw the emergence of cartels, which
absorbed certain functions originally performed by guilds and corpora-
tions, and which also conferred a relatively autonomous political struc-
ture on economic interactions. In many cases, these processes led to a
recorporation of society, and the emergence of powerful economic organ-
izations on both sides of the industrial production process formed a
counterweight to the nationally expansive political systems of society
promoted by the eighteenth-century revolutions. The main consequence
of disproportionate economic inclusion, however, was experienced when
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states began to activate political rights as more general media of effective
inclusion. Generally, as already mentioned, it was only in the latter part
of the nineteenth century that states began to allocate extensive political
rights, and effectively to construct a political nation, as the basis for the
political system. By this time, however, states were required quite funda-
mentally to redefine the nations to which they owed their legitimacy.
Owing to their initial asymmetrical reliance on private-legal rights as
instruments of inclusion, states ultimately encountered political nations,
not as communities of equal rights holders, but as societies marked by
quite entrenched economic conflicts, advanced sectoral partitions, and
strict patterns of organizational autonomy. The imbalance in the original
distribution of private and political rights, in short, created longer-term
inclusionary pressures for national states, and it meant that, when they
finally began to integrate their national societies through political rights,
they were required to internalize societies marked by deep fissures, deep
conflicts, and radically divergent material demands, partly caused by the
processes of inclusion triggered by the national revolutions in France and
America. This dialectic of rights first appeared in the earlier dynamics of
state formation and national inclusion in the nineteenth century; howev-
er, it has reappeared in the construction of many contemporary legal-
political entities, where its potential for generating systemic crisis is evi-
dently undiminished.8
Well into the nineteenth century, of course, many societies avoided
this dialectic of rights by perpetuating an essentially local/privatistic
structure, and, as far as possible, by deliberately curtailing the social
penetration of political rights. However, societies which began to allocate
extensive political rights to different social groups were soon obliged to
promote national-societal inclusion through a third stratum of rights:
through rights allotted via the medium of labour law. In much of late
nineteenth-century Europe, labour law typically became the domain of
law which refracted the widening reach of political rights. The expansion
of the inclusionary system of political rights inevitably meant that a sys-
tem of labour rights had to be established, through which national states
absorbed the inclusionary pressures created by political rights. Labour
law thus assumed a vital role in conducting processes of national inclu-
sion which were only precariously performed by private rights and polit-
ical rights.
The process of national inclusion through labour law had already
gained momentum in the nineteenth century. Initially, this process oc-
curred through progressive recognition and, in some cases, limited politi-
cal assimilation, of trade unions. In the later decades of the nineteenth
century, most European societies accepted the legality of trade unions. By
the year 1900, many societies had, in some tentative way, integrated trade
unions into the margins of the political system. In addition, this process
occurred through the establishment of conflict resolution mechanisms in
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factories and productive units. By the late nineteenth century, many Eu-
ropean societies had begun to formalize procedures for arbitration be-
tween rival parties in the industrial process.9 In some settings, tentative
steps toward the institution of collective bargaining were also being tak-
en.10 On each count, labour relations became objects for state regulation,
and labour regulation became part of the fundamental inclusionary struc-
ture of more integrated national political systems. However, this dynamic
of socio-material inclusion underwent dramatic acceleration in the course
of WWI. At a general sociological level, WWI marked a great leap for-
ward in the process of European nation building. Arguably, it was only
in the years 1914–1918 that the concepts of national unity, equal inclusion
under law, equality in rights, and cross-sectoral immediacy to state au-
thority, which had been first proclaimed in and around 1789, became
common objective realities. The revolutionary nation-building impact of
WWI was caused by the fact that belligerent societies promoted the mo-
bilization of all social groups for the war effort, so that differences of
social class, gender, age group, confession and regional affiliation were
diminished in importance in the context of shared national military ad-
versity. The revolutionary nation-building impact of WWI was also
caused by the fact that states were forced to galvanize the entire industri-
al workforce for military production, and governmental ministries were
required to co-opt or secure the compliance of trade unions for the war
effort. This meant that previously privileged élites, such as members of
the aristocracy, lost their elevated standing in the peripheries of govern-
ment, and were often replaced by actors who were able effectively to
regiment labour for the manufacture of armaments.
However, the revolutionary impact of WWI was caused, most particu-
larly, by the fact that, in order to mobilize labour, governments were
forced to recognize labour organizations as holders of collective rights
and as partners in collective bargaining. In order to solidify national sup-
port for the wartime economy, states were obliged to refine their existing
systems of industrial arbitration, to establish labour tribunals for the reso-
lution of industrial conflicts, and, ultimately, to give public standing to
interassociational agreements regarding conditions of employment and
production.11 In most belligerent societies, notably, the war gave impetus
to the elaboration of a body of labour law in which provisions for worker
representation, industrial codetermination, collective bargaining, and eq-
uitable arbitration in industrial disputes acquired standing close to public
law, or were even integrated into democratic constitutions. Organized
labour thus became a constituent actor in the national political system,
and labour law was used to impose a cohesive structure of political-
economic inclusion on national societies.
WWI, in short, was the period in which the nation state became a
reality, and the construction of societies as systems of general inclusion
approached conclusion. Tellingly, this process was registered in the me-
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dium of rights: labour law became a most vital instrument of national
formation, and labour law was applied to construct a deepened body of
socio-material rights throughout society. The increasing penetration of the
political system into society was supported by a definition of society as a
material community, a nation of socio-material rights holders.
THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC AND LABOUR LAW
The process of rights-mediated national inclusion and nation building
expressed during the WWI found distinct expression in the Constitution
of Weimar Republic. This constitution expressly reflected the belief, de-
clared by Friedrich Naumann in the National Assembly in early 1919,
that Imperial Germany had not been formed as an integrated nation. Like
the 1849 Constitution before it, the Constitution of 1919 was intended, not
only to allocate powers in the German national state, but also to found the
German nation. In this conception, in particular, the basic rights con-
tained in the constitution were construed as instruments of national in-
clusion, completing the unfinished process of nation and state making
through rights initiated in 1848.12
The nation-building objectives of the Weimar Constitution were vis-
ible in a number of its dimensions. Most obviously, the basic democratic
content of the Weimar Constitution was designed to promote rights-
based national integration. Indicatively, the functions of the elected mem-
bers of government were defined in the Constitution in clear relation to
the nation as a whole, and emphasis was placed on the fact that politi-
cians had responsibilities, not to professional groups, classes or regions,
but to the German people in its entirety. This was evident in Article 21,
which accounted for representative duties of parliamentary delegates in
expressly national-integrative terms, and in Article 41, which defined the
presidential office in unmistakably national categories. Equally signifi-
cantly, the Constitution was expected to create a nation by incorporating
the different German states evenly within a territorially cohesive system
of public law. This was expressed in a number of clauses: in Article 13(1),
giving national law primacy over the different constituent states of the
Empire; in Article 15, allowing the Empire to supervise legislation in the
states; in Article 19, giving the Staatsgerichtshof oversight of legal disputes
within and between the states; and in Article 48(a), which authorized the
president to overrule the states in cases of exceptional legal conflict with
the Empire. In these instances, the Weimar Constitution was clearly de-
signed to establish the Empire as a national entity. Importantly, the Con-
stitution reflected the demand of prominent political actors that Prussia
should be fully incorporated as an equal part of Reich, and that a remedy
should be found for the traditional gravitational pull of Prussia, reflected
during the Kaiserreich in the disproportionate representation of Prussia in
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the Bundesrath (Union Council), against the construction of a fully bal-
anced national state.13 In fact, anti-Prussianism was a pronounced atti-
tude among the architects of the Weimer Constitution; Hugo Preuß, most
notably, had deliberated, and continued to deliberate through the early
1920s, as to whether Prussia should be divided into smaller states. In
addition, the Weimar Constitution was accorded nation-building func-
tions in that it reflected some residues of the doctrine of industrial Caesar-
ism endorsed in the Wilhelmine era by Max Weber and Friedrich Nau-
mann. The basic premise of industrial Caesarism was that a strong state
executive was required to integrate diverse sectors of the population into
the political system, and that such integration would reinforce the posi-
tion of the German nation in the international political economy. Traces
of this outlook underpinned the symbolic design of the executive in the
Weimar Constitution.14 In this respect, in fact, the Weimar Constitution
was clearly an early example of a national-developmentalist constitution,
and it construed executive authority as a symbolic point of popular iden-
tification, unifying otherwise antagonistic societal groups in order to in-
crease industrial productivity. Quite generally, the provisions for presi-
dential rule under Article 48 were shaped by a strategy for cohesive
nation building and mobilization. Furthermore, the Weimar Constitution
was expected to give effect to religious conceptions of the national com-
munity. Notably, Weber’s model of a presidential or élite democracy was
shaped by the belief that modern complex nations, defined by deep class
fissures, cannot be unified under law alone.15 Instead, he implied, it was
only as the people were addressed directly by a charismatic leader that
lateral affiliations (between classes, regions, professions) could become
subordinate to the spirit of national unity. The charismatic politician as-
suming presidential office under Article 48 was thus intended to instil a
class-transcendent, or even cultic sense of unity in the German nation.
This outlook in some ways evoked the concept of the inspirited commu-
nity proposed by the Lutheran theologian Rudolf Sohm.16
Most importantly, the Weimar Constitution was accorded a central
role in a process of nation building because it was intended to create the
basic public-legal structure for a national welfare state and a corporatist
national economy organized by interorganizational political-economic
consensus.17 Accordingly, the Constitution provided in Articles 159 and
165 for a system of industrial negotiation, in which legislation could be
based upon cross-class agreements. These provisions recalled Hugo Sin-
zheimer’s wartime reflections on collective bargaining as a source of pop-
ular will formation.18 In Articles 7 and 157, moreover, the Constitution
placed national labour in an immediate relation to the Empire, implying
that the labour force was a core part of the material substructure of the
nation-state. In Article 157, it envisioned the introduction of a unified
system of labour law, to include, equally, all members and sectors of
society. In each of these respects, the Weimar Constitution was assigned
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distinctive status as a nation-building document. It was envisaged as an
instrument for mediating class differences, and it was intended to tie
together all diverse groups within the nation, promoting the creation of a
nation of equal rights holders.19 As such, the Weimar Constitution was
enforced, finally, to eradicate the primacy of private groups and organ-
izations, which many influential theorists of early Weimar Germany saw,
and, earlier, many leading intellectuals had seen, as responsible for the
history of weak statehood in Germany.20 At the heart of the Weimar
Constitution was the idea of an inclusionary nation, based upon collec-
tive material rights, guaranteed through a systematic body of labour law,
in which organized labour played an integrated role both in legislation
and in ongoing processes of national inclusion.
THE END OF THE MATERIAL NATION
As is well documented, the attempt at rights-determined nation-building
in the Weimar Republic had disastrous consequences. Paradoxically, in
fact, many aspects of the Constitution which were deployed to promote
consolidated nationhood ultimately had exactly the opposite outcomes.
First, the assumption among the Verfassungsväter of 1919 that Prussian
hegemony was detrimental to national democracy proved spectacularly
misguided, and measures taken to eliminate Prussia as an independent
political force played a significant role in the unravelling of national de-
mocracy. By 1928, it had become apparent that Prussia was actually the
major bastion of German democracy. By 1930, the Prussian parliament
was the most powerful democratic institution that was still more or less
intact. However, provisions in the Constitution for the annexation of
states to the Reich meant that Prussia could be legally removed from the
institutional landscape of the Reich, which famously occurred in the Pre-
ussenschlag of 1932. The abolition of the Prussian parliament as a distinct
political actor was the most important prelude to the eventual process of
Gleichschaltung, or comprehensive institutional colonization by the
NSDAP.
Second, the use of emergency legislation as a means to ensure the
primacy of national law over state law had a deeply corrosive impact on
national society. Within a short period, the use of emergency legislation,
rather than solidifying a direct link between the Imperial President and
the national people, had stripped the core executive away from society,
and it had rendered offices around the presidency porous to individual
actors and groups seeking access to directive power for their own person-
al motives. Presidentialism, thus, clearly undermined the national foun-
dation of the political system. By 1930, use of executive prerogative had
created a system in which powers of government could be allocated upon
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a personalized basis, and the link between the executive and the people
could be snapped.
Third, the attempt to construct a unified nation through a quasi-cor-
poratist system of labour law also fell catastrophically short of its goals.
In the first instance, the attempt to use labour law for nation-building
purposes in interwar Germany never came to fruition. Indeed, even the
modest idea that a comprehensive codification of labour law could be
undertaken was not realized. For this reason, the Weimar Republic ac-
quired a half-evolved or semi-corporatist system of political economy
and a half-evolved or semi-corporatist system of public law. At one level,
the body of labour law in the Weimar Republic created a legal framework
in which collective bargaining was formalized, in which the state inter-
acted directly with organizations of aggregated interests, and, crucially,
in which, after the emergency laws on tariffs passed in 1923, the govern-
ment was forced directly to internalize conflicts in the production process
through mandatory arbitration and obligatory dispute resolution. How-
ever, the state’s ability to control industrial negotiations always existed
more on paper than in reality. In fact, governmental capacities for indus-
trial control were increasingly unsettled, after the hyperinflation of 1923,
by the fact that the relative parity between big business and big labour
(large trade unions), formally presupposed in the corporatist ideals of
1919, was tilted in favour of business organizations. As a result, it slowly
became clear that the corporatist opening of the state in 1919 had estab-
lished a system in which large-scale enterprises could exploit their posi-
tion in the state periphery in order to oppose those groups (i.e., trade
unions), with which they had originally sworn to cooperate in the name
of cross-class national unity, and in which powerful industrial bodies
were able to direct public policy to suit defined élite prerogatives. Pro-
gressively, it became clear that the democratic state institutions created
under the Weimar Constitution lacked the robustness required to direct
government policy through the consensual mediation of class interests,
and many institutions were rapidly placed in thrall to powerful extrasys-
temic societal interests. The establishment of a quasi-corporatist system
of industrial organization thus ultimately meant that private organiza-
tions could use the corporatist arrangements to pursue distinct interests
through the state, often bypassing established (national) procedures for
representation and legislation. Notable in this, in particular, was the fact
that, in the Weimar Constitution, the state projected its legitimacy, in
part, as derived from group rights, which it was bound to allocate to
different social organizations, as a prerequisite for class equilibration.
Eventually, however, the guarantees of group rights announced by the
Weimar Constitution promoted a collectivization of society around pri-
vate group interests, and it meant that organizations pursuing group
rights were able to monopolize bargaining positions in the state, to mobi-
lize social groups around single policy objectives, and, ultimately, even to
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dictate legislation, spending and fiscal policy. Finally, the sanctioning of
group rights imprinted a deep structural privatism on society as a whole,
and it meant that the state was required to negotiate points of policy, not
with a uniformly ordered nation, but with massed ranks of sectorally
organized private associations.
Through the 1920s, consequently, the Weimar political system was
exposed to a process which we might now define as hyperpoliticization:
that is, it entered a condition in which public offices and resources were
transformed into spoils to protect the extrasystemic interests of powerful
social groups. Accordingly, the inclusionary corporatism promoted under
the democratic constitution of 1919 was replaced by a system of exclusion-
ary corporatism. In this system, some structures of collective-interest ag-
gregation and articulation were retained, but these were organized in a
highly coercive fashion, and negotiations between different factions were
clearly aligned to the prerogatives of powerful economic groups. The
transition from inclusionary to exclusionary corporatism passed through
three distinct steps. The first step saw the weakening of protective provi-
sions for trade unions and the limiting of union powers of collective
bargaining.21 This began in 1925 with the establishment of the Bürgerblock
government,22 but it gained momentum after the end of the Grand Coali-
tion (1929–1930). The second step saw an active retrenchment against the
welfare provisions obtained by the unions. This was reflected in Heinrich
Brüning’s coercive Sparpolitik (austerity policies) of 1930–1932, widely
supported by big business.23 It culminated, in particular, in the economic
decrees introduced under Article 48 by Franz von Papen. Finally, the
third step was the institution of a fully evolved system of quasi-corporat-
ist economic coercion, instituted by Adolf Hitler through the Arbeitsord-
nungsgesetz in 1934 and the introduction of Zwangskartelle in 1933, which
carried over some principles of corporatist public law into a legal order
designed to consolidate a system of authoritarian capitalism.
Overall, the constitutional order of the Weimar Republic was a legal
system designed, under the flag of national integrity, to internalize, to
pacify and to mediate starkly opposed economic interests. However, it
lacked the institutional stability—or the basic publicness—required to so-
lidify the political system against the antagonistic, essentially private fac-
tions which it had internalized. The crisis of the Weimar Republic can
thus be seen, simultaneously, both as a failure of labour integration and as
a failure of nation building. In particular, the failure of national construc-
tion in the Weimar Republic can be linked to the inclusionary functions of
rights. The national inclusion of society promoted through three stratified
layers of rights degenerated into a condition of extreme social fragmenta-
tion, in which the national political system forfeited its essential national/
inclusionary characteristics.
The Constitutionalization of Labour Law and the Crisis of National Democracy 99
FROM INCLUSIONARY TO EXCLUSIONARY CORPORATISM
The Weimar Republic is often observed as a sui generis political experi-
ment, or even as a particularly unusual part of Germany’s already highly
distinctive Sonderweg toward modern nationhood.24 In fact, however, it
can be observed as a quite typical exemplification of the pressures result-
ing from rights-mediated national-societal formation. The long transition
in the Weimar Republic and after 1933 from inclusionary to exclusionary
corporatism, and the correlation of this transition with the fragmentation
of national-social structure, describes a trajectory subsequently followed
by a number of societies, and it throws quite general light on problems of
national inclusion.
After the Weimar Republic, notably, many societies began to utilize
corporatist constitutionalism, and many societies pursued inclusion
through socio-material rights to serve a strategy of national inclusion and
even national developmentalism. Many societies identified the program-
matic allocation of socio-material rights, on top of private and political
rights, as a technique for linking together obdurately conflictual and
loosely solidified social groups into one integrated national whole. An
immediate example of this can be found in the Spanish Second Republic,
whose 1931 Constitution copied many quasi-corporatist elements con-
tained in the Weimar Constitution. Countries in Latin America soon fol-
lowed this example. First, in the late 1930s and 1940s, Brazil and Argenti-
na devised corporatist constitutions, which, within a semi-authoritarian
executive system, elaborated material rights as part of a national inclu-
sionary structure: that is, as the media of inclusion, used to bind together
different groups and different regions in societies otherwise only weakly
consolidated as nations. Subsequently, other Latin American states, not-
ably Colombia and Bolivia, promoted corporatistic political organization,
semi-democratic in the case of Bolivia and semi-fascist in the case of
Colombia, as a technique for enforcing national inclusion.25 These politi-
cal orders applied socio-material rights in order to attach different sectors
in economically divided societies directly to the departments of the cen-
tral state, thus imposing a material-political structure of inclusion across
the whole of society.26 Subsequently, in postindependence states in Sub-
Saharan Africa, corporatist constitutionalism was widely utilized as a
nation-building technique in which material rights were applied as insti-
tutions with ex nihilo powers of national formation and social integration.
Even states such as Kenya, which remained formally capitalist during
decolonization, devised semi-corporatistic techniques to ensure national
control of the economy, and to reduce the extent to which lateral or
centrifugal obligations in society could pull against the power of national
political institutions.27
Most societies that copied the Weimar Republic in their use of socio-
material rights, however, also copied the Weimar Republic in their resul-
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tant experience of crisis. Almost uniformly, across different societies at
varying stages of institutional construction, the attempt to forge a system
of national inclusion through labour law failed as a strategy of national
construction. In fact, in most cases, the corporatist enforcement of socio-
material rights acted, of itself, as an impediment to the establishment of
reliable modes of generalized inclusion in society. On the one hand, cor-
poratistic nation building usually had the result that single groups were
able to use corporatist bargaining arrangements to infiltrate the state.
Consequently, corporatism fostered very high levels of patrimonialism,
in which private groups seized institutionalized opportunities to colonize
offices of the state, either for material gain or for sectoral influence.28 In
most cases, also states promoting corporatist nation building were soon
exposed to high, and ultimately unmanageable, levels of politicization, in
which private groups translated distinct, often implacably hostile, social
prerogatives directly through the institutions of the state administration.
In most cases, such hyperpoliticization of the political system led to acute
state debilitation, in which state institutions forfeited autonomy and in-
dependent capacity, and often ceded authority to groups located outside
the political domain, not strictly bound by political rules or oriented
around political directives.29 In most cases, furthermore, states commit-
ted to nation building through corporatist rights circulation usually also
echoed the Weimar experience because they underwent a transition from
inclusionary corporatism to exclusionary corporatism. Firstly, these states
rapidly abandoned the democratic/inclusionary dimension of corpora-
tism. Simultaneously, however, they preserved some of the mechanisms
for the aggregation of economic interests, for the coercive regimentation
of labour and labour markets, and for the collective economic steering
which had characterized democratic corporatism. Unlike the systems that
they supplanted, they deployed these mechanisms to reinforce the con-
solidated interests of élite groups (usually large-scale enterprises) in in-
dustrial conflicts, openly enforcing public authority to allocate privilege
to select parties, and to stabilize a small number of private elite preroga-
tives.30 The Weimar experience of counterintentional denationalization
through the distribution of social/material rights, in short, was paradig-
matic for many later cases of corporate state building and national con-
struction. Most subsequent attempts at corporatist nation building led
both to a parcellation of national state institutions and, at least de facto, to
a parcellation of the nation as a system of social inclusion.
FROM MATERIAL RIGHTS TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
Striking, in this analysis, is the fact that the collapse of the Weimar Re-
public does not only provide a paradigm of national fragmentation and
state collapse: it also illuminates alternative patterns of national inclu-
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sion, and alternative patterns of inclusionary-systemic construction
through rights. For example, the most notable feature of the constitution-
al order that developed after 1945, at least in Western Germany, is that it
introduced a new series of rights in the domestic legal order. Notably,
through its commitment to Völlkerrechtsfreundlichkeit declared in Articles
24, 25, 26 and 100(2), the Grundgesetz (1949) gave semi-constitutional
standing to rights enshrined in international instruments and promoted
by international organizations, and it tied the jurisprudence of national
courts to international human rights law. The resultant activist role of the
high domestic judiciary may not have been entirely a matter of conscious
design. But within a short period of time, the newly established West
German Bundesverfassungsgericht had defined itself as a transformer of
international law,31 and it began to extract rights norms from the inter-
state domain to check domestic legislation, to oversee legislative proce-
dure, and to scrutinize judicial verdicts. By 1958, the court had made
decisive rulings on the use of proportionality and the third-party effect of
human rights in West Germany, such that these rights came to overlie the
strata of private, political and socio-material rights already articulated
through national constitutional law. In so doing, in fact, the court began
to promote international rights norms as the basic diction for all legal
relations, all interpersonal interaction, and all acts of social inclusion, and
it elaborated a corpus of rights as the basic inclusionary fibre of society.32
If, before 1945, national societies had been mainly formed through pro-
cesses of inclusion mediated through private, political and material
rights, international human rights norms now assumed a very salient
position in the system of social inclusion.
Very important in this respect was that the penetration of internation-
al human rights law into domestic law had a decisive impact on econom-
ic law and labour law. One outcome of the rising prominence of interna-
tional human rights law was that the Grundgesetz, shaped by internation-
al norms, gave primacy to individual personal rights over collective,
programmatic or group rights, and it defined singular, personal rights as
irreducible sources of legitimacy for law. As a result, it curtailed the
dependency of the state on the allocation of group rights, and it reduced
the extent to which the political system was obliged to produce legitima-
cy through the concrete mediation of social groups or the concrete pacifi-
cation of social conflicts.33 Generally, in fact, the fact that it derived part
of its legitimacy from an external normative order meant that the political
system assumed heightened autonomy vis-à-vis social conflicts, and the
organizations expressing such conflicts, with which it was confronted,
and it could separate some of its functions from everyday processes of
contestation and conflict settlement. In consequence, the state was able to
establish an inclusionary structure for a society as a whole which was, to
some degree, set a priori above specific social antagonisms, and the polit-
ical system was able to apply the law as a relatively neutral inclusionary
Chris Thornhill102
medium, partly insulated against day-to-day crises, and capable of social
integration at a high level of abstraction and immunization. Ultimately,
in fact, the shift from socio-material rights to international human rights
as sources of legitimacy created a social environment in which the politi-
cal system was able to reconceive policies of socio-material integration,
and to resume selective material distribution as a means of societal inclu-
sion. Progressively, through the 1950s, West Germany redeveloped a
semi-corporatist system of economic conflict management. But, in this
system, rival organizations were not directly internalized in the state, and
negotiations between rival groups were not subject to mandatory state
arbitration. As a result, the legitimacy of the state was not made fully
contingent on its internal ability to mediate and defuse factual conflicts
between fractious organizations.34 A relatively depoliticized, societalized
version of corporatism thus began to emerge. Central to this neocorporat-
ist system was the fact that the state authorized its inclusionary functions
through international rights norms, and it could perform functions of
cross-class mediation and conflict management without projecting these
functions as the ultimate basis for its legitimacy. This led to a depolitic-
ization of corporatism, and, ultimately, through the de-emphasis of socio-
material rights as objects of socio-political conflict, to the more effective
distribution of material rights across society.35
The example of state construction in Germany following the collapse
of the Weimar Republic exemplifies the role of international human
rights in the formation of national societies. If we accept the sociological
intuition, discussed previously, that modern societies are constructed
through a gradual thickening of rights, the German example suggests
that the layers of rights generated by national societies are often unable to
promote enduring structures of national inclusion. This example, in fact,
suggests that it is only where a fourth set of rights, international human
rights, is applied to avert the extreme politicization caused by other
rights (especially social/material rights) that societies are able to consoli-
date themselves as reasonably stable systems of inclusion. Notably, this
shift from material rights to international rights as the primary media of
legitimation and inclusion also underlies other recent transitions to dem-
ocratic statehood, in Argentina, in Brazil, in Ghana, in Kenya, and even in
Russia and Poland. The study of Weimar thus allows us to observe the
paradoxical fact that sustainable national statehood and sustainable na-
tionhood typically have transnational foundations. Moreover, it allows
us to recognize international human rights as the fourth inclusionary
dimension of national society, without which most national societies
struggle to exist as such. To this extent, the long German transition from a
political system based upon corporatist rights to a political system based
upon international rights can be taken as an exemplary sociological learn-
ing process, which ultimately generated insights for other patterns of
institutional and social formation. Outside Germany, most national states
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and national societies were only solidified through the integration of
international human rights as basic principles of legitimation and inclu-
sion. The question of whether international rights can be applied to as-
suage inclusionary crises in transnational polities remains, of course,
open.
NOTES
Research for this chapter was funded by the European Research Council (Advanced
Grant 323656—STC).
1. See Émile Durkheim, Leçons de sociologie (Paris: PUF, 1950); Talcott Parsons, ‘Full
Citizenship for the American Negro? A Sociological Problem’, Daedalus 94 (1965):
1009–54; and T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (London: Pluto, [1950] 1992).
2. See Elisabeth Fehrenbach, ‘Nation’, in Rolf Reichardt and Eberhard Schmitt,
eds., Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich 1680–1820, vol. 7 (Munich:
Oldenbourg, 1986), 75–107, at 85–89.
3. Emmanuel Joseph (Abbé) Sieyès, Préliminaire de la constitution: Reconnaissance et
exposition raisonnée des droits de l’homme et du citoyen (Versailles: Ph.-D. Pierres, 1789),
19.
4. Philippe Joseph Benjamin Buchez and Pierre Celestin Roux-Lavergne, Histoire
parlementaire de la Révolution française, vol. 22 (Paris: Paulin, 1834), 194–95.
5. On this general principle, see Christian Starck, Verfassungen. Entstehung, Ausle-
gung, Wirkungen und Sicherung (Tübingen: Mohr, 2009), 124.
6. Karl Marx, Zur Judenfrage, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Werke, vol. 1 (of
43) (Berlin: Dietz, [1844] 1958–68), 347–77.
7. See the rather quaint account of the ‘social movement’ in Lorenz von Stein,
Geschichte der sozialen Bewegung in Frankreich, vol. 2 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, [1850] (1959), 110, as a key example of such anxieties.
8. Asymmetrical inclusion through monetary rights is of course a central charac-
teristic of the EU, and the inclusionary dialectic described here in nation-state contexts
could also be applied, with some adjustments, to crisis potentials at a transnational
level. On the dialectical standing of rights in the foundation of the EU, see Jason
Coppell and Aidan O’Neil, ‘The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?’
Legal Studies 12 (1992): 245; Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, ‘The ECJ between the Individual
Citizen and the Member States—A Plea for a Judge-Made European Law in Reme-
dies’, in Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz and Bruno de Witte, eds., The European Court of
Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2012), 349–99.
9. For example, Prussia had communal labour courts from 1845 (see Günter Graf,
Das Arbeitstarifgesetz von 1926. Weimarer Verfassungsvollzug auf justizpolitischen Irrwegen
des Kaiserreichs? [Goldbach: Kneip, 1996], 10). In the UK, an Arbitration Act was passed
in 1824, Councils of Conciliation were established by parliamentary statute in 1867,
and arbitrational powers in labour disputes were augmented in the Conciliation Act of
1896 (see Lord Amulree, Industrial Arbitration in Great Britain [Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1929], 101). By 1840, a basic system for industrial arbitration was in place in
the UK (see James Jaffe, ‘Industrial Arbitration, Equity and Authority in England,
1800–1850’, Law and History Review 18 [2000]: 557). Napoleon introduced petty labour
courts in France in 1806 because a substitute jurisdiction was required for cases that
had been heard by corporations before 1791 (François Étienne Mollot, De la justice
industrielle des Prud’hommes [Paris: Napoléon Chaoix, 1846], 21).
10. See the classic analysis in Léon Duguit, Les transformations générales du droit privé
depuis le Code Napoléon (Paris: Alcan, 1912), 134–35; Philipp Lotmar, Der Arbeitsvertrag,
ed., Manfred Rehbinder (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, [1902–1908] 2001), 818.
11. See, for example, Jürgen Kocka, Klassengesellschaft im Krieg. Deutsche Sozialges-
chichte 1914–1918 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1973), 115; Barthélemy
Chris Thornhill104
Raynaud, Le contrat collectif en France (Paris: Rousseau, 1921); G. R. Rubin, ‘The Origins
of Industrial Tribunals: Munitions Tribunals during the First World War’, Industrial
Law Journal 6 (1977): 149–64, at 152–53.
12. Verhandlungen der verfassunggebenden Deutschen Nationalversammlung (1920:
2190).
13. Gerhard Schultz, Zwischen Demokratie und Diktatur: Verfassungspolitik und Reichs-
reform in der Weimarer Republik, vol. 1: Die Periode der Konsolidierung und der Revision des
Bismarckschen Reichsaufbaus 1919–1930 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1963), 173.
14. Friedrich Naumann, Demokratie und Kaisertum. Ein Handbuch für innere Politik
(Berlin-Schöneberg: Burchverlag der Hilfe, 1900), 350; Elisabeth Fehrenbach, Wandlun-
gen des deutschen Kaisergedankens 1871–1918 (Munich-Vienna: Oldenbourg, 1969, 85–89;
Stefan-Georg Schnorr, Liberalismus zwischen 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Reformulierung lib-
eraler politischer Theorie in Deutschland und England am Beispiel von Friedrich Naumann
und Leonard J. Hobhouse (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1990), 148.
15. Max Weber, Gesammelte Politische Schriften (Tübingen: Mohr, 1921), 425.
16. Weber borrowed from Rudolf Sohm, Kirchenrecht, in 2 vols. Die geschichtlichen
Grundlagen, vol. 1 (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1892), 22, 28 and 699, the idea that
rule-bound or purely legal order is not sufficiently compelling to integrate modern
societies.
17. One observer (Ulrich Nocken, ‘Corporatism and Pluralism in Modern German
History’, in Dirk Stegmann, Bernd-Jürgen Wendt and Peter-Christian Witt, eds., Indus-
trielle Gesellschaft und politisches System: Beiträge zur politischen Sozialgeschichte (Bonn:
Verlag Neue Gesellschaft GmbH, 1978), 37–56, at 55, calls Weimar Germany the first
major experiment in societal corporatism. See, also, Werner Abelshauser, ‘The First
Post-Liberal Nation: Stages in the Development of Modern Corporatism in Germany’,
European History Quarterly 14 (1984): 285–318.
18. Hugo Sinzheimer, Ein Arbeitstarifgesetz. Die Idee der sozialen Selbstbestimmung im
Recht (Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1916), 202.
19. Hugo Preuß argued that a legitimate legal state must be founded in ‘organic
social law’, in which the rights of citizens can be negotiated to incorporate material
entitlements and rights of distribution; Preuß, Gemeinde, Staat, Reich als
Gebietskörperschaften. Versuch einer deutschen Staatskonstruktion auf Grundlage der Genos-
senschaftstheorie (Berlin: Julius Springer, 1889), vii.
20. For earlier liberal reflections on this problem, see Friedrich Christoph Dahl-
mann, Die Politik, auf den Grund und das Maß der gegebenen Zustände zurückgeführt,
introduced by O. Westphal (Berlin: Hobbing, [1835] 1924), 124–32.
21. See Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘Der Funktionswandel des Arbeitsrechts’, Archiv für Soz-
ialswissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 67 (1932): 146–74, at 169; Thilo Ramm, ‘Die Arbeitsver-
fassung der Weimarer Republic’, in Franz Gamillscheg, Jean de Givry, Bob Hepple
and Jean-Maurice Verdier, ed., In Memoriam Sir Otto Kahn-Freund (Munich: Beck,
1980), 225–46, at 243.
22. Fritz Blaich, Staat und Verbände in Deutschland zwischen 1871 und 1945 (Wiesba-
den: Franz Steiner, 1979), 64.
23. See Rainer Meister, Die große Depression. Zwangslagen und Handlungsspielräume
der Wirstchafts und Finanzpolitik in Deutschland 1929–1932 (Regensburg: Transfer Ver-
lag, 1991), 248; Michael Grübler, Die Spitzenverbände der Wirtschaft und das erste Kabinett
Brüning: Vom Ende der Großen Koalition 1929/30 bis zum Vorabend der Bankenkrise 1931
(Düsseldorf: Droste, 1982), 168–69; Claus-Dieter Krohn, ‘Autoritärer Kapitalismus.
Wirtschaftskonzeptionen im Übergang von der Weimarer Republik zum Nationalsozi-
alismus’, in Dirk Stegmann, Bernd-Jürgen Wendt and Peter-Christian Witt, eds., Indus-
trielle Gesellschaft und politisches System: Beiträge zur politischen Sozialgeschichte (Bonn:
Verlag Neue Gesellschaft GmbH, 1978), 113–29, at 119.
24. See the thumbnail summary in Jürgen Kocka, ‘German History before Hitler:
The Debate about the German Sonderweg’, Journal of Contemporary History 23 (1988):
16.
The Constitutionalization of Labour Law and the Crisis of National Democracy 105
25. See Håvard Haarstad and Vibeke Andersson, ‘Backlash Reconsidered: Neoliber-
alism and Popular Mobilization in Bolivia’, Latin American Politics and Society 51 (2009):
1–28, at 10; Helwar Figueroa Salamanca and Carlos Tuta Alarcón, ‘El estado corporati-
vo colombiano: Una propuesta de derechas 1930-1953’ (2005) 32 Anuario Colombiano de
Historia Social y de la Cultura, 99–148.
26. Álvaro García Linera, La condícion obrera en Bolivia. Signo XX (La Paz: Plural,
2014), 204.
27. See, for discussion, Donald Rothchild, Racial Bargaining in Independent Kenya: A
Study of Minorities and Decolonization (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 262–63
and 420–21; Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Coloni-
alism 1964–1971 (London: Heinemann, 1975), 222; Nicola Swainson, The Development of
Corporate Capitalism in Kenya 1918–77 (London: Heinemann, 1980), 180; John W. Harbe-
son, Nation-Building in Kenya: The Role of Land Reform (Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 1973), 18.
28. For separate studies on different polities, see Barbara Geddes, ‘Building “State”
Autonomy in Brazil’, Comparative Politics 22 (1990): 225; Harvey F. Kline, State Building
and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 1986–1994 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama
Press, 1999), 4–5; Thomas M. Callaghy, ‘The State as Lame Leviathan: The Patrimonial
Administrative State in Africa’, in Zaki Ergas, ed., The African State in Transition (Ba-
singstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1987), 87–116, at 108.
29. See the theory of the politicised state set out in Douglas A. Chalmers, ‘The
Politicized State in Latin America’, in James M. Malloy, ed., Authoritarianism and Corpo-
ratism in Latin America (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), 23–46, at
30–31 and 38. On overpoliticization in Argentina, see Gerardo L. Munck, Authoritarian-
ism and Democratization: Soldiers and Workers in Argentina, 1976–1983 (University Park:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 51.
30. For examples of exclusionary corporatism outside Europe, see Guillermo
O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American
Politics (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973),
53–55; and ‘Corporatism and the Question of the State’, in Malloy, ed., Authoritarianism
and Corporatism, 47–87, at 48); Kenneth Paul Erickson, The Brazilian Corporative State
and Working-Class Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 42; Salvador
A. M. Sandoval, Social Change and Labor Unrest in Brazil since 1945 (Boulder, CO: West-
view Press, 1993), 42; Margaret Keck, The Workers’ Party and Democratization in Brazil
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 63.
31. See Karl Josef Partsch, Die Anwendung des Völkerrechts im innerstaatlichen Recht.
Überprüfung der Transformationslehre (Karlsruhe: Müller 1964), 53, 80 and 115.
32. See the Constitutional Court ruling in Lüth 1 BvR 400/51 (1958). This ruling
instilled a rights-based order in West German society as a whole. In this case, rights
were not expressly extracted from international law, but the openness of the Grundge-
setz to international norms was a very important influence on the ruling.
33. See the seminal ruling on trade union autonomy in West German Constitutional
Court, 1 BvR 629/52 (1954).
34. See Jürgen Nautz, Die Durchsetzung der Tarifautonomie in Westdeutschland: Das
Tarifvertragsgesetz vom 9 April 1949 (Frankfurt aM: Lang, 1985), 45.
35. Manfred Spieker, Legitimitätsprobleme des Sozialstaats. Konkurrierende Sozialstaats-




Conflict and the Crisis in Labour Law
From Weimar to Austerity
Ruth Dukes
This chapter aims to investigate the ways in which the notion of conflict
has figured within academic depictions of a crisis in the discipline of
labour law, and, further, how it has been understood and deployed in
policy debates regarding labour laws and labour markets. The starting
point for the investigation is the observation that, in both scholarly and
policy discourse, the existence of conflict between the social classes has
tended to be underemphasized in recent years, even by those on the left
or centre-left. Conflicts of interest are located, instead, as arising between
workers, or groups of workers—designated often as ‘insiders’ and ‘out-
siders’—and policy prescriptions drafted accordingly.1
The title of the chapter refers to an article published in 1933 by the
German Jewish scholar Hugo Sinzheimer, titled Die Krisis des Arbeit-
srechts.2 Sinzheimer was a legal academic and practitioner who is widely
regarded today as one of the founding fathers of the discipline of labour
law, in Germany and beyond.3 In his 1933 article, his primary concern
was to illustrate how and why the economic crisis of the time meant a
crisis for labour law. The notion of conflict figured prominently in the
discussion. The crisis in the economy, Sinzheimer explained, exposed the
conflicts that existed between the quite different rationalities which
underpinned labour law, on the one hand, and private law (bürgerliches
Recht), on the other: conflicts, in other words, between the principles of
labour law, and the wider economic order, since the latter was regulated
primarily by private law.4 Before the economic crisis, labour rights and
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collective institutions had been introduced in the belief that these could
achieve the resolution of such conflicts, allowing for the regulation of
production and work in the interests of all. Bringing with it steeply de-
clining wages and catastrophic levels of unemployment, the economic
crisis of the 1930s cast doubt on the capacity of labour law to function as
intended within a capitalist—‘private law’—economy. A renewal of la-
bour law no longer appeared possible without the renewal of the entire
economic order.
In the very different context of the 1980s and 1990s, scholars in North
America and the UK began anew to talk of a crisis in labour law. Broadly
speaking, the crisis was understood to result from a growing mismatch
between the assumptions that had underpinned the development of la-
bour laws and labour law scholarship in the beginning and middle of the
twentieth century, and the realities of production and working relation-
ships at its end.5 The shrinking prevalence of what had been defined as
the standard employment relationship—full time, stable, secure—and its re-
placement with a panoply of contract forms designed to shift risk from
the employer to the worker; the increasing feminization of the workforce;
the ‘globalization’ of product markets and production chains; the muting
of the trade unions in both industrial and political contexts—each of
these was understood to call into question ‘old’ ways of thinking about
the subject. At the most fundamental level, new economic orthodoxies
and their prescription of flexible, unregulated labour markets appeared
to threaten the very viability of protective or emancipatory labour laws:
laws aimed at ensuring decent terms and conditions for workers, and at
guaranteeing workers’ rights to act in association with others.
So understood, the end of the century ‘crisis in labour law’ was fur-
ther exacerbated by the financial crisis of 2008 and the ensuing crisis in
the Eurozone. If a case could still be made in the 1990s and early 2000s for
the singularity of the European ‘Social Model’, and the success of ‘flexi-
curity’ in charting a third way between free markets and overly generous
welfare states, by 2012, it was quite clear that the Social Model was gone.6
Labour laws and institutions were now routinely characterized by EU
institutions and national governments alike as tools to be wielded for the
achievement of economic goals, and especially greater labour market
flexibility and economic growth. In several Member States, sometimes as
a condition of ‘bailout’ loans, existing employment protection legislation
was amended so as to afford workers fewer or weaker rights, and steps
were taken to encourage the dismantling or decentralization of industry-
wide collective bargaining.
Juxtaposing Sinzheimer’s analysis of the crisis in the Weimar Republic
with contemporary approaches to the study of labour law and the analy-
sis of labour markets, this chapter seeks to highlight the excessive empha-
sis given today by policymakers and commentators to the conflicting
interests of different workers or groups of workers. It illustrates how the
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identification of conflicts of interest between workers is closely linked,
often, to the claim or belief that flexible—‘free’—markets benefit all, rais-
ing employment levels and encouraging economic growth. Labour mar-
ket segmentation should be addressed, so the argument goes, so as to
maximize flexibility and ease market access for all. In a final section, and
with reference to the work of Sinzheimer, it is suggested that scholars
and policymakers ought to consider the motivations and actions of em-
ploying organizations as well as workers. The extent to which the inter-
ests of certain workers conflict with those of others, or with those of
employers or consumers, is a matter which falls to be scrutinized with
reference to the specific context, and not simply to be assumed or de-
duced by reason of a characterization of some as insiders and others as
outsiders.
SINZHEIMER’S KRISIS DES ARBEITSRECHTS
Labour law lay right at the heart of Weimar social democracy.7 Famous-
ly, the Constitution proclaimed the will of the German people to ‘advance
social progress’. In its second part, it defined the basic rights and obliga-
tions of citizens so as to include social as well as civil and politic rights.
Chief among these were labour rights: the right to freedom of association
(Article 159) and the right to participate with capital in the ‘whole eco-
nomic development of the productive forces’ (Article 165). If, in the
decades that followed the adoption of the Constitution, several of its
social rights provisions could be criticized fairly as ‘sententious plati-
tudes’—legally binding no one, and certainly not the legislator—the same
could not be said of the labour rights, which were implemented by way
of legislation in the very first weeks and months of the Republic.8 In the
estimation of Ernst Fraenkel, it was the labour provisions of the ‘Consti-
tution’ (understood in the broader sense to include the terms of the rele-
vant legislation) which secured the trust of the working classes in the
new democratic order.9 An attack on the fundamental principles of la-
bour law amounted, for this reason, to nothing less than an attack on the
continued existence of the Republic.10
As a parliamentary representative of the SPD and a Party spokesman
on labour and social policy, Sinzheimer had the opportunity to shape,
quite directly, the relevant terms of the Weimar Constitution and labour
legislation.11 Politically, he was positioned to the non-Marxist right of the
Party. In common with others at the time—notably Hermann Heller—he
theorized social democracy as involving the extension of democratic
modes of decision making from the political to the economic sphere, and,
thereby, the emancipation of the working class.12 A democratized econo-
my was a capitalist economy with guaranteed property and contract
rights, but it was an economy governed by capital and labour acting to-
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gether in furtherance of the public good. This was the principle which
Sinzheimer understood to be embodied in Article 165 of the Constitution,
and in the legislation that regulated the rights of trade unions and works
councils. In Sinzheimer’s terms, the law formed an ‘economic’ or ‘labour
constitution’; it called labour into a community with ‘property’ (i.e., capi-
tal), guaranteeing the right of labour to participate, upon a parity basis, in
the administration of production. Through such participation, labour was
freed from its subordination to capital; workers were freed from the ef-
forts of employers to dictate the social and economic conditions of their
existence, and, at the same time, became free to participate in the forma-
tion of those conditions.13
Sinzheimer’s labour law scholarship, which predated WWI, was close-
ly informed by the writings of Marx and of Otto Gierke.14 In developing a
particular conception of the sociology of law—and a particular socio-
legal methodology appropriate to the study of labour law—he was also
strongly influenced by the Austrian scholars, Eugen Ehrlich and Karl
Renner.15 Given the strong similarities between the labour legislation of
the Weimar Republic and the postwar Federal Republic, Sinzheimer’s
contribution to the development of labour law was patently a lasting one.
Among scholars today, almost a century after its publication, there is
continued, and even renewed, interest in his work on labour law and the
sociology of law.16 Indirectly, moreover, his influence has extended over
the years through the work of his students: the political scientists Ernst
Fraenkel and Franz Neumann, and the labour lawyer Otto Kahn-Freund.
Having settled in the UK in the 1930s, Kahn-Freund was eventually to be
regarded as the founding father of the discipline of labour law in that
country. His work, too, continues to figure as a primary point of reference
for scholars in the field.17
Crisis
As narrated by Kahn-Freund in the early 1930s, the story of the labour
law of the Weimar Republic was the story of the frustration of efforts to
create a ‘collectivist’ system for the administration of production, and the
regulation of the terms and conditions of employment of workers as a
fundamental component of the new social democratic state.18 Adopted in
the early years of the Republic, the collectivist legislation provided for a
system of industry level collective bargaining between trade unions and
employers’ associations, workplace bargaining between works councils
and employers, and the compulsory arbitration of industrial disputes. In
the hands of a ‘fascist’ judiciary and increasingly interventionist govern-
ment, however, its terms were interpreted, and eventually amended, to
allow for the ever-greater involvement of the state in deciding wage lev-
els and maintaining industrial peace.19 In the early 1930s, the Brüning
and von Pappen governments even made use of Emergency Decrees to
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impose lower wages by way of ‘collective’ agreements drafted by the
state, and to empower employers to cut wages unilaterally.20
This was the context within which Die Krisis des Arbeitsrechts was writ-
ten, in late 1932. As a Jew, Sinzheimer was stripped of his chair at the
University of Frankfurt in 1933 and fled thereafter to the Netherlands.
Employed by the University of Amsterdam, he continued to lecture and
write, but with a focus now on legal theory rather than labour law: the
sociology of law, jurisprudence, a theory of legislation. Die Krisis des Ar-
beitsrechts was then his last publication on labour law and his last publica-
tion in Germany. Appearing in the twentieth-anniversary edition of Ar-
beitsrecht, a journal he had himself helped to establish, it amounted to
nothing less than the recognition of the ultimate failure of the project to
which he had devoted so many years of his life. As Kahn-Freund later
recalled, it read, ‘like a farewell. It was his swan song’.21
The principal theme of Die Krisis des Arbeitsrechts was the fundamental
importance of the economy to labour law. The primary subject of labour
law was dependent labour, Sinzheimer explained, and dependent labour
was nothing less than an element of the economy. The situation of the
worker was defined by economic relations, the assumptions upon which
they were based, and the ways in which they were ordered. In a time of
crisis, this became clearer. The economy no longer produced a yield suffi-
cient to meet the needs of the people. Large sections of the economy, of
production, were inactive, and this was so despite a level of technical
development never seen before. While people starved to death, goods
and foodstuffs lay unused in warehouses because buyers could not be
found. Workers did not work, as unemployment soared to catastrophic
levels.
The crisis in labour law could be understood, then, in the first in-
stance, as a direct consequence of the crisis in the economy. Labour law,
which had previously functioned to raise the price of labour, no longer
achieved that aim: the output of the economy no longer corresponded to
the collectively agreed rates of pay, and employers refused to bear the
‘social burden’ that honouring those rates would have entailed. In the
face of devastating levels of unemployment, the workers’ capacity for
collective action was greatly diminished, such that they were unable to
force the employers’ hand. The government, meanwhile, acted to amend
the law so as to free the supposedly ‘natural’ laws of the economy from
the ‘artificial’ constraints of labour law; to ‘recontractualize’ labour law to
the benefit of the employers, with the value of work thereby radically
reduced.22 While billions of Marks of public money were spent in prop-
ping up the private sector (in something approaching a ‘grotesque para-
dox’), no means could be found, apparently, of public job creation.23
As Sinzheimer went on to describe, the crisis in labour law ran, in fact,
far deeper than the mere frustration of its aims in a time of economic
recession. The crisis in the economy revealed the situation of tension in
Ruth Dukes112
which labour law always existed (in the Weimar Republic as in any other
capitalist economy): tension between the ‘social’ rationality of labour law
itself, on the one hand, and the ‘individualistic’ rationality of the econom-
ic order. Labour law was social law, according to Sinzheimer, because it
was the (primary) body of law which recognized the social existence of
the worker, elevating him from the status of legal person (which he en-
joyed in private law) to human being. By recognizing and guaranteeing
the role of labour in the regulation, or ordering, of the economy, labour
law sought at once to emancipate the worker from his relation of subordi-
nation to the employer, and to ensure that the economy would function
in furtherance of the common interest, as identified by the representa-
tives of labour and capital. It sought, in other words, to socialize the econ-
omy. Plainly, it had failed in this objective. What had been made clear by
the economic crisis, if it had not been obvious already, was that the econ-
omy continued to be ordered around the pursuit by individuals of their
own private interests. Within such an economy, labour law did not and
could not have the intended effect, since all efforts to raise the value of
labour, and to emancipate workers were resisted by the self-interested
owners of capital.24
Conflict and Crisis
Throughout his life, Sinzheimer adhered to an essentially Marxist con-
ception of capitalism as a system in which the interests of the social
classes—dependent labour and the owners of capital—were diametrical-
ly opposed.25 In an essay of 1928, he charted the evolution of the institu-
tion of labour in different types of society—feudal, bourgeois, social demo-
cratic—emphasizing, in each case, the significance of the relationship of
labour to ‘property’.26 Social democracy was understood by him, as we
have seen, to entail democratic control of the economic, as well as the
political, sphere. His advocacy of the creation of an economic, or labour,
constitution was informed by a belief that all (collective) economic actors
ought to be involved in the ordering of the economy, and not only the
most economically powerful.27 Through the creation of a labour institu-
tion and the bipartite identification and furtherance of the common inter-
est, conflicts of interest between the social classes would be resolved or
transcended.28 At the end of the Republic, and in the context of economic
crisis, he noted that they had instead been thrown into starker relief than
ever before.29
As for conflicts of interest arising between workers, Sinzheimer seems
to have regarded these as largely illusory. The existence of the individual
worker, he insisted, was determined by collective living conditions, so
that any improvement in the former depended upon an improvement in
the conditions of the worker’s whole class.30 It was true, however, that
workers might experience feelings of competitiveness with one another:
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for example, groups of workers employed in one workplace might regard
themselves as in competition with workers employed elsewhere.31 To
guard against such Betriebsegoismus (workplace egotism), Sinzheimer
argued, national ‘umbrella’ organizations of workers and employers
ought to be accorded primacy over workplace and district organizations,
so that they might coordinate all bipartite labour/capital negotiations
(particularly wage negotiations) in furtherance of the interests of all.
In Krisis des Arbeitsrechts, the instance of conflict discussed at greatest
length was that which existed between the rationalities of private law, on
the one hand, and labour law, on the other.32 Appraising the state of
labour law scholarship within the Republic at the time of writing, Sin-
zheimer noted that labour law continued to be understood, for the most
part, as an ‘appendage of private law’.33 Scholars overlooked the fact that
the two fields of law differed in their very fundamentals. Private law was
based upon the idea of individual free will, and upon the rather abstract
notion that all legal persons enjoyed such freedom of will equally. Labour
law, in contrast, was based upon the relationship of dependency (upon
capital) in which the worker, and the working class, concretely existed.
Private law sought to protect the individual’s free will, labour law to
subject that free will to a rational social order. Based as it was primarily
upon the principles of private law, the current economic order pulled in
the opposite direction to labour law. As a result, labour law was at risk of
‘an inner destruction of its new, unique, fundamental substance’.34 And
this posed a danger not only for labour law, but also ‘for the totality in
which we all live’.35 The crisis of labour law was a crisis of the entire
economic order. Labour law had to be renewed, and such renewal would
require the deep restructuring of the entire economic order. Economic
law would have to be rethought as a matter of social law as well, the
economy reorganized according to socialist (social law)—and not private
law—principles.36
CONFLICT AND THE NEW CENTURY CRISIS IN LABOUR LAW
Diagnosing Crisis
Though it has become commonplace in the course of the past thirty years
or so to speak of a crisis in labour law, the notion of crisis has not always
been understood or deployed in precisely the same way.37 Some com-
mentators have sought to explain why, in conditions of late capitalism,
labour law is suffering from a crisis of concepts. Focusing, for example, on
the ‘cornerstone’ concept of the ‘employee’, it has been emphasized that it
can no longer be assumed, as it was in the past, that most workers are
employees, hired under a contract of employment with a view to a long-
term engagement.38 Motivated by a desire to ‘maximize flexibility’, to be
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in a position to shrink and grow the workforce as circumstances demand,
employers have made ever-greater use of a variety of working relation-
ships that do not fall within the category ‘employment’. Throughout the
developed world, there has been a massive rise in the number of workers
hired through agencies, or as part-time, or casual, or zero-hours work-
ers.39 From the point of view of workers, this has been experienced, first
and foremost, as a loss of security in employment; as the substitution of
precariousness for security. Instead of enjoying a ‘job for life’, workers
have had to adjust to the new reality of short-term or fixed-term hires,
weak or no legal protections against redundancy or dismissal, and the
prospect of participating several or many times throughout their lives in
external labour markets. From the point of view of scholars, the problem
to be addressed is the unsuitability of ‘employment’ as either the peg
upon which to hang protective labour rights and standards, or as the
foundation upon which to construct a defining paradigm of the subject of
study.
Elsewhere, and especially since the financial crisis of 2008, the focus
has lain with the even more fundamental challenge posed to labour law
by the by now mainstream characterization of ‘protective’ labour legisla-
tion and labour market institutions as creating rigidities in markets and
therefore barriers to economic growth. In substance, the idea is the ex-
pression, in the field of employment relations, of a particular strand of
economic rationality or logic derived from a version of neoclassical eco-
nomics.40 Since the 1980s, it has become accepted across the globe to a
remarkable extent, such that it has come to enjoy the status, almost, of a
new ‘common sense’: something that is routinely claimed and assumed
without being proven.41 For scholars of labour law, and especially those
on the left, this has resulted in a crisis of identity. From the time of the
birth of the subject, scholars have conducted their studies, often, with the
aim of influencing policymakers and decision making within courts and
legislatures.42 (For, Sinzheimer questions of legal policy were even intrin-
sic to the study of labour law.43) Today, however, those who wish to
construct arguments in favour of unionization and collective voice, or
against deregulation and the persistent ratcheting down of workers’
terms and conditions, risk having their contribution overlooked or ig-
nored in favour of apparently more compelling claims regarding the der-
egulatory steps necessary to ensure job creation and growth. Unless they
can identify a means of countering the new economic ‘common sense’,
they risk the charge of irrelevance or futility. If their aim is, more modest-
ly, to describe and analyse the law as it is, they face the rather different
challenge of how to avoid appearing to endorse policies and legislative
programmes based upon the ‘flexibilization’, deregulatory logic; how to
avoid inching toward the conclusion that the very field of law which they
seek to study is disintegrating or disappearing even as they write.44
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A Third Way in Labour Law?
Towards the end of his life, Kahn-Freund remembered the Weimar era as
one in which conflict between the social classes had been grossly accentu-
ated.
It was a society in which the conflictual element was more palpable,
more visible to the eye. . . . The concluding words of the Communist
Manifesto—‘Nichts zu verlieren als eure Ketten . . . und eine Welt zu gewin-
nen’—really made sense in Germany in 1930.45
From the standpoint of 2015, Britain in the 1980s might similarly be re-
membered as a time and a place in which class conflict was overt: picture
a line of striking miners eye to eye with an opposing line of police; a
mounted policeman, truncheon raised; a roomful of young, male traders
popping champagne corks as computer screens flash green around them.
In stark contrast to these images, the Third Way discourse developed
in the UK in the 1990s represented an attempt by the centre-left to
transcend the ‘old’ divides between left and right, and to offer, instead, a
vision of a ‘win-win’ society in which rich and poor alike would be better
off. In the UK, ‘New’ Labour devised a set of policies and legislative
initiatives in the field of employment and employment relations which
were introduced as offering ‘fairness at work’.46 The premise upon which
the claim of fairness lay, quite explicitly, was that certain kinds of labour
laws and legally enforceable standards could benefit employees and em-
ployers alike, improving the situation of the former while helping at the
same time to make British businesses and the British economy more com-
petitive. ‘[F]airness at work and competitiveness go hand in hand . . . one
must reinforce the other. That is the cardinal principle’.47 Describing the
social policy of the EU at the time, and with reference to Karl Polanyi,
Colin Crouch spoke of ‘embedded neo-liberalism’.48 Neoliberal strategies
were pursued, but it was recognized that such strategies should be nested
or embedded in certain forms of social protection, to gain legitimacy and
to ease disruptive transitions. ‘Flexicurity’ programmes aimed, then, to
increase the flexibility of action open to employers, especially their ability
to dismiss workers, while offering those workers ‘security’ in the form of
improved opportunities for alternative employment and adequate in-
come support during periods of ‘transition’.49
During the 1990s and early 2000s, many scholars of labour law in the
UK were critical of Third Way policies and legislative initiatives, illustrat-
ing how measures which purported to benefit both sides of industry in
truth served the interests of employers rather better than those of the
workforce.50 Others, however, glimpsed therein the possibility of a way
out of the crisis in labour law.51 Without, of course, simply endorsing
government policy and legislation in the field uncritically, these scholars
felt themselves able to identify, within its terms, a set of objectives that
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went some way toward offering an alternative to the ‘deregulation’ or-
thodoxy of the 1980s, and which they could approve as setting an appro-
priate agenda for scholarly investigations. In their authoritative history of
labour legislation and public policy in the years up until 2007, for exam-
ple, Paul Davies and Mark Freedland adopted a framework which as-
sessed laws and policies primarily with reference to New Labour’s stated
objectives of maximizing social inclusion and improving the competitive-
ness of the economy.52 These were ‘profoundly important social objec-
tives’, Davies and Freedland suggested, with which scholars would do
well to engage.53 Writing alone and together with Frank Wilkinson, Si-
mon Deakin sought to employ economic arguments and methodologies
to challenge head-on the notion that protective and emancipatory labour
laws were economically damaging.54 Building on the work of Amartya
Sen, for example, Deakin and Wilkinson recharacterized social rights not
as constraints upon market activity (as T. H. Marshall had done) but,
rather, as constitutive of well-functioning markets—well-functioning
markets being those in which all economic agents are able to participate
to the benefit of themselves and others.55 On this logic, they were able to
argue that certain social rights and labour standards (including, for ex-
ample, minimum wage laws) were beneficial not only to workers and
rights holders, but to all.
Crisis, Austerity, Insiders, Outsiders
Where is the fairness, we ask, for the shift-worker, leaving home in the
dark hours of the early morning, who looks up at the closed blinds of
their next-door neighbour sleeping off a life on benefits?
—George Osborne, UK Conservative Party Conference, October 2012
For a brief moment in 2008, the financial crisis appeared to reveal the
deep-seated nature of the conflict of interests between those who (had)
benefited from deregulated or ‘lightly’ regulated financial markets, and
those who had not. As a matter of more or less unanimous agreement, it
seemed, the ostensibly ‘win-win’ strategies of the Third Way would be
rethought: more stringent financial regulation would be introduced,
bankers’ salaries and bonuses reigned in. Before such steps could be tak-
en, however, the crisis was quickly recast as one of swollen public sec-
tors, overgenerous welfare systems and rigid labour markets.56 The kind
of ‘grotesque paradox’ observed by Sinzheimer in the 1930s played out
again: as billions in public money were spent on propping up the banks,
unemployment rates rose, welfare payments were reduced, and legal and
institutional supports for better-than-minimum terms and conditions of
employment were removed.57
In what has since become the mainstream analysis of ‘failing’ labour
markets, labour market segmentation has routinely been attributed to the
existence of market insiders and outsiders. Insiders are those who enjoy
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‘unnaturally’ and, therefore, ‘unfairly’ high wages and good working
conditions including, importantly, job security; outsiders are those with-
out work or in precarious, low-paid work. Often insiders are defined sim-
ply as those in a SER, enjoying all the legal protections that are accorded
to (standard) ‘employees’, while outsiders are correspondingly those in
non-SERs.58 The characterization of labour markets as dually segmented
in this way encourages the conclusion that conflicts of interest arise—
primarily and problematically—not between workers and their employ-
ers, but between different groups of workers. The logic implied by the
diagnosis is that, in order to improve the position of the outsiders, the
insiders’ rights should be weakened or forfeited: it is because the insiders’
terms and conditions are unfairly high that those of the outsiders remain
low.59
In the context of the financial crisis of 2008 and the ongoing crisis in
the Eurozone, the EU Commission and its Troika associates have consis-
tently identified dual segmentation as a primary cause of failing labour
markets, high unemployment levels, and stunted economic growth. Ac-
cordingly, they have recommended or required national governments to
reform employment protection legislation so as ‘to reduce over-protec-
tion of workers with permanent contracts, and provide protection to
those left outside or at the margins of the job market’.60 With the stated
aim of better ‘balancing’ the legal protection afforded to so-called insid-
ers and outsiders, national governments have amended legislation so as
to weaken the rights and lower the standards enjoyed by the former,
without, in fact, strengthening the protections afforded to the latter.61
Elsewhere, conflicts of interest have been deemed to arise between ‘hard-
working families’ and ‘welfare-scroungers’, ‘strivers’ and ‘shirkers’, and
used to legitimize cuts to welfare.62 In an attempt to explain the imposi-
tion of draconian restrictions upon the right to strike, the interests of
striking workers have been said to conflict with those of other worker-
consumers, whose access to services is purportedly unfairly hindered by
reason of the industrial action.63
In scholarly writing, the language of labour market insiders and out-
siders is familiar, first and foremost, from the US and a line of ‘law and
economics’ analysis which seeks to illustrate the allegedly damaging ef-
fects of trade union representation; particularly, the barriers put in the
way of employers who would otherwise ‘increase efficiency’ by hiring
cheaper, nonunion labour.64 In recent years, it has appeared, too, in the
work of some left-wing, or centre-left, commentators. Perhaps the best-
known example is Guy Standing and his identification of an emerging
global class of low-paid workers with little or no job security: the ‘precar-
iat’.65 As the dynamics of globalization and government policies aimed at
‘flexibilization’ have fragmented older class divisions, so Standing
argues, several new social classes have emerged, which may be defined
with reference, essentially, to the degree of vulnerability suffered by their
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members. Above the ‘precariat’, sit then, among other classes, the ‘salari-
at’ (comprising those employed in large corporations and government
administration upon a full-time basis, enjoying job security, pensions and
paid holidays) and the rump of the old working class (also employed
under full-time, long-term contracts, enjoying both legal protections and
representation by trade unions). Below it, sit the unemployed and the
Lumpen. Implicit, and, at times, even explicit, in Standing’s analysis is the
suggestion that the interests of these different classes of worker conflict.
From a social policy/basic income group perspective, for example, he
describes the current systems of welfare and labour law as ‘labourist’,
effective only in supporting the shrinking and privileged population who
are in stable and secure jobs. The centre-left must abandon the interests of
‘labour’, he argues, and turn its attentions instead to representation of the
precariat.
‘The Sharpest Weapon . . . in the Hands of the Bourgeoisie’
In common with other commentators of the time, Sinzheimer tended, in
the course of his analysis, to treat labour as a unitary social class.66 He did
admit, as we have seen, of the existence of competition between work-
ers—for example, between groups of workers employed at different
workplaces—and he spoke at times of the role of the state in protecting
the interests of individuals (as against the collective).67 For the most part,
however, he was more immediately concerned to emphasize the ways in
which all workers stood to gain from their collectivization and from the
efforts of the collective to further collective interests. Through collectiv-
ization, competition between workers was minimized, and a defence
created against the levelling down of wages that would otherwise result
therefrom.
It is as true today as it was then that the interests of individual work-
ers and groups of workers can conflict. Competition between workers for
jobs is as much a characteristic of market economies as conflict between
workers and their employers over terms and conditions,68 and the great-
er the inequality of rewards attached to particular jobs—both within and
among different countries—the more accentuated such competition is
likely to be. It is also manifestly the case that law can serve to intensify or
to weaken such conflicts of interest, or to resolve them in favour of partic-
ular parties.69 Which workers or groups of workers stand to benefit, and
which to be disadvantaged, by particular labour laws is—or should be—a
matter of concern to all scholars and policymakers working in the field.70
It is nonetheless the case that approaches to the description or analysis
of labour laws and labour markets which begin from an identification of
conflicts of interests between workers—including, especially, those
which employ the notion of insiders and outsiders as a heuristic device—
can suffer from a number of weaknesses. The picture that they present of
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segmented labour markets can be rather simplistic, failing to take account
of the extent to which workers may also share interests—because ‘insider’
and ‘outsider’ identities are fluid and not fixed; because ‘outsiders’ may
be financially dependent on ‘insiders’; because depreciation in the wages
of one group may create downward pressure on those of another. It can
tend, too, to obscure the importance of employer interests and strategies
in causing or exacerbating market segmentation. As was emphasized
long ago by Friedrich Engels, employers have much to gain by orches-
trating and intensifying competition between workers. It was, of course,
precisely for that reason that workers sought to organize themselves into
trade unions and to demand the standardization of terms and conditions
across whole sectors and countries, or regions, refusing to compete with
one another upon the basis of the price at which they were willing to sell
their labour power.
When scholars or policymakers seek to identify conflicts of interest
within workplaces and labour markets, and to draw conclusions accord-
ingly, they ought to bear these points in mind. Instead of characterizing
trade unions as protective only of the interests of a limited group of
‘insiders’, they ought to recognize the extraordinary achievement of the
unions, historically, in improving wages and working conditions for un-
ion members and nonmembers alike, through sectoral collective bargain-
ing as supported by particular legislative mechanisms. Instead of disre-
garding employing organizations as disinterested bystanders in situa-
tions of competition between workers, they ought to direct their attention
squarely on those organizations as additional ‘interested’ parties. The
interests of certain workers may conflict with those of others, or with
those of employing organizations, or with those of consumers. But this is
a matter which fails to be determined with reference to the specific con-
text, and to the interests and practices of all the economic actors con-
cerned.
CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, failing labour markets were
identified as a primary cause of stagnating economies and, accordingly,
as a primary target for reform. As national governments and suprana-
tional institutions moved to prescribe programmes of reform, flexibility
figured as the key to well-functioning markets. In this respect, there was
a significant degree of continuity with ‘Third Way’ and ‘flexicurity’ poli-
cy prescriptions. Now, however, there was far less emphasis by govern-
ment on the capacity of innovations to benefit all, and a much greater
tendency, instead, to assert and emphasize the existence of conflicts of
interest between different groups of workers: labour market insiders and
outsiders, strivers and shirkers, striking railway workers and hardwork-
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ing commuters. Such conflicts of interest were then used to justify re-
forms aimed at lowering labour standards, cutting welfare payments, or
restricting workers’ freedom of association.
In policy debates and academic discussions alike, the identification of
conflicts of interest between different workers or groups of workers has
been based quite routinely upon a depiction of labour markets as dually
segmented; upon the characterization of some workers as labour market
insiders, and others as labour market outsiders. This is oversimplistic,
tending to overlook and obscure the extent to which workers also share
an interest in the improvement of wages and other terms and conditions,
and the ways in which workers’ interests can conflict with those of em-
ploying organizations. It was suggested in this chapter that the analysis
of labour markets and labour law ought to take account also of the inter-
ests of employing organizations and the strategies employed by them to
further those interests. In seeking to identify the interests of various mar-
ket actors, moreover, scholars and policymakers ought to seek to under-
stand markets and market behaviour not in the abstract, but with refer-
ence, instead, to the specific configuration of particular economies and
economic institutions. These, perhaps, are the enduring lesson of old ap-
proaches to the study of labour law, exemplified par excellence in the work
of Hugo Sinzheimer.
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From the Crisis of Corporatism to the
Crisis of Governance
Poul F. Kjaer
In the first half of the twentieth century, and, in particular, in the interwar
period, corporatism, in its populist, progressive, reactionary and totali-
tarian variants, became a central feature of European societies. Many
observers have regarded this development as a central driving force of
the profound societal crises which characterized this period.1 In contrast,
other observers have mainly interpreted the corporatist surge as both a
reaction and a possible solution to societal crises caused by the nature of
capitalist reproduction.2 In a similar vein, the emergence and expansion
of new types of governance institutions since the 1970s has been under-
stood as both the cause and as a reaction to the protracted series of crises
which have characterized Western Europe and the rest of the Western
world from the 1970s to the recent financial crisis.3
In more general terms, societal crises can be said to be intrinsic to a
modern society that is characterized by constant transformations of its
basic structure. This is also reflected in the constitutive distinction of
modern society, the distinction between the factual unfolding of social
processes and contrafactual normative articulations concerning how
these processes ought to unfold. Against this background, this chapter
examines the close link between societal crises and the evolution of inter-
mediary institutions in their corporatist, neocorporatist and governance
variants in the European context. Intermediary institutions fulfil a dual
role in so far as they are simultaneously oriented toward the internal
stabilization of social processes and the establishment of compatibility
between the social process in question and the rest of society. This gives
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them a strategic location in society in so far as they can be understood as
central sites of societal integration as also reflected in the particular way
in which they seek to combine factuality and normative articulations.4
But this location also implies that they are sites where tendencies of soci-
etal disintegration tend to emerge and become most visible. This was
particularly clear in relation to interwar corporatism, but it has also re-
emerged as a central issue within contemporary governance. A central
reason for the crisis proneness of both interwar corporatism and contem-
porary governance can be found in their advancement of a fundamental
antilegalist stance which, both in the interwar period and in the present
time, paved the way for an erosion of the legal infrastructure of society.
THE MODERN CONDITION AND CRISES
Societal crises have two dimensions: a social dimension and a time di-
mension. In relation to the latter dimension, a crisis is a transition which
involves an adjustment of expectations. An expectation is not being ful-
filled and an adjustment of expectations has to take place. Thus, from this
perspective, crises are essentially about the future. This also explains
why, since Georg W. F. Hegel, modernity and crisis are to be understood
as co-original.5 Modernity implies, as also highlighted by Reinhart Kosel-
leck,6 a reconfiguration of the time structures of society from a circular to
a linear conception of time, where the reality of the present is constituted
on the distinction between the past and the future. It is through the con-
tinued projection of problems, demands and expectations out in the fu-
ture that the social world maintains its vigour. In practice, the continued
displacement of problems, demands and expectations into the future
serves as a way to de-paradoxicalize the constitution of modern society.
The economy is expected to grow in order to maintain itself, and its
ability to do so is linked to the continued ability to inject new capital
which enables it to take yet another step forward. In a similar manner, the
political system continuously needs to make credible promises of a better
future in order to maintain its legitimacy. But, if fulfilled, such promises
are immediately replaced with new expectations, thereby creating a need
for new promises of future fulfilment.7
But modernity not only implies a reconfiguration of the time struc-
tures of society, it also implies their acceleration.8 From economy and
politics to science and sports, modern social processes are based upon an
expansionary logic which implies that the pace of change is continuously
increased.9 Citius, Altius, Fortius is the slogan of not only modern sports,
but also of modernity as such. Acceleration implies that the pace of
change is increasing, and, with it, the horizon of expectations is short-
ened. Career planning for a lifetime has, for example, become increasing-
ly impossible.10 Instead, the continued readjustment of expectations, and,
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with it, the sense of crisis, tends to become a permanent feature. Under
the condition of accelerated modernity, a conflation is taking place, in
which transition, adjustment and uncertainty become an integrated and
permanent feature of everyday life. It is therefore hardly surprising that
Søren Kierkegaard’s problematization of existential anxiety and angst
emerged at the dawn of modernity.11
The second dimension, the social and integrative dimension of soci-
ety, is also intimately linked to the structural composition of modern
society. A central feature of modern society is the differentiation of a
number of functionally delineated societal spheres or, in systems-theoret-
ical parlance, function systems, which increasingly operate autonomous-
ly based upon their own logic. Here, Karl Marx’s and, later on, Karl
Polanyi’s, reconstruction of the differentiation of the economic system
into a self-propelling and expansionist system guided by the objective of
profit is only one particular, albeit very clear, case of this development.
The turn to modernity implied a reconfiguration of society through the
emergence of a whole string of increasingly autonomous social processes
related to functional areas as diverse as the arts, education, health, law,
the mass media, politics, science and sports.12 These systemic processes
are all based upon expansionist logics, as expressed in terms such as
juridification, medicalization, politicization and scientification, in that
they tend to produce negative externalities which cannot be handled in a
purely system-internal manner.13 The reification of social relations, as
diagnosed in different ways by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, as well
as Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, are therefore not a phenome-
non which is specific to the economy, but rather a feature of modern
society as such. The same might be said for the related issues of aliena-
tion, anomie, the colonialization of lifeworlds, disciplination, rationaliza-
tion and technification.14
STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATIONS AND SOCIETAL CRISES
Within the Marxist tradition, contradictions between social classes, capi-
tal owners and labour providers, have traditionally been regarded as the
central driving force of history, just as the inequality produced within
capitalist society is seen as a root cause of societal upheaval and crisis.
Whereas the handling of social class differences certainly has been a cen-
tral issue throughout modern times, an adequate structural perspective,
however, highlights that such differences are more of a side effect of
increased functional differentiation.15 This does not imply that social dif-
ferences related to inequality are irrelevant for social crises, but it does
imply that, behind the issue of social inequality, more profound structu-
ral transformations in relation to the intensity and structural centrality of
functional differentiation can be detected. The crisis trajectory leading to
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the French Revolution of 1789 was, for example, closely linked to the
increased differentiation and empowerment of the political-bureaucratic
system.16 The revolution essentially amounted to a coup d’état in which
an increasingly professionalized bureaucratic machinery sought to eradi-
cate competing claims to political power.17 This again implied that novel
and very profound effects were produced vis-à-vis the rest of society in so
far as the traditional nobility, the petite bourgeoisie and the peasantry were
all faced with fundamental changes in the way in which their lives were
organized as well as their formal status in society.
As also argued by Franz Neumann and Hugo Sinzheimer among oth-
ers, the crisis of the Weimar Republic can, furthermore, be traced back to
a fundamental ‘construction failure’ of the institutional setup of the new-
ly founded republic. The institutional framework of Weimar Germany
rested, to a considerable degree, upon the idea of the collective inclusion
of social classes into the state, and thus upon the idea that social classes
provided the fundamental building blocks of society. As also pointed out
by Chris Thornhill in this volume, the comparatively late, and, in many
ways, incomplete unification of Germany implied that the early years of
the Weimar Republic were driven by a state-building effort guided by the
desire to establish a more unitary and coherent German society capable
of replacing the conglomerate institutional structure of the German Reich
of 1871.18 Thus, the introduction of a collectivistic and class-based corpor-
atist institutional framework, mainly enshrined through labour law, as
developed in the early Weimar years, was intended to act as a counter-
weight to the local and particularistic forces which continued to be a
central trademark of German society.19 In practice, the collective inclu-
sion of social classes into the state, however, led to an undermining of the
fragile public law framework of the state and the de facto privatization of
public power, since it opened the gates for a circumvention of democratic
procedures by organized interest groups, most notably business groups.
This again led to a factual curtailing of the state’s capacity to pursue
coherent and long-term policy objectives in relation to issues of economic
policy, among others.20 The catastrophic end of Weimar can, therefore, in
this light, be seen as a result of the de facto short-circuiting of the func-
tional delineations of society, since the boundaries between the political-
bureaucratic system and the economy were effectively fractured, which
led to a profound crisis of legitimacy.21 In sociological terms, one might,
therefore, argue that the Weimar crisis, in contrast to the crisis leading to
the French Revolution, was a ‘retroactive crisis’, in so far as it was a
reflection of an attempt to normatively institutionalize a framework of
collective decision making which factually rested partly on the stratifica-
tory differentiation between social classes and partly on the segmentary
forms of differentiation, as expressed in the continued vibrancy of strong
localistic and particuralistic centres of authority throughout German soci-
ety. The root cause of the crisis was therefore profoundly linked to the
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absence of a condensed and institutionally stabilized functionally delin-
eated sphere of public power due to the continued resistance of societal
countermovements. To the extent that modernity is defined as the prima-
cy of functional differentiation vis-à-vis segmentary, territorial and strati-
ficatory differentiation,22 Germany, at the time, might therefore be con-
sidered to be a country which had only partially arrived in modernity.
From a structural perspective, the successive series of catastrophic events
from 1914 to the division of Germany in 1949 might be seen as the ‘side
effects’ of a protracted reconfiguration process which led to the emer-
gence of a more outright supremacy of functional differentiation in
(Western) Germany in the post-WWII era.
The protracted series of crises which evolved in Western Europe and
the rest of the Western world from the 1970s onward, and which found
its (preliminary) culmination in the financial crisis that became visible
from 2007 onward, might also be regarded as a reflection of more pro-
found structural transformations. From the 1970s onward, the system of
economic production increasingly broke loose from its confinement with-
in the national and transnational institutional setups which were estab-
lished throughout the Western world in the wake of WWII. At nation-
state level, fundamental neocorporatist constitutional and welfare re-
forms were unfolded, partly based upon developments such as the New
Deal in the 1930s and the military planning efforts undertaken during
WWII. At transnational level, a new architecture was established through
frameworks such as Bretton Woods, the GATT, the International Mone-
tary Fund, the OEEC/OECD, and the World Bank. It was this institutional
framework which became ‘exhausted’23 due to a radicalization of social
processes in the latter half of the twentieth century, a radicalization
which implied a massive spatial expansion as well as an immense accel-
eration of time in relation not only to economic, but also to other systemic
processes in relation to the mass media and education, just as two exam-
ples. An expansion and acceleration, typically described with the term
globalization, which implied that the institutional frameworks aimed at
stabilising systemic reproduction processes, such as economic processes,
no longer corresponded to the nature and reach of the processes that they
were oriented against. From the 1960s onward, technological transforma-
tions implied a gradual shift to a service and knowledge society which
made the institutional framework of the preceding industrial society in-
creasingly outdated, just as the modernization processes in East Asia and
elsewhere have made the existing transnational architecture, from the
composition of the UN Security Council, to the power relations within
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, out of touch with
the reality that they are directed against.24 It is this development which
has found its expression in the emergence of a new semantic universe
through the ‘turn to governance’.
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It follows that the history of societal crises in the twentieth and early
twenty-first century is intimately linked to the consecutive expansion and
deepening of modernity. The gradual succumbing of ever larger seg-
ments of global society to the logic of modernity, as expressed in a rela-
tive dominance of functional differentiation as the organizing principle of
society, has unfolded in a ‘two steps forward and one step back’ manner,
in which catastrophic and violent excesses have been a central trademark.
Rather than social inequality, the structural cause for the outbreak of
crisis tends to be related to the emergence of discrepancies between the
unfolding of societal processes and the institutional architecture aimed at
stabilising these processes. Social processes are constituted upon the ba-
sis of a ‘doubling of reality’25 between facticity and normativity, between
the factual existing social reality and the equally real idea of what the
factual reality ought to look like. This doubling is expressed in a function-
al need to stabilize social processes normatively through institutional
frameworks such as those associated with rights-based rule of law, con-
stitutional democracy, and labour market regimes. Forms of institutional
stabilization, however, tend to change at a slower pace than the social
processes that they are oriented against. In a world characterized by con-
stant change, they again and again end up being ‘out of touch’ with the
structural composition of the very processes that they aim to stabilize.
Sociological theory, conceptual history and social and political theory
converge on this point, in so far as the tension between facticity and
normativity is where they, albeit from different angles, meet up. As we
will turn to now, both the crisis of the interwar period, and the post-
WWII response and the subsequent turn to governance which emerged
from the consecutively unfolding experience of crisis from the 1970s on-
ward, were intimately linked with the articulation and the unfolding of
new ideological frameworks aimed at addressing the continuously un-
folding discrepancy between facticity and normativity.
CORPORATISM AS ANTIMODERNISM
From the late nineteenth century onward, the emerging sociological dis-
cipline was characterized by increasingly critical voices concerning the
consequences of modernity. Not just Marx, but also scholars such as
Émile Durkheim, Ferdinand Tönnies and Georg Simmel voiced their con-
cerns in relation to the side effects of a rapidly changing world character-
ized by an implosion of holistic sources of meaning through increased
temporalization and functional differentiation. Throughout Europe, this
discomfort with the everyday life of modernity also became mirrored in a
broad host of social movements of socialist, syndicalist and religious vari-
ants, which emerged from the mid-nineteenth century onward. Common
to these otherwise very diverse groups was their call for the curbing of
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the volatility of market-based interactions. They shared the view that a
competition-based economy produced anomie and other side effects, just
as they called for the reinstalment of guild or guild-like corporations in
order to reduce the contingency of market interactions. These move-
ments, in most instances, saw themselves as opposed to liberal as well as
Marxist ideas. Instead, they emphasized the protection of artisans, shop-
keepers and other groups related to the petite bourgeoisie.26
This line of thinking was taken up in the interwar period, in Weimar
Germany as well as throughout the rest of Europe, through the develop-
ment of forceful corporatist ideologies. Even though corporatist dis-
course took substantially different forms and unfolded with different de-
grees of force and resonance in different European and non-European
settings, the common feature was the advancement of an idea of society
as an organic body. In practice, this holistic view implied calls for limita-
tions to be imposed upon the competition-based economy and the view
that modern liberal statehood was an insufficient basis for societal order.
The rejection of the modern liberal state was expressed in a rejection of its
core component, namely, the rule of law, which was seen as an alienating
tool which inhibited efficient and goal-orientated planning.27 The corpor-
atist rejection of the rule of law, which was taken to an extreme in the
ideological underpinnings of Italian fascism and German National Social-
ism, implied that the state/society distinction was to be dissolved. Thus,
the core trait of corporatist thinking was the desire to return to a holistic
world in which the functional differentiation of society had been undone.
This desire was, however, not only a prevalent idea, it also gained factual
reality. Although Mussolini’s Italy and post–Weimar National Socialist
Germany massively radicalized both the ideational foundation and its
practice, corporatism was not confined to these totalitarian regimes. Both
at the level of ideas and at the level of practical politics, corporatism
became a central trademark of interwar Europe. This was the case from
de Rivera’s authoritarian conservative regime and later under the Falan-
gist regime in Spain, the Ditadura Nacional and the Estado Novo in Portu-
gal, Engelbert Dolfuss’ Austrofascism, the Josef Pilsudski regime in Po-
land as well as throughout the rest of Eastern, Southeastern and Central
Europe which all succumbed to various degrees of corporatist authoritar-
ianism at different stages of the interwar period.28 The corporatist desire
for a new type of ordering also heavily influenced political discourse and
practice in those few European states where democracy did not experi-
ence an outright breakdown, such as Belgium, France, the Netherlands,
the Nordic countries and the UK.
The dual corporatist rejection of liberal market economy and the liber-
al state can be seen as a reflection of a demand for order and certainty
which gained traction due to the earthquake caused by WWI. In sociolog-
ical terms, corporatism can be understood as being characterized by a
general rejection of the spontaneous dimension of social processes and
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their substitution with planned and organized processes. Most function-
ally differentiated areas of society are characterized by a duality between
hierarchically organized and spontaneously coordinated areas, as, for ex-
ample, is expressed in the distinction between firms and the market, the
political system and public opinion, and between institutionalized relig-
ious congregations and their believers.29 It is this duality which corporat-
ist ideologies sought to break down through the substitution of spontane-
ous processes, including market-based processes and pluralist politics,
with hierarchical structures relying on organization and planning.30 The
corporatist urge was therefore based upon a fundamental paradox.
Strong states and strong leadership was promoted at the same time as the
most central infrastructure of state-based authority, its legal underpin-
ning, was to be removed. Not surprisingly, the freeing of political deci-
sion making from the constraints of law in almost all settings ended up
being a very short-lived strategy. In almost all cases, the suspension of
the legally imposed self-restraint of state power implied an initial explo-
sion of political energies and a strengthened capability to act under ex-
ceptional circumstances. In the longer run, however, the dismissal of le-
gal self-restraint implied that the functionally confined integrity of state-
based power was eroded, thereby paving the way for societal break-
downs and disaster.
NEOCORPORATIST RESTABILIZATION
The interwar experience and the subsequent totalitarian disaster became
the focal point around which intellectual thought circulated from the end
of WWII onward. Friedrich von Hayek and Karl Polanyi, for example,
simultaneously developed theories concerned with why totalitarianism
had emerged.31 But they arrived at diametrically opposed conclusions, in
so far as the former argued that the problem was ‘too little’ and the latter
‘too much’ market and competition. From the perspective of sociology,
their respective positions can also be seen as focused upon whether the
existence or the absence of a functionally differentiated society was the
underlying reason for the emergence of totalitarianism. The resurgence of
the ordoliberal school in post-WWII Western Germany implied strong
advocacy for the former perspective, that the short-circuiting of function-
al differentiation was a central reason for the totalitarian surge. Accord-
ingly, the ordoliberal school reinforced its focus on law and legal instru-
ments as the central tools through which the dual separation and recon-
nection of the economic and political dimensions of society should be
achieved.32 Thus, at the heart of the ordoliberal perspective was an
understanding of Rechtstaatlichkeit as the central framework through
which the functional differentiation of society was to be established and
maintained. This issue lay, furthermore, at the heart of the dispute be-
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tween Wolfgang Abendroth and Ernst Forsthoff concerning the compat-
ibility between Rechtsstaatlichkeit and progressive welfare-state arrange-
ments.33
Ordoliberalism only gained central traction in Germany, but the
broader emphasis on Rechtsstaatlichkeit was a general thing and heavily
influenced practical politics throughout Western Europe. In the part of
Europe which did not succumb to Soviet control, a substantial wave of
both constitutional and welfare reforms all reinforcing the legal structur-
ing of relations between the state and the rest of society were enacted in
the immediate post-WWII years. Almost all European states outside So-
viet control granted themselves new constitutions or substantially re-
vised the ones they had between 1945 and 1953.34 The West European
political economy regimes furthermore underwent fundamental transfor-
mations. Already during the allied occupation regime, a disentanglement
of the conglomerate structure of German industry, characterized by a
horizontal integration of industries such as coal, machinery and steel,
was initiated. This paved the way for the strong focus on competition
(antitrust) policy as a cornerstone of industrial policy at both national and
European levels in the post-WWII area. In addition, the International
Ruhr Authority, through which the Western Allied powers imposed their
control over the German economy, initiated a reform of the German
codetermination (Mitbstimmung) framework35 which guaranteed em-
ployees places on company boards. Codetermination has a long history
in Germany but was fundamentally reformed with the Gesetzüber die Mit-
bestimmung der Arbeitnehmer in den Aufsichtsräten und Vorständen der Un-
ternehmen des Bergbaus und der Eisen und Stahl erzeugenden Industrie of
1951. This law, reforming codetermination in the coal and steel sector,
eventually came to serve as the template for codetermination in the entire
German industry. The same was the case with the reform of the frame-
work for collective bargaining autonomy (Tarifautonomie) which was de-
veloped in a similar manner and which was finalized in April 1949 one
month before the establishment of the Federal Republic. In the UK, the
Social Insurance and Allied Services Report, the so-called Beveridge Report,
of 1942 provided the cornerstone for the reformation of the British wel-
fare and labour market system in the early postwar period, and, as such,
provided the basic framework for the British political economy until the
late 1970s. In France, where only timid moves toward a generalized wel-
fare and labour market system had emerged from the late nineteenth
century onward, the immediate post-WWII period saw the emergence of
an ‘across-the-board’ welfare system. A system which emerged through
the merger of the existing plethora of mainly ‘private law’-based social-
security systems into a single ‘public law’-based generalized framework,
covering, among other things, pensions, occupational injury, health and
housing.36 The Constitution of the Fourth Republic of 1946 furthermore
introduced a ‘right to social security’ and reinforced the right to form
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occupational associations, business associations and trade unions, and
the right to strike.
This cluster of arrangements has traditionally been denoted as ‘neo-
corporatist’, although, in fact, they have essentially nothing in common
with the earlier forms of corporatism.37 Although considerable variation
can be observed,38 the welfare state conglomerates which emerged in
Western Europe in the postwar period shared the feature that they had
formal organization and formalized positivist law as their key organiza-
tional components, and, as such, they were directly opposed to the core
organizational ideal which had driven interwar corporatism. The post-
WWII neocorporatist institutional formations were characterized by hier-
archically organized ‘peak associations’, which served as negotiation sys-
tems (Verhandlungssysteme)39 aimed at mediating between the different
spheres of society, most notably—but not exclusively—between the econ-
omy and the political system in the state form. As such, the core objective
of the emerging neocorporatist set-ups was to establish a mutual stabil-
ization of exchanges between different societal spheres.40 While acknowl-
edging the centrality of the state, the fundamental starting point was an
acceptance of functional differentiation and the legally mediated stabil-
ization of relations between the different functionally delineated seg-
ments of society.
THE ‘TURN TO GOVERNANCE’: DEEPENING MODERNIZATION
OR REFEUDALIZATION?
In spite of the strong developments in the immediate post-WWII years,
the structuration of society through legally mediated neocorporatist insti-
tutions did not reach a mature level in most Western European settings
before in the 1960s. First, at this time, one might plausibly argue that at
least some European states had gained the capability of establishing a
coherent framework for society as a whole.41 This evolutionary achieve-
ment was, however, ‘tragic’ in nature in so far as this unitary society
started to unravel at the very moment of its completion,42 thereby creat-
ing a basis for contemporary golden age nation-state nostalgia.43
The massive expansion in the size of the public sector and the general
‘demand overload’ which Western, including Western European, states
were confronted with from the 1970s onward led to a problematication of
the state’s steering capacity as both left and right leaning scholars iden-
tified a planning and steering crises.44 The ‘turn to governance’, typically
associated with decentring, and increased hybridization between public
and private spheres, as well as the increasing deregulation and privatiza-
tion from the 1980s onward, is typically seen as a response to this devel-
opment.45 However, this shift did not imply a substantial shrinking of the
state, but rather a reconfiguration, through a shift in policy priorities, a
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restructuration of the tax base upon which states relied as well as an
internal reorganization of states through the introduction of NPM tech-
niques. In ongoing critiques of this new, often denoted as neoliberal,
policy regime, the central focus has been on the expansion of commodifi-
cation and thus marketization. While this is certainly an important trend,
this development did not imply a reduction in the reach of state power.
On the contrary, a double-movement which implied a dual expansion of
the economy and statehood was the central feature. The reorganization of
the state through NPM implied, in most European settings, the introduc-
tion of competition as a central steering instrument within public institu-
tions. From the public service mass media,46 to public research funding
and health care,47 the establishment of internal modes of competition,
where tasks and funds are allocated through competitive bidding have
become commonplace. This sort of framework mimics the logic of the
market but remain essentially nonmarket in so far as they typically are
organizational or regime internal institutions where the parameters, as
well as the final decision, tends to rest with management and as such are
hierarchically and not spontaneously defined. This again creates a need
for constant evaluations to be conducted as efficiency increases and re-
source allocation cannot be linked to the price mechanism. Thus, whereas
this development indeed implies an increased marketization, it also, and
probably more substantively, implies an expansion of a state-based bu-
reaucratic logic, de facto serving as a tool for undermining a central char-
acteristic of the neocorporatist welfare regimes, namely, the profession-
based autonomy of areas such as health, science and the mass media.48
The competitive bidding for resources is, in other words, an instrument
which allows for an expansion of political rationality—which, to a large
extent might be considered bureaucratic rationality in disguise—into
spheres which, to date, had been capable of upholding a certain degree of
autonomy vis-à-vis political influence.
The most fundamental transformation following on from the reconfig-
uration of the state is, however, observable at the legal level through the
dual expansion of contract and administrative law. This development has
been considered a one-way absorption of contract law by administrative
law.49 A contradictory double movement can, however, be observed, in
so far as the contract tool has been introduced into the organization of
public policies at the same time as increased hybridization between the
public and the private implies that administrative law provisions are
increasingly applied to private structures as well, leading de facto to the
emergence of considerable grey zones that are not clearly demarcated to
one or the other sphere, a development which indicates that the differen-
tiation between state and nonstate social processes is becoming increas-
ingly strained, potentially allowing for the increasingly unregulated
introduction of privatistic logics into public processes and vice versa.
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This development is being further enhanced by the ethos dominating
NPM and the wider neoliberal discourse, in so far as its call for increased
efficiency and adaptability are closely linked to an anti-legalistic dis-
course in which the ‘removal of red tape’ hampering social interaction is
seen as a central objective. Whereas the corporatist discourse of the early
twentieth century was closely linked to an anti-legalist discourse because
formal law was seen as inhibiting the possibility of planning and political
action, the neoliberal discourse develops the same argument upon the
basis of the idea that legal formalism inhibits spontaneous market pro-
cesses. In both discourses, ‘society’, and not the state, is considered to be
the true constitutive object and source of social progress at the same time
as both discourses, paradoxically, provide the basis for an expansion of
state power in the short and middle term. As is clearly visible in relation
to the 2007–2008 financial crises, the legal infrastructure, with its strategic
function of simultaneously separating and reconnecting numerous social
spheres in order to enable a stabilization of expectations and a structur-
ing of exchanges between these spheres, came under sustained pressure
in most developed countries from the 1990s onward. Over time, this led
to an incremental undermining of the integrity and sustainability of polit-
ical, economic, as well as other social processes. Much like in corpora-
tism, the turn to governance and its accompanied expansion of competi-
tion might, therefore, in the short and middle term, have established the
basis for a dual expansion of political and economic rationality as the
same as the suspension of reflexive self-limitation through law indicates
the long-term dangers associated with this development for the state as
well as the economy.
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What Is Left of the European
Economic Constitution II?
From Pyrrhic Victory to Cannae Defeat
Christian Joerges
Ordoliberalism is en vogue. If you search for this term on the homepage of
the Observer newspaper, you will be led within 0.15 seconds to thirty-five
pertinent entries.1 The resonance in academic writing is even more im-
pressive, not only in the UK, but also in France and Italy. The recent
interest was obviously provoked by the financial crisis and Germany’s
orchestration of the European responses. And the tone of the comments is
quite uniform. It has been set by a much-cited paper by Ulrike Guérot
and Sebastian Dullien, which seeks to discern the ideational basis of ‘Ger-
many’s approach to the Euro crisis’.2 ‘The long shadow of Ordoliberal-
ism’ is its title. Thomas Biebricher’s objections against ‘The Return of
Ordoliberalism in Europe’3 sound similar. But his argument is embedded
in a much more comprehensive long-term research agenda on the varie-
ties of political and economic liberalism.4 There are more learned ac-
counts available,5 some apparently written in some haste.6 No further
lamentation. The quality of academic work is not uniform; indignation
about Germany is comprehensible. Three queries which deserve to be
taken seriously remain.
1. How come the broad stream of critical evaluations fails to mention,
let alone discuss, the interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary founda-
tions of the ordoliberal tradition? This school of thought is, or was,
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essentially a socio-legal philosophy which sought to synthesize
two disciplines under overarching normative visions.
2. Not only is there hardly only mention of law and of lawyers, it is
also equally difficult to discern who in the academic profession
represents ordoliberalism today and defends Germany’s responses
to the crisis on such conceptual grounds.7 Scholars indebted to the
legacy of the Freiburg School tend to focus on its conceptual histo-
ry and philosophical or methodological underpinnings. In the de-
bates over the financial crisis, this kind of work is not particularly
useful. One wonders, however, why there is so little engagement
with contributions that defend at least some elements of the ordo-
liberal tradition. How significant is it that this kind of work tends
to be sceptical as to the impact of ordoliberal ideas and critical in
the evaluation of what is so widely perceived as an institutional-
ization and implementation of ordoliberal principles and concepts.
To put this slightly differently: Could it be that references to ordo-
liberal notions not only in political discourses, but also in academic
contributions no longer defend its foundational premises?
3. The third query mirrors the second: for decades, ordoliberalism
has dominated what Germans call Wirtschaftsrecht (economic law is
only an approximation to this notion). Why is it, one wonders, that
this school, which is still well represented in German academia,
remains so silent in the intense debates on Europe’s ‘crisis law’.
How significant is it that the critics of ordoliberalism simply can-
not name contemporary jurists who would defend what they criti-
cize and skip over this difficulty and discuss other challenges.8
Franz Böhm, who passed away in 1977, is the only representative
of the faction of ordoliberal jurists cited in an essay by Matthias
Siems and Gerhard Schnyder.9
For all these reasons, ordoliberalism will figure here as a spectre, rather
than a vibrant movement and school of thought. Why, then, care at all?
Do the three queries even merit attention? My thesis is that the discovery
of a culprit who is not alive is indicative of a deeper dilemma and a
twofold crisis. The nomination of the culprit is a political gesture which
camouflages deep uncertainties on the part of the critics about the causes
of the European crisis and the means which could cure it. This is less
disquieting than the other side of the dilemma. I will argue that the crisis
has revealed the conceptual emptiness of Europe’s crisis management.
The lost paradigm has been replaced by discretionary managerialism
while a conceptual renewal is not in sight. This is not to discharge either
the spectre or the European praxis. It is to indicate that we have to liberate
ourselves from the dichotomies which dominate the current debate.
The foundation of these messages will be elaborated in three steps.
The first is a historical account which seeks to explain the ordoliberal
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legacy. The second will deal with the European aspirations of ordoliber-
alism up to the Treaty of Maastricht, in particular with the project of a
European economic constitution. Only the third will be directly con-
cerned with the financial crisis.
TWO NARRATIVES
The writing of the history of ordoliberalism is dominated by protagonists
and adherents to this tradition. This is a rich literature—and, unsurpris-
ingly, one which underlines its accomplishments and merits. Nonparti-
sans have submitted more critical accounts.
The supportive reconstructions tend to start with the 1920s of the
twentieth century. Anxieties about the economic downfall and social ten-
sions of post-WWI and post-Monarchic Germany were about to get out of
control. The first German republic was a democracy with strong antidem-
ocratic opponents both from the radical right and from the radical left.
Doubts as to the strength of the new order and the determination of its
institutions, particularly the Reichstag, were widespread, and were nur-
tured by renowned teachers of public law (‘Staatsrecht’ and ‘Verfassung-
slehre’).10 The ordoliberal legacy can be characterized as a then new varie-
ty of liberalism. This neoliberalism distanced itself from laissez-faire ideas,
which, notably, Alexander Rüstow belittled as ‘paläo-liberal’.11 Two in-
fluential manifestos were published at the peak of the great economic
crisis in 1932: Walter Eucken’s Staatliche Strukturwandlungen und die Krise
des Kapitalismus (‘Structural Transformations of the State and the Crisis of
Capitalism’),12 and Alexander Rüstow’s Interessenpolitik oder Staatspolitik
(roughly: ‘Defending Interests or Striving for the Common Good’).13 Oth-
er subsequently famous protagonists followed suit in the same year:14
Franz Böhm’s seminal monograph on Wettbewerb und Monopolkampf
(roughly: ‘Competitive Order or Monopoly Struggle’) followed just one
year later.15 The thrust of these works was liberal in its rejection of the
Historic School of Economics, on the one hand, and of socialist visions of
Wirtschaftsdemokratie as propagated by the labour movement, on the oth-
er.16 It was post laissez-faire in that it assigned the task of ensuring the
ordo of the economic sphere to the state. Walter Röpke used the oxymo-
ronic notion of ‘liberal interventionism’ to characterize this function.17
The ordoliberal critique of economic power, the commitment to a
strong antitrust law which aims to protect markets against self-destruc-
tion and an impartial state order, may attract popular support but are
hardly a conclusive explanation for the broad acceptance and political
success of ordoliberalism in the young Federal Republic. A plausible ra-
tionale for this impact has been submitted by Philip Manow in his explo-
ration of the religious underpinnings of ordoliberalism. The notorious
‘social question’ which generated so much unrest in the late-nineteenth
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and the early-twentieth century was a challenge to which both Christian
Churches sought to respond. This is not major news as far as Germany’s
political Catholicism is concerned. But the story which Manow recounts
about the importance of social Protestantism was hardly known.18 Ordo is
a Catholic notion. Yet, the ordoliberal founding fathers who embraced
it—Walter Eucken, Alexander Rüstow, Wilhelm Röpke—were all strong-
ly linked to Protestantism.19 What both the Protestants and the Catholics
sought was a third way between capitalism and socialism. The alliance
which they formed was the basis of Germany’s postwar social market
economy, an ecumenical project which united Protestants and Catholics
politically in the Christian Democratic Union.20
Manow’s resort to the Christian churches bridges the ordoliberal be-
ginnings with their postwar success. But what about the in-between, the
twelve years of the Third Reich? This is the reference point of the second
narrative. Ordoliberals were not only prodded to explain their advocacy
for a ‘strong state’, but were also suspected or accused of intellectual
partisanship with the infamous Carl Schmitt or collaboration with the
Nazi regime. It is clear that their third way was not a plea for a constitu-
tional democracy. Their concept of an economic constitution was mis-
trustful of political processes. If they were not democrats, they must have
been sympathizers with the Nazis and, at the very least, the Schmittians.
Tertium non datur! Such presumptions and suspicions are unavoidable
and have, indeed, been submitted.21 The title of Franz Böhm’s famous
monograph, published in 1937, sounds somewhat pathetic and may have
had political appeal.22 But is there really a ‘strong Schmittian flavour’ in
the ‘The Ordo Manifesto of 1936’, signed by Franz Böhm, Walter Eucken
and Hans Großmann-Doerth,23 as Julio Baquero Cruz has argued?24 The
manifesto is a critique of the erosion of the trust ‘in a natural system in
both law and political economy’ by romanticism and historicism. The
‘economic constitution’ is understood as a ‘general political decision on
how the economic life of the nation is to be structured’. The line between
unfair and permissible competition is to be drawn by the cooperative
efforts of lawyers and economists.25 Is this Schmitt’s discretionary poli-
tics? Is it the authoritarian liberalism which Hermann Heller criticized?26
This is what I suggested in my ‘melancholic eulogy’.27 That evaluation
may have to be revised under the present crisis. The resort of the strong
state to strong law and ‘economic science’ has an authoritarian touch. But
this authority nevertheless invokes and legitimates its actions by valid
law and economic science, and hence not on discretionary political
grounds. Heller, publishing in 1933, does not mention ordoliberalism.
His opponent is Carl Schmitt with his theses on the state of exception and
the irrefutable dictatorship.28 What Heller describes is an economic emer-
gency. This is why he discusses, in the final pages of his essay, Schmitt’s
infamous talk on the ‘strong state and the healthy economy’.29 There are
affinities in this talk with an interventionism establishing market mecha-
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nisms. But Schmitt’s proclamation of a strong state with unfettered pow-
ers, on the one hand, and a depoliticized economy which is obedient to
authoritarian commands, on the other, can hardly be understood as a
promotion of the ordoliberal agenda. Schmitt’s plea for political decisions
which depoliticize the economy, and his polemics against ‘Wirtschaftsde-
mokratie’ (industrial democracy), form a tandem, although Schmitt’s ideas
about the role of the strong state in the economy seem somewhat opaque.
We leave their deciphering to the Schmitt research, but will have to re-
turn to the substance of the problem in the concluding section on Eu-
rope’s new ‘crisis law’.
THE PROJECT OF A EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION
The following brief reconstruction of the ordoliberal impact on the inte-
gration project is not an end in itself, but is meant to elucidate the flaws of
the integration project which have contributed to its present malaise. I
refrain from repeating my earlier reconstruction.30 What I want to under-
line here is what I consider to be a merit of the ordoliberal reading of
European law, and then focus on two further aspects, the rarely noticed
hijacking of the ordoliberal school by the near-to unanimous31 reading of
the EEC Treaty as a constitution which was written by the ECJ and,
thereafter the reconceptualization of the EMU as established by the Trea-
ty of Maastricht and the Stability Pact of 1997 as a ‘diagonal’ conflict
constellation.
Economic Constitutionalism
‘Die Wirtschaft ist das Schicksal’ (‘the economy is our destiny’)—this in-
sight of Walter Rathenau, politician and industrialist, murdered in 1922,
is anything but trivial. My somewhat pathetic quotation alludes to a long-
term problématique and a critique of European legal scholarship. The
problem concerns the relation or tension between markets and politics,
more specifically, between the democratically legitimated political rule in
constitutional states and the autonomy of their economies. For European
constitutionalism, the economy is en quelque façon nulle. This kind of com-
placency is (co-)responsible for a good number of failures, which include
the benign neglect of the ordoliberal project. This complacency is remark-
able. Walter Hallstein, the first president of the European Commission,
was, after WWII, an avowed ordoliberal.32 One could have been inter-
ested in understanding what he meant when he famously characterized
the EEC as ‘Schöpfung des Rechts, Rechtsquelle, und Rechtsordnung’ (‘created
by law, the source of law, and legal order’).33 In a nutshell, European
integration had been launched as an economic project, not as a political
union. The ordoliberal version of economic constitutionalism provided a
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conceptual framework within which European integration could be legit-
imated: the freedoms guaranteed in the EEC Treaty, the opening up of
national economies, the antidiscrimination rules, and the commitment to
a system of undistorted competition, were interpreted as a principled
‘decision’ for the establishment of a free-market economy and its compet-
itive ordering.34 And it is worth underlining that, in this reading, the
community acquired a legitimacy of its own. The validity of Europe’s
economic governance was not dependent upon some foundational politi-
cal democratic act. Quite the contrary, the EEC was perceived as a non-
majoritarian settlement par excellence; its competitive order was based
upon law, and shielded against political influence.35 Interpreting the per-
tinent Treaty provisions as prescribing a law-based order committed to
guaranteeing economic freedoms and protecting competition by supra-
national institutions elegantly resolved the legitimacy problématique. The
legitimacy of the economic ‘ordo’ was independent of the state’s demo-
cratic constitutional institutions. By the same token, it could be argued
that it imposed limits upon the community and that discretionary eco-
nomic policies were illegitimate and unlawful.
Integration through Law as Congenial Project
Ordoliberalism was by no means dominant within the—then quite
small—community of European law teachers in Germany, and was sim-
ply unknown elsewhere. To be sure, the Federal Cartel Agency in Berlin
made its views known to Brussel’s legendary DG IV (Directorate General
for Competition) and important officials from Germany were committed
ordoliberals. This should have had its impact. It remains nevertheless
somewhat mysterious that a school of thought which is unknown outside
Germany and resorts there in the private law departments of Germany’s
law faculties should influence the formation of European law so signifi-
cantly. There was, however, a kind of meeting of minds, which occurred
between ordoliberal economic constitutionalism and the constitutional-
ization of the EEC Treaty, which the jurisprudence of the ECJ, an institu-
tion ‘tucked away in the fairy tale duchy of Luxembourg’,36 promoted so
successfully: the principles of direct effect, supremacy, preemption, with
self-empowerment as the ultimate authority in the interpretation of Euro-
pean law, and, most importantly, the granting of economic rights to Eu-
rope’s market citizens, which empowered them to move the integration
project ahead through the defence of these rights against the legislative
and regulatory activities of their home states.
This is all well known, a hardly questioned fait accompli, and yet it is
equally mysterious. The famous formula of the ‘object and the agent of
integration’37 was coined as late as 1990. At that time, the American law
and society movement promoted the sociological study of law and all
sorts of interdisciplinary ‘law and’ explorations. It inspired the ‘law-in-
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context’ approach which was to become the methodological trademark of
the Law Department of the European University Institute in Florence.
‘Integration through law’, taken literally, was both a concept and a strate-
gy which disregarded the embeddedness of law in all sorts of social
norms, and of its societal functions. The success of the ‘integration-
through-law’ agenda can only be explained on metamethodological
grounds. Since the commitment to ‘more integration’ was unquestioned
with ‘law’ providing a normatively appealing means for its promotion, it
is unsurprising that the support of the project through ever more legal
harmonization and uniformity was so widely accepted. The methodolog-
ical solipsism of the formative years, the doctrinal rigidity and its formal-
ism, all enabled transnational interactions and acting, which instituted a
European community of lawyers and legal scholarship long before social
scientists started to take Europe seriously.38 The price to be paid for this
kind of progress was to become apparent only with the various rounds of
enlargement and the ever-greater socioeconomic diversity and political
salience of the integrationist moves. Integration through law rests upon a
‘one-size-fits-all’ assumption which was to become an ever more inade-
quate response to the challenges of European diversity. And the promo-
tion of more unity as an end in itself was to become an ever more insuffi-
cient response to the quest for the legitimacy of European rule.
We conclude that the conceptual foundation of both economic and
treaty constitutionalism was not impressive. Its considerable impact must
have had metajuridical reasons. One such support was certainly the legit-
imacy of the postwar consensus on a peaceful European future,39 another
more mundane one, the neoliberal tilt of the integration project, which
ensured its support by powerful actors.
The Maastricht Monetary Union as Diagonal Conflict
Neither the intellectual nor the broad political support, however, was as
robust as it seemed during the successful years of the foundational peri-
od and the dynamics of the ‘completion of the internal market’ which
Jacques Delors had initiated. The success stories need to be retold here.
After the crisis, it is more important to explore the design failures which
have contributed to Europe’s by now apparent instability. The institu-
tional and sociopolitical turning point, we submit, was the Treaty of
Maastricht.
The Treaty of Maastricht, signed in 1992, in force since 1993, was
perceived at the time as both a continuation and a deepening of what had
been accomplished, a move towards ‘an ever closer union’, marked by an
opening of new policy fields and the crowning of the completion of the
internal market by monetary union.40 In hindsight, we see a more com-
plex picture, and what we are becoming aware of are institutional insuffi-
ciencies, and failures to deal with them. It is, by now, common wisdom:
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the separation of monetary policy from fiscal and economic policy estab-
lished by the Treaty of Maastricht is deeply flawed. The decoupling of
monetary policy from national fiscal and economic policy has created an
unruly space beyond the reach of law and European policy making. Si-
mon Deakin provides further explanation:
[T]he national economies of the eurozone were on different economic
growth paths. The future debtor states were mainly pursuing policies
of financially-driven growth that were dependent on an expansion of
private credit and on increasing asset prices in the markets for commer-
cial and residential property.41
This is a significant point. It explains why more stringent cooperation was
not conceivable and why a more stringent legal regime would have been
bound to fail. These negative assessments do not yet tell us how we
should characterize, in positive terms, what was actually established. As
indicated, I suggest that the specifics of the Maastricht settlement can best
be characterized as a ‘diagonal conflict’. At this point, this notion needs to
be explained further.
Monetary policy has become an exclusive competence of the Union
under the Treaty of Maastricht (Article 3(1) c TFEU). The conferral of this
competence did not include economic and fiscal policies. The exercise of
these two policies can have external effects and can lead to ‘horizontal’
conflicts among member states. Very soon after 1992, tensions between
Europe’s monetary policy and the national policies could be observed
where Member States felt that the European monetary policy did not
respond adequately to their specific difficulties and interests. Germany’s
problems in the wake of the unification of the country provide the best-
known example.42 The legal configuration of these tensions is ‘diagonal’.
It was not possible to invoke the supremacy or the preemption doctrine
against the disobedient states. Monetary policy is neither ‘supreme’ to
fiscal and economic policy, nor does it ‘preempt’ the exercise of national
powers. Both the Union and the member states are certainly interested in
the functioning of the economy, but the powers needed to accomplish
this objective are attributed to two distinct levels of governance. The
accommodation foreseen in Article 119 TFEU is ‘the adoption of an eco-
nomic policy which is based on the close coordination of member states’
economic policies’ as substantiated in Article 121 TFEU. This mechanism
does not resolve the tensions and was not designed with such ambitions.
Each and every member state has distinct fiscal and economic policy
preferences. This was not just an unfortunate failure, but one which re-
flects the structural socioeconomic differences and varieties of capitalism
in the Union.
To elucidate this further: the notion of diagonal conflicts characterizes
a conflict constellation in the European multilevel system of governance,
which has to be distinguished from vertical conflicts between the EU and
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its member states, on the one hand, and horizontal conflicts among the
member states, on the other. The notion also helps us to understand why
uniform rules for the solution of such conflicts are simply unavailable as
long as European diversity persists—as it does to an ever-increasing de-
gree.
The notion also helps us to understand why the ‘integration through
law’ project cannot cope with the EMU. The coordination of monetary,
fiscal and economic policy occurs in constitutional democracies through
political processes with political actors who can be held accountable by
their constituencies.43 A procedural legal framework within which coor-
dination would take the diversity of Europe’s economies and societies
into account has not been established, and, hélas, cannot be established in
conformity with standards of democratic accountability under the Maas-
tricht rules.
The responses to the European crisis which we have witnessed in
recent years provide a dramatic illustration of this thesis. Characteriza-
tions such as ‘constitutional mutation’44 are all too euphemistic. To be
sure, the Maastricht regime was unsustainable and the need for legal
change irrefutable. But this does not imply that the new constellation
which European crisis politics has brought can be characterized as a con-
stitutional move which would deserve recognition. This new constella-
tion with its resort to a ‘strict conditionality’ of financial aid (Art. 136 (3)
TFEU) can transform Member States ‘in difficulties’ such as Greece into
‘zero-choice democracies’—that is, into polities, in which the elected rep-
resentative bodies no longer matter much.45 We are witnessing how a
Central Bank, which was supposed to operate outside the political
sphere, is engaged in the correction and supervision of national politics.46
It seems, indeed, that the ECB, through the changes in its lending and
collateral policy ‘has risked attaining a stakeholder position vis-à-vis the
banking sector, which may cause complications for its role as an indepen-
dent monetary expert’.47
These transformations will be discussed in the next section. For now,
an interim summary on the ordoliberal project and economic constitu-
tionalism can be drawn: (1) an ordoliberal imprint is clearly visible in the
EMU. The commitment to price stability, the establishment of an inde-
pendent central bank, the prohibition of monetary financing by Article
123 TFEU, the prohibition of bailouts by Article 123 TFEU and the objec-
tives of the Stability and Growth pact all mirror the ordoliberal ‘stability
philosophy’. Leading proponents of the Freiburg tradition continue to
underline and defend these components.48 They add, however, that this
framework was never credible; it could not, and did not, ensure that
member states would subordinate their fiscal autonomy to the ordoliber-
al stability philosophy.49 (2) The reconstruction of the EMU as a ‘diago-
nal’ conflict constellation is again illuminating here. The ‘one-size-fits-no-
one’ dilemma, which was established through the EMU, cannot be sub-
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jected to general rules. The heterogeneity of the Eurozone instead neces-
sitated managerial practices, bargaining processes and political compro-
mises. In view of the ever-deepening socioeconomic diversity of the Eu-
rozone, it follows that the failure of the EMU cannot be corrected through
ever stricter rules. (3) The EMU did not establish an ordoliberal constitu-
tion and hardly deserves to be called a constitutional accomplishment of
any kind.50
CRISIS GOVERNANCE
The fragility of the Maastricht arrangement was a birth defect, which
remained latent for a good number of years. This changed dramatically
after 2008. The responses were equally spectacular. Within the time-span
of half a decade, we have been witnessing the turbo-speed establishment
of new modes of economic governance and regulatory mechanisms, such
as the ‘Europe 2020 Strategy’ (March 2010), the ‘European Semester’
(May 2010), the ‘EFSF Framework Agreement’ (June 2010), the ‘Euro Plus
Pact’ (March 2011), and the ‘Six Pack’ (December 2011), the ‘European
Stability Mechanism’ (ESM, February 2012), the ‘Treaty on Stability, Co-
ordination and Governance’ (TSCG, March 2012), the banking union (on
the road since September 2012), the ‘Two Pack’ submitted back in 2011
and adopted with parliamentary blessing in March 2013. With regard to
the compatibility of these measures with the Treaty, in particular its bail-
out ban (Article 125 TFEU), an ex-post revision procedure amending Arti-
cle 136 TFEU has been undertaken in order to legalize financial assistance
as of 1 January 2013.51
Each and every legislative act and political step has attracted broad
academic attention and considerable judicial attention. Unsurprisingly,
lawyers, academics and courts, provide arguments which seek to justify
the practice of Europe’s crisis management. I continue52 to believe that
the veneer of legality offered is all too thin. Three features of the new
modes of European economic governance seem particularly intriguing.
First, through the supervision and control of macroeconomic imbalances,
Europe’s praxis disregards the principle of enumerated powers and, by
the same token, cannot respect the democratic legitimacy of national in-
stitutions, in particular the budgetary powers of the parliaments of the
states receiving assistance. Second, the departure from the ‘one-size-fits-
all’ philosophy orienting European integration in general and monetary
policy in particular, nonetheless fails to achieve a variation, which might
be founded in democratically legitimated choices; quite to the contrary,
the individualized scrutiny of all member states is geared to the objective
of budgetary balances and seeks to impose the necessary accompanying
discipline. Under the conditions of a monetary unity, the member states
can only respond to pertinent requests through austerity measures: re-
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ductions of wage levels and reductions of social entitlements. Third, the
machinery of the new regime with its individualized measures which are
oriented only by necessarily indeterminate general clauses is regulatory
in its nature, establishing transnational executive machinery outside the
realm of democratic politics and the form of accountability which the rule
of law used to guarantee. Core concepts used by new economic govern-
ance cannot be defined with any precision, either by lawyers or by econo-
mists, and are therefore not justiciable. This implies that rule-of-law and
legal protection requirements are being suspended. This type of de-legal-
ization is accompanied by assessments of member state performance,
which cannot be but highly discretionary. The ‘excessive imbalance pro-
cedure’ as adopted in the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack regulations is the
strongest conceivable illustration.53 As Fritz Scharpf has put it so suc-
cinctly:
its economic logic dictates that it must operate without any pre-defined
rules and that the Commission’s ad hoc decisions must apply to indi-
vidual Member States in unique circumstances rather than to EMU
states in general. Regardless of the comparative quality of its economic
expertise, the Commission lacks legitimate authority to impose highly
intrusive policy choices on member states—choices that are fundamen-
tally controversial and have massively unequal distributive impacts.54
Back to our beginnings: Has this reconceptualization of European
governance been inspired by German ordoliberalism? Such assignments
of conceptual responsibilities disregard the reserves and critique which
ordoliberal scholars have raised against the Treaty of Maastricht. They
also disregard their objections against conditionality provision of Article
126(3) TFEU, which are not normative, but instead underline that failure
to comply with the imposed restrictions is inconceivable. They disregard,
last, but not least, the proprium of that tradition, namely, its synthesizing
of law and economics. This implies that economic policy must be guided
by law and justiciable criteria.55 The implementation of the new econom-
ic policy, however, is resistant against the guidance by general legal
rules.
The situational and largely discretionary interventionism through the
executive and governmental bodies is anathema to ordoliberal jurists.
This reserve should have become even stronger after the Hayekian turn
of the ordoliberal school in the 1970s. The current interventionist praxis
replaces the exercise of individual freedoms and does away with the
Hayekian ‘discovery procedure of competition’,56 in which individual
decisions are meant to be set in motion. As Michelle Everson has recently
put it: just as the new regulatory interventionism can no longer be under-
stood as a correction of market failures, the supervision of the politics of
member states by technocratic rule cannot be understood as a mere cor-
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rection of policy failures by expertise or a targeted compensation of the
external effects of nation-state decision making.57
As underlined in the introductory section, the new critique of ordolib-
eralism pays no attention to the synthesis of law and economics, which
this tradition sought to accomplish. To be sure, the practices of new eco-
nomic governance have apparently silenced ordoliberal jurists.58 Is this
an explanation or even an excuse for the disregard of law by social scien-
tists? Even if this were the case, it would be necessary to substantiate the
ordoliberal ingredients of the crisis recipes with some precision. This is
by no means easy. To be sure, early ordoliberals expected, as Thomas
Biebricher pointed out,59 that the ‘science of political economy’ would
provide objective guidance in instances where the law had no answers.
But this trust was lost in the second generation of ordoliberals after Frie-
drich A. von Hayek’s philippic against the ‘pretence of knowledge’ in his
Nobel Memorial Lecture, 11 December 1974.60 This objection concerns
the whole exercise of macroeconomic supervision, of macro- and micro-
prudential controls—and it is more than euphemistic anyway to assume
that the activities of the Troika are guided by something like science; the
expertise which is operating here is necessarily politicized. Neither the
much-cited Swabian housewife, nor journalistic slogans and buzzwords,
represent ordoliberal scholarship.
CONCLUSION: THE LAW IN CRISIS
If the new economic governance cannot be qualified as an ordoliberal
project, how else should it be characterized? The list of pertinent sugges-
tions is long; in alphabetical order: ‘New sovereignty with largely unfet-
tered power of rule’ (Chalmers);61 ‘executive powers beyond the reach of
national and European democracies’ (Curtin);62 a ‘coordinative method’,
in which ‘the level of sovereignty a state enjoys increasingly depends on
its solvency’ (Dawson);63 an ‘executive mode’ of governance (Enderle-
in);64 ‘post-democratic executive federalism’ (Habermas);65 ‘authoritarian
managerialism’ (Joerges/Weimer);66 a move from ‘democratic deficit’ to
‘democratic default’ (Majone);67 ‘legally- and politically-unconstrained
expertocracy’ (Scharpf);68 ‘the consolidating state’ (Streeck);69 and ‘au-
thoritarian liberalism’ (Wilkinson).70
All of these notions signal more or less intense discontent with the
present European praxis. None of them fails to consider the pressures and
constraints under which Europe’s crisis management operates. Its meas-
ures were taken to compensate for the failure of both the original EMU
and the Stability and Growth Pact, and sought to prevent collapse of the
financial system of the Eurozone. They cannot be understood as some
wilful, let alone malicious, disregard of legal rules and principles. How
then? Already back in 2010, Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, a renowned
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scholar and former judge of the German Constitutional Court, started to
talk of a state of emergency.71 This is a notion with a dark legacy, in
particularly in Germany, of which Böckenförde is well aware.72 He sub-
stantiated his resort to this notion much earlier, defining the state of
exception as a breakdown of the correlation between the regular situation
presupposed in the law (Normallage) as the reference point of its regulato-
ry objectives (die intendierte Regulierungskraft der Norm).73 Such a break-
down generates a discrepancy and a tension between conferred powers
and means, on the one hand, and the irrefutable challenges of a state of
emergency, on the other.74 In such exceptional circumstances, we will, so
Böckenförde submitted, observe the quest for both exceptional powers
and means to cope with such emergencies. Such explanations seem to
capture the exigencies of the present crisis quite well. If we have to con-
cede that the establishment of the EMU was a mistake which cannot be
corrected by a stricter enforcement of its rules, the resort to exceptional
measures after the collapse of this fragile edifice is unsurprising. We are,
as submitted in the introductory section, witnessing a destructive disre-
gard for the ordoliberal legacy of economic constitutionalism under the
impact of the crisis. And why should we care, we have asked? We should
care because we are witnessing the imposition of assumed functional
necessities by Europe’s new ‘crisis law’ on the European polity. These
assumed necessities are devoid of any inherent normative foundation.
This is ‘what is left of the European economic constitution’.
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TEN
Reflections on Europe’s ‘Rule of Law
Crises’
Jan-Werner Müller
European integration was to advance through crises. Or so its founding
fathers thought. To be sure, not just any kind of crisis; rather, Jean Mon-
net and other pioneers of what today is known as the EU envisaged crises
that were eminently containable. Or, more precisely put, eminently con-
tainable through more integration. Whatever one thinks of this particular
strategy of bringing about ‘ever closer union’, it is hard to deny that it is
no longer available to European leaders today. For one thing, the kind of
‘permissive consensus’ that allowed integration to proceed without too
much popular engagement has given way to what many scholars now
call a ‘constraining dissensus’: more integration is always bound to be
controversial and likely to generate an almost instinctual opposition to
‘more Europe’ in some countries. And then, there is the fact that the crises
have simply become much more threatening; hence, containment is also
politically costly both for national élites (governments can now fall over
European issues) and the EU as a whole (whose approval ratings have
declined dramatically over the past few years).
This is rather obvious with the Euro crisis, which has hit Europe like a
perfect storm: a combination of failed institutional design (the currency
union as envisaged in the 1990s simply could not work without some
form of fiscal union), a series of banking crises, a state debt crisis (mostly
as a result of the banking crises), and, finally, a very serious crisis of
legitimacy for the EU as a whole (with the added complication that the
Euro crisis—or, more precisely, the crisis management of the Euro cri-
sis—keeps producing conflicts between nation-states along the lines of
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‘Germany versus Greece’, the very thing the Union had been designed to
prevent). All this is well known and expertly analysed elsewhere in this
volume. What has received less public and also academic attention is
what has sometimes been called Europe’s ‘rule of law crisis’. This crisis
has, in fact, taken at least three forms, two of which directly relate to the
Euro crisis: for one thing, member states kept violating the rules of the
currency union with apparent impunity; second, in its response to the
Euro crisis, member states, and the EU itself, took actions that are impos-
sible to square with the basic principles associated with the rule of law
(and also with ordoliberal legal theory, as Christian Joerges points out in
his chapter1): they broke the Treaty, so the argument usually goes, in
order to provide assistance to the ‘crisis countries’; leaders opted for
discretion over legal rules; and, less obviously, the regimes put in place to
supervise and ‘condition’ the conduct of the ‘crisis countries’ also violates
the rule of law.2 These (ongoing) rule violations are not a trivial matter,
even if the responses by the EU might one day be judged as having
rescued the currency union. After all, European integration has always
been ‘integration by law’—and persistent rule breaking puts the very
idea of an entity functioning legally like a federal state (without actually
being a federal state) at risk. Indeed, Walter Hallstein, the first Commis-
sion president, along with the founders, counted on the ‘cultural force’ of
law; when that force ceases to function, there is little else—and certainly
not popular enthusiasm—to take its place.
The rule of law crisis has taken a third form, one that has been much
less discussed in Europe as a whole. I am speaking of the purposeful
destruction of the rule of law inside EU member states, with Hungary
being the most obvious example over the past half decade or so (other
instances being Romania in the summer of 2012, and Poland since Octo-
ber 2015). To be sure, the conduct of the Hungarian government has been
seen as a threat not just to the rule of law, but to other ‘fundamental
values’ of the EU, as codified in Article 2 of the Treaty on European
Union, democracy and human rights in particular.3 Yet, the European
Commission as well as a number of national leaders have framed the
issue as predominantly one of a ‘rule of law crisis’ (the European Council
has been virtually absent in this discussion, very much unlike the Euro
crisis).
The designation ‘rule of law crisis’ has itself been a political choice;
there have been political reasons behind it and it has generated particular
political consequences. This chapter explores these reasons and conse-
quences, including the consequences for the notion that the EU ought to
intervene in the member states in order to protect the rule of law. While it
is not exactly news4 that the rule of law is not some always uncontested,
de-politicized, technocratic, and the like, set of principles and institu-
tions, it is still important to examine the precise shape a politics around
the rule of law has taken. I shall argue that, in confronting proto-authori-
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tarian conduct by member state governments, the focus on the rule of law
seemed somehow to be a safer option for EU actors. At the same time, the
very semantics of ‘crisis’—suggesting something like a systemic failure
without any clear account of individual agency—exacted costs, in that it
made it harder to understand this particular ‘rule of law crisis’ as a seri-
ous political conflict (which is not to say that the criteria for judging
breaches of fundamental values are all ‘just’ political or politicized by
whoever calls the shots in the EU). This particular framing also made it
more difficult for European actors to intervene, because the latter are
now cast as the defenders of the rule of law, whereas those in breach of
fundamental values can still claim to be the champions of (national) de-
mocracy. Finally, the ongoing deployment of the very concept of ‘crisis’
has had a further ambiguous results: one the one hand, it has been help-
ful in calling out populists who really are undermining the EU’s funda-
mental values, but it has also assisted populists in doing what all popu-
lists do: polarize, sharpen conflict, and offering a story of good versus
evil, of two forces that are bound to clash in an all-decisive battle. At the
time of writing, this battle has been stylized as one of ‘Christian’ and
‘national’ (and, so the implication, authentically) countries such as Hun-
gary and Poland versus decadent liberal Western states. The latter, so this
story goes, are still dominant in EU institutions—but, if one were to be-
lieve leaders like Hungarian leader Viktor Orbán, they are governing
against the wishes of their own people. One should not be alarmist about
these new political confrontations—but some aspects undoubtedly are
reminiscent of the Kulturkampf rhetoric of the interwar Europe, as ana-
lysed by Balázs Trencsényi in his chapter.5
EUROPE’S OTHER CRISIS, FROM 2010 ONWARD
The Euro crisis became fully apparent in early 2010. Another develop-
ment that started later that year has received much less attention.6 In
April, the right-wing Fidesz party won an absolute majority in the Hun-
garian national elections, defeating a left that had been plagued by cor-
ruption scandals and an abysmal economic record in the wake of the
financial crisis. Due to Hungary’s disproportionate election system, Fi-
desz’s 52 percent at the polls translated into a two-thirds majority in par-
liament—a majority large enough to change the constitution. Declaring
that the April election had, in fact, amounted to nothing less than a ‘revo-
lution in the voting booths’, the government immediately started to
amend the constitution (there were no less than twelve amendments in
the first year of Fidesz rule) and also to engage in highly controversial
symbolic politics such as establishing a day to commemorate the loss of
Hungarian territories in the Treaty of Trianon in 1920. Despite the fact
that the idea of a new constitution had not been debated in the spring
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2010 election campaign, Fidesz also began to write a new ‘Fundamental
Law’, which was passed with government votes only in April 2011 and
came into effect at the beginning of 2012.
By autumn 2010, an increasing number of outside observers were be-
ginning to be concerned about developments inside Hungary. The
government passed a draconian media law that an OSCE representative
compared to what one usually expects in totalitarian states. The constitu-
tional court was both packed and institutionally enfeebled; this was par-
ticularly significant in a highly centralized country with a unicameral
parliament and a rather weak president; the court had always provided
the main constraint on government legislation. A whole range of nomi-
nally nonpartisan official positions were being filled with Fidesz loyalists,
who were to enjoy unusually long appointments. The new constitution
itself codified a peculiar, highly nationalistic, even ethnic, understanding
of Hungarian history in its preamble. It also constitutionalized a whole
range of policy decisions, such as national budgets, which would have
been left to day-to-day political struggle in most other democracies.7
EU representatives, most notably members of the European Commis-
sion, started to criticize some of these actions vocally. But they found
their own scope of action restricted by the fact that the Commission can
only sanction member states when they apply EU law (or so conventional
lawyer’s wisdom had it; more on this below). So when, for instance, the
Hungarian government drastically lowered the retirement age for
judges—effectively decapitating the judiciary and then filling the open
posts with loyalists—the Commission took Hungary to the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Union. The charge was ‘age discrimination’. The
Commission won its case legally. But Fidesz won its case politically—the
judges were never comprehensively reinstated (many took the financial
compensation that was offered, instead); in other words, the government
in the end achieved the desired political effect.
A similar dynamic could be observed throughout the half decade after
the supposed ‘revolution in the voting booths’. The Hungarian govern-
ment took a bold initiative which appeared to be blatantly designed to
consolidate or even perpetuate its own power, then became defensive in
the face of international criticism, retreated tactically but stuck to its stra-
tegic goals. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán even admitted that he had to
perform a ‘peacock dance’ on the European stage to suggest compliance
with EU expectations, while de facto advancing his domestic political
agenda: two steps forward, one step back was the basic logic.
More particularly, the Hungarian government responded to interna-
tional criticism with tactics of contesting through comparing (along the
lines of: ‘other countries do it, too!’), partial compliance, and, not least,
shifting political attention elsewhere.8 This again and again put the bur-
den on international, and, in particular, European, institutions to keep
pointing to problems by explicating what certain measures meant in the
Reflections on Europe’s ‘Rule of Law Crises’ 165
particular Hungarian context—a potentially lengthy process. These insti-
tutions also faced the difficulty of having to follow up properly on its
criticisms and recommendations during times when much political atten-
tion (as well as political capital, alongside financial capital) were being
absorbed by another crisis—that is, the Euro crisis. Under such circum-
stances, were European leaders, administrators, and, not least, jurists,
justified in framing the crisis in Hungary as one primarily one of the ‘rule
of law’—and, by implication, are they right to repeat that framing in the
context of Poland, after the Law and Justice party (PiS) came to power in
October 2015 and started to implement its goal of creating ‘Budapest in
Warsaw’?
JUST WHAT IS A ‘RULE OF A LAW CRISIS’?
Clearly, defining a rule of law crisis will depend on what one thinks the
rule of law is in the first place. On one extreme, one might collapse rule of
law and rule by law; such a purely procedural account would make it
exceedingly difficult to claim that a rule of law crisis is anything but a
crisis of the state as such (with rule having become completely informal,
and the judiciary perhaps disintegrating). On the other extreme, one
might subsume everything that might be desirable politically, from de-
mocracy to human rights, under the category of ‘rule of law’—this, as we
shall see further below, was eventually the approach taken by the Euro-
pean Commission, which argued that all fundamental values in Article 2
were connected and mutually-reinforcing (and thus could also be
summed up with the shorthand notion of the ‘rule of law’).
More plausible, however, is the following understanding: first of all, a
‘rule of law crisis’ has to be something different from a ‘rule of law
violation’—in other words, it has to have a systemic character: it has,
somehow, to put the whole system of the rule of law under threat. Other-
wise, any infringement proceedings by the European Commission or any
fundamental rights violation ascertained by the European Court of Hu-
man Rights would signal a ‘rule of law crisis’. Arguably, this distinction
was not properly observed by Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding in a
2013 speech, when she put a number of different problems and chal-
lenges into the same category: the ‘Roma crisis in France in summer 2010;
the Hungarian crisis that started at the end of 2011; and the Romanian
rule of law crisis in the summer of 2012’.9 As abhorrent as the treatment
of the Roma by the Sarkozy government was, it did not appear to amount
to a systemic problem in the French justice system. And as dangerous as
Victor Ponta’s power grab, or ‘constitutional coup’, was, it did not indi-
cate a persistent problem in the Romanian legal system as such. Only if
one were to return to one of the original meanings of crisis—as in krinō—
as a moment, as opposed to a period, where a life-and-death decision or a
Jan-Werner Müller166
judgement is rendered, could France and Romania be said to have suf-
fered a ‘rule of law crisis’: with the wrong resolution of the particular
crisis, the whole system would disintegrate.10 But, even then, the Roma-
nian case seems much more plausible than the French one, unless one
argues that the latter involved a systemic breakdown of minority protec-
tions.11
Second, a widely-shared notion of the rule of law defines it in essen-
tially negative terms: it is about preventing arbitrary rule by official pow-
erholders. In other words, there has to be equality before the law; proce-
dures have to be fair and predictable; the judiciary has to be independent
(hence, also the tendency to associate the rule of law with civil rights, as
opposed to political rights and property rights). If a system that promises
to deliver the rule of law begins to show evidence of many arbitrary,
unpredictable or politically-motivated decisions, the rule of law can plau-
sibly be taken as going through a crisis.
But then again: just how arbitrary is the creation and application of
law in Hungary today? Arguably, the problem is precisely that, in many
areas, the outcomes—and the next steps in institutional reengineering—
are actually quite predictable (and, as Kim Lane Scheppele has pointed
out, usually done by well-trained lawyers able to bear rule-of-law sen-
sibilities in mind): the resulting rules are very likely to work in favour of
Fidesz loyalists or Fidesz-related business interests, but, on paper, they
might not look like they simply license discretion or empower partisan
actors. For instance, the decision to concentrate the power of assigning
court cases in the hands of one person, the president of the National
Judicial Office, was widely seen as a violation of the rule of law. Howev-
er, the actual assumption behind this worry was not that the person—
close to the Prime Minister and, in fact, married to the main author of the
constitution that came into effect in 2012—would act randomly, but that
she would do favours to her political friends (or family). Of course, one
could still say that the danger remains arbitrariness or, in the language of
republican political philosophy, ‘domination’: citizens are at the mercy of
the will of another whose decisions they cannot foresee, let alone proper-
ly authorize or control.12 That person might do things this way or that
way and, on a good day, actually have mercy for the opposition.
In the same vein, one might argue that large parts of the Hungarian
judiciary de facto remain independent and predictable in their decisions.
But this could change in the future; hence, citizens can never be entirely
secure in their expectations. Hungary might even become a kind of ‘dual
state’, as it was famously theorized by Ernst Fraenkel in response to the
rise of National Socialism: a ‘normative state’, on the one hand, where the
rule of law continues to function, and a ‘prerogative state’, on the other,
where arbitrary measures can be deployed by the regime (and where the
government can shift the border between the two whenever it wishes).13 I
do not mean to suggest that Hungary has reached this ‘dual state’ already
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(let alone, that the dominant ideology is fascism); it is still more plausible
to see a division into rule of law, on the one hand, and rule by law for
political purposes (as opposed to completely unpredictable measures,
which would fit Fraenkel’s theory), on the other.
This risk of domination points to what might be described as the most
fundamental challenge in the Hungarian context: the weakening of con-
straints on government power. One does not have to associate the rule of
law with all sorts of other ideals, from justice to democracy, to claim that
its proper understanding necessarily involves more than the notion of a
‘government of laws, and not of men’: it requires lawmakers to be subject
to ‘higher law’, or, in the words of Gianluigi Palombella, there needs to
be jurisdictio and not just gubernaculum.14 If real constraints go, one might
assume that, sooner or later, democracy and rights protection are also
likely to go.
It is here that the conduct of the Fidesz government has been most
egregious: they peopled the institution upholding higher law, the consti-
tutional court, with men to their liking; and when the court still found
laws unconstitutional, they responded by putting the laws into the con-
stitution itself. This removal of constraints has occurred at all political
and legal levels: the political and legal structures are much more central-
ized than they were in 2010 (and, arguably, power was already very
centralized even then); civil society has come under immense pressure
(with arbitrary interference directed especially at organizations receiving
funding from outside the country); and powerful economic actors who
might have de facto provided a constraint on government action have
been disempowered (put more bluntly, oligarchs have ceased to be a
threat for the moment).
Now, one might be tempted to think that there is something contra-
dictory about a government that wishes to be unconstrained (including
by higher law) writing a constitution: Why create constraints when con-
straints are seen as always a problem? The answer is that the government
essentially designed what Dieter Grimm has called an ‘exclusive constitu-
tion’, or what one might also term a partisan higher law: the constitution
sets a number of very specific policy preferences in stone, when debate
about such preferences would have been the stuff of day-to-day political
struggle in normal democracies.15 Moreover, it excluded opposition par-
ties in a double sense: they did not take part in the writing or passing of
the constitution, and their political goals cannot be realized in the future,
as room for policy choices is highly constrained. In other words, Fidesz
can perpetuate its power even after losing an election.
It should have become clear, then, that Hungary’s situation is not in
any simple sense a ‘rule of law crisis’. Rather, we have been witnessing a
constitutional crisis, or, still more narrowly put, a crisis of constitutional-
ism, or, if I may try to say it more strictly still: the end of a crisis of
constitutionalism (with crisis implying an ongoing state of affairs which
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will require a resolution one way or another), and the beginning of a new
era of what Kim Lane Scheppele and Catherine Dupré have called an
‘unconstitutional constitution’.16
An unconstitutional constitution in this sense (what I have elsewhere
also called a ‘populist constitution’) is incompatible with democracy. It
does away with the constitution as an instrument to preserve pluralism
and to enable contained political conflict; even if a whole range of basic
rights remain protected and political rights are retained on paper, the
latter are bound largely to lose their meaning. Put differently, free speech,
free assembly and free association might still be tolerated, but with the
media in the hands of the government, electoral rules manipulated in the
government’s favour, and policy changes in some areas virtually impos-
sible, even if the government were to lose its majority, it is hard to see
how we can still speak of democracy.
One can see why outside observers might have been reluctant to cry
that democracy itself is in danger—‘rule of law’ suggests something more
consensual, neutral or indeed technocratic (especially if one can, at the
same time, effectively subsume democracy and human rights under the
rule of law).17 More particularly, for EU officials, the ‘rule of law’ could
be connected to concerns about the internal market; after all, the core
business of the EU remains business, and a rule of law crisis just cannot
be good for business.18 Invoking this link, Commissioner Reding at one
point called for ‘justice scoreboards’ which were to measure the rule of
law in member states partly upon the basis of what the experience of
enterprises with a country’s legal system turned out to be. As Jan
Komárek has pointed out, such management speaks about ‘scoreboards’
and ‘benchmarks’ which promise to evacuate politics from any confron-
tation between Commission and the member states—but politics, in one
way or another, is likely to take its revenge.19 And, furthermore, such
rhetoric is likely to encourage a view that sees the rule of law in purely
instrumental terms—as opposed to endorsing it on principled grounds
(and sticking to it, even when it is bad for business). Or, as Michael
Oakeshott once observed, ‘the rule of law bakes no bread, it is unable to
distribute loaves or fishes (it has none), and it cannot protect against
external assault, but it remains the most civilized and least burdensome
conception of a state yet to be devised’.20
There are other reasons still for why it might have seemed advanta-
geous to frame the issue as one of ‘rule of law crisis’, and avoid talk of
democracy and other ‘fundamental values’. There appears to be a clearer
understanding of the ‘standard operating system’ of the rule of law,
while definitions of democracy seem to vary more and remain deeply
contested even within European nation-states (or, as Poland’s foreign
minister put it recently in response to criticisms of the Law and Justice
party government’s treatment of the constitutional court, ‘there are dif-
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ferent forms of democracy in the European Union . . . so there’s no basis
to stigmatise Poland’).21
It may indeed seem that Europe has a common market, but no com-
mon model of democracy. In fact, many countries in the postwar period
have converged on what one might call antitotalitarian or ‘never again’
constitutionalism, with a strong emphasis on fundamental rights protec-
tion as well as checks and balances.22 It would be wrong to suggest that
only this model of constitutional democracy enjoys legitimacy in today’s
Europe—many states, for instance, do not have a constitutional court at
all. But outside observers can make meaningful judgements of political
systems as a whole, especially when they have understood the inner
dynamic of a constitutional development over time, as opposed to taking
legalistic snapshots. The Council of Europe’s Venice Commission has
rendered many such judgements, including in the case of Hungary,
which was criticized for, among other things, writing too many policy
decisions into the new constitution.
There is yet another suspicion that critics narrowing their diagnosis of
the developments in Hungary to ‘rule of law crisis’ want to avoid talking
of democracy and instead push for a judicialization of politics, because
the EU itself falls so ruefully short of democratic standards.23 In other
words, they realize that they might be starting to throw stones from glass
houses if democracy becomes the main issue.24 However, it is far from
obvious that an institution that seeks to protect democracy itself has to
comply with standard models of electoral democracy. In countries featur-
ing ‘militant democracy’, constitutional courts have legitimately been
tasked with banning antidemocratic parties. One can find some of these
decisions to be deeply problematical from a democratic point of view, but
the problem is not usually the fact that the members of the constitutional
court are not directly elected. In the EU, member states voluntarily
sought to bind themselves with the treaty and, in particular, established
an instrument that allows European action in cases of a persistent breach
of fundamental EU values: Article 7 specifies that a government in viola-
tion of Article 2 values can have its membership rights in the European
Council revoked. In other words, the fact that the EU itself might not be
democratic is irrelevant for the question of whether member states can
accept it, in principle, as an agent for protecting democracy within mem-
ber states—and they have accepted it as such.
Shying away from democracy talk has led to a strange normative
division between the national and the supranational in the EU: the EU
gets the rule of law—or, more broadly put, ‘liberalism’—while the na-
tion-state keeps democracy. This has played into the hands of a self-
declared antiliberal such as Orbán. The Hungarian prime minister has
made clear his intention to create an ‘illiberal state’ in the Union, while
retaining democracy; he has also objected to the supposed hegemony of
liberalism in Western Europe and at the EU level, and tried to ignite
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nothing less than a pan-European culture war, where his preferred vision
of a ‘Christian national’ democracy is deployed against liberal democracy
(a distinction which picks up some of the thought patterns described by
Balázs Trencsényi in his analysis of the interwar period; it is not an acci-
dent that the Fidesz government has been attempting to reformat the
cultural canon in Hungary, rehabilitating many interwar right-wing in-
tellectuals in the process).
This split between liberalism and democracy, indirectly condoned by
some European élites, it seems, is a fateful one. It makes liberalism into a
kind of optional add-on for democracy, as opposed to a proper under-
standing of the fact that the rule of law as a set of constraints on power—
as well as the preservation for democracy-constitutive rights, such as free
speech and free assembly—are constitutive of democracy as such (as op-
posed to majoritarianism).25
Finally, what disappears from the mental map which has the rule of
law in blue and democracy in national colours is the concern that the EU
itself in important respects does not quite live up to rule-of-law ideals (or
even, as Dimitry Kochenov has argued, is barely different from Hungary
under Fidesz, as far as the rule of law is concerned).26 EU law, critics have
charged, is presumed to be unclear and hence in need of clarification by
courts through the preliminary reference procedure (as well as adversari-
al legalism). As Kochenov has also pointed out, the teleological interpre-
tation of the law (‘ever closer Union’ and always more ‘integration
through law’), coupled with the omnipresence of proportionality, makes
it difficult to judge what would be a violation of the law. At the same
time, the core of EU law is presented as apolitical (even if it builds on
clearly political assumptions), while no real control of gubernaculum
through jurisdictio ultimately exists; in other words, EU law itself is not
properly subject to something like higher law.27
Alas, I cannot engage with this critique here—even though, if some of
the points mentioned could be shown clearly to affect the ‘protection of
the rule of law’ as well, this would be a much more serious challenge
than saying that the protector of democracy is not itself democratic.
Clearly, protection of the rule of law must itself be subject to the rule of
law.
CRISIS TALK: A CRITIQUE
Article 7 is the prime means for the EU institutions and the member
states to react to a persistent breach of the fundamental values of the EU.
While the wording of the article does not contain the word crisis, it seems
plausible enough that it gestures to something of the sort: the threat to
values has to be systemic, and the problem must persist over time (crisis
being a processual concept or, as Reinhart Koselleck put it, a Verlaufsbe-
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griff).28 Moreover, the article implies a contrast between some (normative
and legal) normality, as well as the possibility of closure—crisis is the
exception and, by definition, a crisis must, in principle, lead to a judge-
ment (judicium) and have an end point.29
So far, so good. What Article 7 does contain—and what ‘rule of law
crisis’ fails to convey properly—is any kind of account of political agency.
The treaty makes it clear that someone is consciously (and persistently)
breaching fundamental values; ‘rule of law crisis’, by contrast, makes it
sound like there is an objective failure in the system. While ‘crisis’ is
certainly stronger than ‘failure’ (it is premised on a kind of mediation, or
interpretation, by observers, as Benjamin Moffitt has pointed out) ‘crisis’
is still likely to be seen as a matter of institutional shortcomings, as op-
posed to a question of conscious choices by political actors.30 Now, on
one level, that is a good thing: constitutional courts, for instance, do de-
personalize matters; it is the act that is the problem, not the actor.31 How-
ever, in the EU context, it is clear that it can be all too convenient to
remake political conflict into something seemingly impersonal or even
given, as the national actors are bound to have significant power that can
be used to make life difficult for everyone in the EU (imagine a govern-
ment that sees Article 7 sanctions on the horizon starting to wreak havoc
in the European Council or forming alliances so that proto-authoritarian
governments protect each other, as they threaten to veto sanctions im-
posed on one of their group).32
The same relative de-personalization can be found in Article 7 itself.
‘Crisis talk’ generally legitimates action (to address the crisis), but, in the
context of the EU, crisis talk tends to leave it unclear who exactly is to
take action. After all, Article 7 does not specifically designate one institu-
tion (the Commission, the Parliament or the Council) as something like a
‘democracy and rule of law watchdog’; under such circumstances, collec-
tive action problems and interinstitutional rivalries are likely to make
effective sanctions more difficult.
Let me illustrate these points. In the summer of 2013, the foreign poli-
cy spokesperson of the German Social Democrats published an opinion
piece on the rule of law crisis in Hungary.33 It was interesting to note that
the ‘what to do about Hungary’ question featured in the German election
campaign that summer (even if in a very minor way); this background
probably also explains why the author, Michael Roth, sought to distin-
guish his ‘solution’ from that of the governing coalition of Christian
Democrats and Free Democrats. He argued that, upon the basis of contin-
uous monitoring by the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency, Europe’s ‘de-
mocracy sinners’ should receive ‘points’ for their sins (just as German
drivers incur ‘points’ for violating traffic rules, until, with a certain num-
ber of points, one has to lose one’s licence completely). However, rather
than sanctions being the decisive factor in bringing about change in the
conduct of political actors, Roth advocated for the creation of ‘stable
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structures’ to ensure a functioning rule of law. Instead of cutting funds
for a member state in breach of fundamental values, the funds should be
redirected toward ‘programmes and projects’ which promote democracy
and the rule of law. In short, then, the ‘crisis’ was portrayed as a matter of
institutional deficits (to employ the usual ‘accountant-speak’ so prevalent
when talking about the EU); it was simply not understood that Roth and
everyone else in Europe had to face up to a political conflict (instead of
treating Hungary, and potentially others, as a kind of legally underdevel-
oped country).
Now, it is clear that the EU has always been about minimizing politi-
cal conflict in a certain sense: a culture of compromise and consensus-
seeking has arguably been one of its genuine achievements. In recent
decades, the EU has also put ever more emphasis on respectful peer
review (as opposed to top-down judgements) and mutual self-relativiza-
tion.34 Article 7 is, in many ways, an anomaly in this culture of not nam-
ing and shaming, and it is interesting to note that, while it shames, it is
actually more about insulating the rest of the EU from a member state
whose government breaches fundamental values, as opposed to interven-
ing in that member state (Article 7, one might say, brings about a moral
quarantine of the country). Still, as many lawyers have rightly argued, it
is a distinctly political article. Given that none of the EU institutions, let
alone the member states, have been willing to use it against Hungary, the
tendency has been to displace a political conflict into discussions about a
‘crisis’, as if the latter had somehow been caused externally or were a
common problem that Europeans should constructively address togeth-
er. This tendency has only been strengthened by the small contributions
that the European Council has made to the debate on fundamental val-
ues: in December 2014, it decided to begin an annual ‘Rule of Law Di-
alogue’, which, the Council insisted, had to be ‘evidence-based’ and re-
spect the principle of equality of member states. The outcome of the first
such Dialogue in November 2015 sounded a tad anodyne at best: ‘Minis-
ters shared examples of best practices and challenges faced at national
level in the field of the rule of law, and presented the approach chosen to
respond to them’.35
Note that this emphasis on the political nature of the conflict does not
amount to saying that the standards used for judging breaches of funda-
mental values are all necessarily political, or easily subject to politiciza-
tion by the most powerful member. As I argued earlier, while the quality
of ‘democracy’ and ‘rule of law’ cannot be assessed by ticking boxes on a
checklist or filling out numerical scoreboards, it is simply false to assert
that there is such diversity of institutions in Europe that nobody can
really say what democracy and the rule law actually are. In fact, the EU
itself—for all the rhetoric about diversity—does not follow such an ‘any-
thing-goes’ logic; after all, every time a country accedes to the Union,
someone somewhere has made the call that the prospective member state
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has fulfilled the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ (which include a functioning de-
mocracy and the rule of law). The point is that neither the Commission
nor the Council (in particular) can abdicate their political responsibility
when faced with a political conflict in which a member state inside the
Union is violating the same criteria.
CONCLUSION: A CRISIS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT
Claus Offe has argued that the Euro crisis also constituted a crisis of crisis
management: nobody seemed to understand how the Eurozone could
really exit from the crisis, and the longer the crisis dragged on, the more it
undermined the potential political forces that might have helped to re-
solve the crisis.36 There is certainly a parallel between the Euro crisis and
the rule of law crisis in that both started with ‘rule breaking’ in the widest
sense by member states. In both cases, the Commission has to date turned
out to lack the powers to be a genuine enforcer. One difference, however,
is that, for better or for worse, in the Euro crisis, ‘the markets’ exercised
another form of outside pressure on governments—and there is no equiv-
alent of such enforcement in the case of ‘rule of law crises’ (unless one
assumes, with Commissioner Reding and other ‘rule of law promoters’
that lack of the rule of law will also be so bad for business that it might
ruin a regime). Hence, it is possible that the supposed crisis of the rule of
law becomes permanent; the EU might feature a periphery of countries
(not necessarily on the geographical periphery of the Union), in which
‘fundamental values’ are steadily, but not necessarily spectacularly, vio-
lated. Everyone will be in the know, and yet nobody will do anything.
Such a scenario is arguably a much greater threat to the core moral and
political promise of the EU than the Euro crisis ever was or will be.
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The Decay of Constitutionalization and the Crisis of
Public Law and Public Opinion
Hauke Brunkhorst
An author from middle of the nineteenth century observed that the par-
liamentary regime is the ‘regime of unrest’:
[It] lives by discussion. . . . The struggle of the orators on the platform
evokes the struggle of the scribblers of the press; the debating club in
parliament is necessarily supplemented by debating clubs in the salons
and the bistros; the representatives, who constantly appeal to public
opinion, give public opinion the right to speak its real mind in peti-
tions. The parliamentary regime leaves everything to the decision of
majorities; how shall the great majorities outside parliament not want
to decide? When you play the fiddle at the top of the state, what else is
to be expected but that those down below dance?1
The argument of this author from the nineteenth century is that it is the
legal form of the parliamentary constitution, which enables the dance of those
down below. As he shows in his analysis of the short history of the French
Republic of 1848, once this legal form is destroyed, the dance comes to an
end.
My general thesis is that the present political crisis that has been trig-
gered by the global economic and financial crisis of 2008, and that it has
become a crisis of the parliamentary regime. In some respects, this crisis
resembles other crises of parliamentarism. Roughly compared with the
crisis of the Weimar Republic, there are some obvious economic, social,
cultural and political similarities, but there are also important differences.
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Again, the economy is the trigger, and this comes as no surprise because
any great economic crisis erodes mass loyalty in so far as it is based upon
output legitimization. Therefore, a political crisis of legitimization be-
comes more likely, the smaller the substance of input legitimization is.
My thesis is that this is the case both at global and at European levels.
Despite the fact that national democracy, enabled and stabilized through
a deep change in global public law towards democratic constitutionalism,
worked much better after WWII than after WWI, in particular in the
(small) Western segment of the (OECD) world, national parliamentary
democracy came increasingly under pressure from global markets and
from the postdemocratic global politics of neoliberalism. Europe is no
exception, but paradigmatic. The threat to democracy increased dramati-
cally as a result of the growing gap between one of the greatest global
cultural revolutions ever and the capacities of the social welfare state to
decrease, bridge or at least compensate the dramatically growing social
differences effectively. We have, at the same time, a cultural transforma-
tion compared to which the cultural transformation in the course and
aftermath of WWI were small, and an increase of social differences bigger
than in the Weimar Republic. The question is whether, this time, parlia-
mentary democracy (or a functional equivalent that is not less democrat-
ic) will prevail, and finally cope with the crisis. I will begin with a diffe-
rentiation between two legal cultures, which were already at the centre of
the Weimar jurists’ debate.
TWO CULTURES
In his seminal history of modern international law, Martti Koskenniemi
has distinguished two legal cultures, the legal culture of dynamism and the
legal culture of formalism.2 The legal culture of formalism (in the Weimar
Republic, this was the legal culture of Hans Kelsen’s Vienna School) is a
‘culture of resistance to power’, and resistance to ‘the pull towards impe-
rialism’.3 Legal formalism can (but must not) resist the pull towards im-
perialism because it is based upon the ‘force of positive law’ that ‘is the
force of the sharp lines that rules draw in a fluid world of opportu-
nity’4—or a fluid world of shifting borders.5 ‘This is why neither the
revolutionary avant-garde nor the manager of a transnational company
likes them’.6
The same is true of Hungary’s leader, Viktor Orbán, the new Polish
government, the members and leaders of the informal steering organ of
the Eurozone, a shadow existence called the ‘Eurogroup’, which is not
even mentioned in any legal document, and, last, but not least, France in
the ongoing extended state of siege of the 2015 terror attacks.
Conversely, the legal culture of dynamism (in the constellation of
Weimar, this was, in particular, the culture of Carl Schmitt’s conceptual
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‘struggle with Weimar, Geneva and Versailles’7) is the culture of a pro-
fessional legal and political praxis that transforms legal formalism into
‘rational imperialism as a façade for cynical imperialism’.8 The legal form
becomes a rational façade of imperialism once it is successfully used to
bypass the legal form of the democratic regime, and to cut the ‘necessary’
relations between the ‘debating club in parliament’ and the ‘debating
clubs in the salons and the bistros’, which are constitutive for democratic
legitimization.9
Legal dynamism is the managerial mind-set of political realism. So-
called realists such as Hobbes, Schmitt and Stalin always ask, as Stalin
did it once: ‘How many divisions does the Pope have?’10 A year after the
US had taken military action against the democratic government of the
Dominican Republic in 1965, there was a debate in the Association of the
Bar of New York City between the legal and political realists A. J. Thomas
and Adolf August Berle, who both defended the military intervention,
and Wolfgang Friedmann, who was one of its sharpest critics. The dy-
namic legal argument of Thomas and Berle was that the free election of a
leftist government in the Dominican Republic was an act of aggression
against the US, and the dissolution of its government by the marines,
was, therefore, a lawful act of self-defence. Friedmann felt like Alice in
Wonderland. He had already arrived in the Großraum-regime of ‘smart’
and ‘moving’ borders, ‘transportable legal walls’ and ‘constitution-free
zones’ that is the well-established border regime of the present continen-
tal powers, be it the hundred miles constitution free zone of the US
(where two-thirds of US population lives), Europe’s Schengen regime, or
the Australian border regime.11 Berle then asked Friedmann the Stalinist
question, which, today, is the question of President François Hollande
and ever more European Prime Ministers such as Horst Seehofer, Viktor
Orbán and Beata Szydlo: ‘In international crisis, do you want actions, or
do you want merely words?’12 Auctoritas, non veritas facit legem. Fried-
mann responded: ‘Whether we like it or not, law is based on words.’
However, these words have a weak, but sustainable, force of resistance to
power because they are ‘words formulated in statutes, in treaties, in con-
ventions, in customary law’.13 Words which have become ‘positive law’
are words that have the (however fragile) communicative power to
‘emancipate us from informal domination’, as Christoph Möllers put it in
a pointed formulation: ‘Zwingendes Recht befreit von informeller Herrschaft’
(‘binding law emancipates us from informal domination’).14 In particular,
when it comes to modern constitutional law, the legal form is emancipa-
tory, and law’s emancipatory form—in another pointed formulation, this
time from Alexander Somek—‘can be halted or inhibited, but it cannot be
eliminated’.15 This needs qualification. The emancipatory form of law
cannot be eliminated by illegal military action because—if we follow
Wolfgang Friedmann—law is not made by auctoritas, but by words, which
are related internally to everybody’s veritas (commitments to consistency,
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truth, etc.). Therefore, as long as a society needs positive law for its func-
tional stabilization, it needs at least some veritas (better insight, for exam-
ple, a critique of law) to eliminate old law and replace it by new law—at
least as long as law has the linguistic force of positive law to draw sharp
lines in a fluid world of opportunities.16
Moreover, positive law which is modern is not only related to veritas
because all law is based upon words, but is also constituted by the emanci-
patory form of universal and egalitarian freedom. For this reason, Rous-
seau and others have defined law as freedom: Dasein des freien Willens
(‘the realization of the free will’).17 It is Dasein, hence repressive, but, at
the same time, freedom. Therefore, modern law can be defined as the
existing contradiction of emancipation and repression.18
RISE AND FALL OF GLOBAL AND EUROPEAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM
In an earlier article on the UN, Martti Koskenniemi describes the emer-
gence of imperial formalism (and the legal culture of dynamism) in the UN-
system as a shift of power from the temple of the General Assembly to the
police of the Security Council.19 During the Cold War, Security Council
police action was blocked. The latter’s immense administrative power was
maintained in stable latency, while the General Assembly functioned
very well as a vivid ‘debating club in parliament’ that was ‘supplemented
by’ a rapidly emerging global network of ‘debating clubs in the salons
and the bistros’, in particular, because it gave not only voice to the con-
flicting Super Powers but also to colonial liberation movements. The As-
sembly, step by step, crossed the ‘colour line’ (Du Bois) and opened its
doors to the majority of world population.20 Therefore, the temple be-
came an important international institution of global influence. It had no
divisions but it had considerable communicative power, embodied in the
constitutional form of an emerging parliamentary regime.
At the beginning of the decade, in 1960, the year of Khrushchev’s
shoe-banging during a fierce speech in the temple, the American sociolo-
gist Talcott Parsons published a little noticed essay on ‘Order and Com-
munity in the International Social System’.21 In contrast to the broad
mainstream of political realism represented in the US foreign policies of
Hans Morgenthau and later of Henry Kissinger, Parsons interpreted the
then actual world situation not as regression to the old international law of
co-existence (Art. 2, para. 7 UN),22 but as progression of the new interna-
tional law of cooperation (Art. 1, paras. 2 & 3 UN)23 towards global democrat-
ic constitutionalism.24 Looking at the world through the sharp lenses of his
AGIL-schema (Adaptation - Goal Attainment - Integration - Latency), he
was probably the only one aware of the structural meaning of the new
UN’s ‘regime of unrest’ ‘living by discussion’. Thus, he made a difference
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between the legal formations of the new global society, its political struc-
ture, its economic relations and cultural dynamic, on the one hand, and
the military options, strategic businesses, overkill capacities, and atomic
threats, on the other. Without underestimating the latter, these differenti-
ations enabled him to reconstruct the constitutional interaction between the
‘debating club’ in the assembly, and the global ‘struggle of the orators on
the platform’ and ‘the scribblers of the press’, as an emerging global
constitutional system of a proto-democratic competition between two op-
posing political projects over global leadership. The emerging global con-
stitutionalism was not just a superstructure phenomenon—the dreams of
presumably idealistic law professors such as Hersch Lauterpacht and
Hans Kelsen. On the contrary, the temple had a solid basic structure due
to the steady growth of global organic solidarity (that means in the differ-
entiated globalization of all four societal dimensions of economic adapta-
tion, cultural pattern maintenance, political goal attainment, and legal
integration).25
Unfortunately, the temple lost all its influence after the neoconserva-
tive and neoliberal turn of the West, and the complementary crumbling
away of the Soviet empire, which proved to be unreformable and mori-
bund from the late 1960s. When the latter finally imploded, both peoples
and individual human beings were liberated from a bureaucratic dictat-
orship, but, at the same time, the power structure within the global con-
stitutional system shifted from the communicative power of the temple to
the administrative power of the police located in th Security Council and
the executive bodies of the major powers. As we now can see, the project of
democratic global politics was the loser, and the Security Council that is
endowed with the ‘perverse’ ‘right . . . to make a lawful threat of mass-
destruction’, together with the other agencies of the administrative global
police were the winners.26 The European project, as I have argued else-
where, has gone through a similar development.27 The police occupied
the temple in 1989, and the present excessive extension of the state of
siege in France is only the last step on the long slippery slope of a new
formation of the ‘double state’.28 Here is the fitting quotation from Marx:
A splendid invention, periodically employed in every ensuing crisis in
the course of the French Revolution . . . that of itself made its way over
the whole Continent, but returned to France with ever renewed love . . .
the state of siege . . . freeing civil society completely from the trouble of
governing itself.29
The final triumph of the international law of cooperation and global constitu-
tionalism that was announced in 1989—and was supported by all of us,
and rightly so—has come to an end in recent years. Two structural trans-
formations indicate the crisis of global constitutionalism: first, the reluc-
tantly emerging global constitutionalism was replaced by the rapid growth
of global administrative law.30
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However, one could argue, as Poul F. Kjaer did in his remarks on this
chapter, that global administrative law finally provides substance to the
ideal of global constitutionalism. The factual creation of emancipative
spaces through formalist law from the seventeenth century onward
might be seen as essentially the history of administrative law providing
the infrastructure of emancipation.31 This is true, but one must add that it
needed the great legal revolution of the late-eighteenth century to trans-
form ‘absolutist’ administrative law into modern constitutionalism
(which was then able to use the administrative law of ‘absolutism’ as a
basis for its own purposes).32 Another case is the German ‘Verwaltungs-
recht’ (administrative law) in the nineteenth century empire that was tak-
en by the public lawyers as a substitute for the missing subsumption of
the Prussian Monarchy under parliamentary rule of law. Unfortunately,
this case did not lead to a revolution and the beheading of a Hohenzol-
lern (a fact very much deplored by Max Weber) but had its part in the
stabilization of the German Anstaltsstaat (bureaucratic state) and its disas-
trous aftermath.33
Second, the reluctantly emerging, evolutionary new formation of inter-
national public law (backed by an impressive global human rights culture,
and stabilized by new international public courts such as the Internation-
al Criminal Court)34 was replaced by an ever denser and rapidly growing
network of transnational private and civil law (backed by the global epis-
teme of neoliberalism, and a dense network of international corporations,
private-public partnerships, arbitration courts, and other dispute settle-
ment mechanisms).35 The growth of global private law goes hand in hand
with the growth of the global capitalist system. It is necessary for the
functioning of a global society of free markets, which are largely disem-
bedded from the democratic legal remedies of control, taxation, and the
other communist threats of socialization, nationalization and public regu-
lation.
From the sociologist observer’s point of view, the looming elimination
of global constitutionalism by global administrative law, together with the
corresponding replacement of international public law by international civic
law looks like a modernized return of old Roman Law, which was, like all
civil law, primarily a law of coordination of the interests of the Empire’s
ruling classes. The emancipatory form of law comes under serious selec-
tive pressure and finally to an end.36
The European Union is—different from its self-representation—far
from resisting the neoliberal global tendency. On the contrary, it acceler-
ates it, and does so not accidentally, but structurally. Due to the two legal
cultures, which are internally related to the dialectical structure of mod-
ern law as the constitution of freedom, legal formalism is a double-edged
sword. Thus, legal formalism has an important place in the imperial legal
culture of dynamism. A good transnational example can be found in the
Trilogue procedure of European legislation. Different from national par-
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liaments, in the European Parliament, it is usual for draft statutes and
agreements to be waved through on the first reading. Due to the autono-
mous self-organization (‘Organautonomie’) of the Parliament, the Com-
mission and the Council (which is constitutive for the checks and bal-
ances of powers), the Trilogue unites the leaders and leading parties of all
three branches of power in a commission to negotiate all legislation be-
fore it goes to the public arenas of the ordinary legislative procedure.
Checking and clearing the majorities in advance, the debating club in par-
liament becomes superfluous. The Trilogue is, as Jelena von Achenbach
has shown in a brilliant study, formal self-organization of the three legis-
lative powers of the EU, which leads to a structural transformation of the
ordinary legislative procedure, which erodes the limitations of European
constitutional law, changes the balance of powers in favour of the Coun-
cil, de-formalizes the legislative procedure, and destroys its democratic
function.37
Thus, the Trilogue is a paradigm case of legitimization through proce-
dure: Niklas Luhmann’s Legitimation durch Verfahren (legitimacy through
procedure) that augments legislative efficiency at the price of democratic legi-
timization.38 Parliamentary legislation is finished before any public con-
flict about it can even occur. One reading, no discussion. The public has
done its duty, the public can go.39
Again (as in the global sphere), constitutionalism is reduced to techno-
cratic administration, and, again, the European constitutional microcosm
mirrors the structural transformation of the global constitutional macro-
cosm. What began as the cooperative work of the constituent power of
the peoples (all founding members obliged their governments by consti-
tutional law to found a politically united European republic) ended with
the transformation of constitutional law into administrative law.40
The reason is structural. The Treaty of Lisbon constitutes a transna-
tional democratic community, however, the centre of European constitu-
tional law is not the system of democratic legitimization (as in the seven
articles of the US Constitution), but the system of competition law.41 Claus
Offe has called it the ‘hidden curriculum’ of Europe, and rightly so.42 Due
to the constitutional priority of competition law, and reinforced by the
dramatically growing blackmailing power of the globalized economy,
state-embedded democratic class struggle has been replaced by the dis-embedded
competition of national member states over locational advantages, such as
low taxes, flexible employment, cheap manpower, constitutional debt
breaks, and so on. The complete constitutional design of the EU, and the
Eurozone in particular, including the concretization of EU law through
national parliaments, through European and national courts and admin-
istrations, is a smart mixture of formal and informal procedures designed
to bypass the public sphere of constitutional law, contested will forma-
tion, and public decisions on political, social and economic alternatives.43
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With deconstructionist irony, the Nobel Prize Committee awarded the
2012 Peace Prize to the EU, in full knowledge of the fact that the presum-
ably bright side of Europe’s ‘peaceful improvement of competition’
(Marx) has its long-lasting dark side in the bloody regime of the colour
line that goes back to the colonial civil war in Algeria.44 When the French
President, François Hollande (whose humanitarian interventions so far,
have all been in accordance with the bloody farce of France’s colonial
past45), declared war against everybody (die Herrschaft des Verdachts46),
and reintroduced the state of siege in France, a legal concretization of the
peaceful rule of law at Europe’s borders had already existed for twenty-five
years.47 The concrete norms of legal border control have revealed the rule
of the law all over Europe as the law of the colour line.48 The state of siege is
just a nationwide expansion of the constitution-free zones of border con-
trol. The people who have been drowning in the Mediterranean Sea for
decades are the victims of the Schengen regime, and this shows that
Europe’s rule of law, the pride of European lawyers, is not so different
from that which allows American police officers to empty their bullets
into the helpless bodies of its black citizens. In both cases, black lives do
not matter.49
So much for the first structural transformation of the public sphere that is
the public sphere of public law.
I conclude with some further remarks on Europe and the second struc-
tural transformation of the public sphere of public opinion.
A SHINING EXAMPLE OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY . . .
World society has been a global sphere since the end of the nineteenth
century.50 It became ever denser with the globalization of mass tourism,
the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the latest great revolution of electronic
media. However, since the occupation of the temple by the police, the
global public is structurally weak. Structurally weak is a public with rights,
but with no (or only symbolic) access to parliamentary decisions through: (1)
general elections; (2) alternative choices; and (3) sufficient representation
of minorities or socially restricted majorities (e.g., women in the 1950s
and 1960s)—or at least some vibrant interaction (significant influence and
indirect representation) between the ‘debating club in parliament’ and
the ‘debating clubs in the salons and the bistros’, such as in the General
Assembly of the UN in the 1960s. Therefore, the global public of the 1960s
was an already emerging strong public.
I should add some brief remarks on the distinction between strong
and weak publics that was introduced by Nancy Fraser many years ago,
and some further differentiations which I want to suggest here.51 Where-
as a strong public couples public opinion via public will formation and
elections structurally with legislative decision making, a weak public at
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least influences legislative decision making, besieges the organs of deci-
sion making even if it has no direct electoral access to be represented
sufficiently. Classical examples for the latter include the North American
settlers before the Revolution who could appeal to a working parliamen-
tary regime that did not represent them (‘No taxation without representa-
tion’), and the women’s and workers’ movements for universal suffrage
in England and Prussia in the nineteenth century, or minority move-
ments without any chance in parliament because they are criminalized by
parliamentary legislation (homosexuals in the 1950s and 1960s). Weak
publics are publics acting within an environment of political institutions,
where they have no de facto chance of changing the world, but a de jure
chance, such as the Tea Party movement of 1773, or the LGBT social
movements in the 1960s. Weak publics like the latter stand against a—as
Theodor Adorno has called it—‘kompakte Majorität’ (a consolidated major-
ity, such as, for example, the Richard Nixon voters in the 1960s). There-
fore, weak publics can become strong publics either through radical reformism
(such as universal suffrage movements, or LGBT movements since the
1970s) or through a revolution (as in the case of the ‘Good People of the
American Colonies’ who, in fact, were slave owners). Weak publics are
latently strong publics. In many cases, they have a high revolutionary
potential.
However, publics like the present global public are structurally weak,
and have been since the police occupied the temple. A very vivid, and, in
real time, an ever more densely connected, global public exists, but it has
no (or nearly no) influence on parliamentary and other political decisions
any longer, because the ‘debating club’ in the parliamentary assembly of
the UN no longer exists factually, only as a ‘desiccated public sphere’.52
Structurally weak publics have, at best, a symbolic (but no real) chance of
influencing political decisions, because the legal system either excludes
parts or even all of the citizens from any access to such decisions, de-
prives them of their rights, and represses them directly, or else citizens
and minorities (hence, all those affected by political decisions) have
rights which only exist on paper, and which nobody respects.53 The for-
mer (no rights at all) was the case of the American slaves after the Revo-
lution, which, therefore, at the same time, was a counterrevolution that
stabilized the, at that time, already endangered institution of slavery for a
further hundred years.54 The latter (rights only on paper) was and still is
true, for example, with the publics of the European periphery, such as the
Greek public during the Euro crisis of 2015. In the latter case, the Greek
(and not just the Greek) public was successfully deprived not only of any
influence on European decisions, but also of their own referenda, elec-
tions and parliamentary legislation, which were rendered null and void
by the overwhelming blackmailing power of the capitalist economy, the
formal and informal executive bodies of the Troika, the Euro Group, the
European Council and, last, but not least, the German hegemon.55 Again,
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the police have occupied the temple. In this case, European and national
constitutional law has regressed to the level of a symbolic constitution.56
However, one must distinguish here between a structurally weak public
with some normatively effective rights to free expression, association, and move-
ment, and other basic human rights (such as, the abolition movements of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries or Greek society in 2015) and
those without such rights (as in the undercover public at Moscow’s kitchen
tables in the 1980s, or the slaves’ Underground Railroad public of Loui-
siana before the insurgency known as the German Coast Uprising of
January 1811).
The present global public of public opinion is a structurally weak public
with international and (in most of its segments) nationally concretized
rights to free expression and association, whereas the present European pub-
lic—thanks to the technocratic regime of public appeasement and silenc-
ing—is now, nationally and transnationally, a weak public which, at least
in some of its southern parts, is already structurally weak. My thesis is
that the weakness of the European public together with the democratically
disastrous effects of neoliberal globalization and the hidden curriculum of
Europe (i.e., the constitutional hegemony of competition law) have trans-
formed the formerly strong publics of Europe’s national states into weak
publics, and partly into structurally weak publics.
If we now look back at the 1950s and 1960s, the public sphere of that
time in some crucial aspects resembles the present situation. Jürgen Ha-
bermas then suggested the very influential thesis of a ‘structural transfor-
mation of the public sphere’ that consisted in its ‘desiccation’.57 The des-
iccation of the public sphere was due to:
• a compensatory consumerist redistribution of wealth (output-
justice/egalitarianism controlled by power élites);
• the advanced cultural industry;
• Nixon’s ‘silent majority’;58
• the gender and the colour lines: affirmative action was white, male
and heterosexual, and the rest were excluded legally or factually.59
The repolitization of the public sphere came with the cultural revolution
of the 1960s and has returned in ever new waves over the last forty years.
Probably, it was one of the largest cultural revolutions in history, and it
was global, strongly enhancing the global public of public opinion.
If we look back, it is evident that this tremendous success of the politi-
cal left was the result of a dialectical interaction between a radical minor-
ity of extraparliamentary or even antiparliamentary social movements
and parliamentary legislation.60 This was not just a national interaction
that accidentally occurred in so many states and regions of the world,
and not just in the Western world. On the contrary, it was already one of
the many structural effects of the co-evolution of national public opinion
and public law formation, on the one hand, and a global public and
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international human rights legislation (and jurisdiction), on the other.61
The now more than forty years of global and national rights revolution
that was concretized by national legislation was a great triumph of the
legal form of the parliamentary constitution that is historically due to the
existing contradiction of repression and emancipation that is modern law
since the days of the Papal Revolution.62 Moreover, the existing contra-
diction of modern law was reflected by the existing contradictions be-
tween radical social movements and parliamentary legislation, the ‘de-
bating club in parliament’ and the ‘debating clubs in the salons and the
bistros’ (including the extremes of Richard Nixon’s ‘silent majority’ and
the Black Panthers’ partially violent resistance). The whole rights revolu-
tion therefore was, and still is, a shining example of deliberative democ-
racy, because deliberative democracy is democratic legislation through
public contestation, conflict and social (class) struggle which, in spite of
everything (sometimes even violent and revolutionary struggle), did not
lose contact with the communicative power of the better argument.
. . . AND ITS ABYSMAL CONTRADICTION CAUSED BY THE LOSS
OF ITS SOCIAL BASIS
However, the success of the rights revolution was based upon the sociolog-
ical premise that the social welfare state lasts forever, comes ever closer to
democratic socialism, and finally is diffused all over the world of national
states.
Unfortunately, this was not the case. The welfare state crumbled
under the pressure of internal problems (the inflation crisis), neoconser-
vative propaganda, and successful neoconservative campaigns, followed
by neoliberal parliamentary reformism and extraparliamentary military
dictatorships (Chile, Argentina, etc.).
In the course of the last forty years, affirmative action became more
and more colourful, but, at the same time, it became a social class privilege,
thus losing its character as affirmative action, leaving ever more parts of
the lower classes without any chance of enjoying the fruits of the global
rights revolution. The great advances of the African American, the Indig-
enous and LGBT social movements in America, Europe, and even in Asia
and Africa no longer have a fair value for everybody (John Rawls). No
wonder that the political language of hard-currency rights was replaced
by the private-property language of soft-currency values, in Europe and
the Eurozone in particular.63
The great transformation of the global economic and political system from
state-embedded markets to market-embedded states has not only in-
creased the blackmailing power of global capitalism dramatically but also
caused an equally dramatic social differentiation between rich and poor social
classes—both within Western societies and between Western (enlarged to
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G20) societies, and excluded the rest of the world population that is be-
yond any hope, and, as a result, has only one perspective left, which is
religious fundamentalism.64 Again, as at the end of the nineteenth centu-
ry, the social class line, overlapping (but not identical) with the colour
line, divides a now completely integrated world society.
Inquiring into the relation of social and political inequality, Armin
Schäfers has discovered one of the very few sociological laws: increasing
social inequality causes increasing political inequality. 65 Social differences
have been growing in most OECD countries for more than thirty years.
No matter how high or low the absolute income and welfare costs for the
lowest classes of society are, what matters is only: With every inch of
growing social inequality, the poor (for example, the relatively worst-off
part of a city), who overwhelmingly voted for socialist/left-wing parties,
are increasingly discouraged from election to election, because, from elec-
tion to election, the social difference increases steadily. Their turnout
shrinks to 30 percent and less, and the few who still participate in elec-
tions switch to far right parties. The rich (for example, the relatively best-
off part of a city), who overwhelmingly vote conservative/right-wing par-
ties anyway, are encouraged, and their turnout comes ever closer to 100
percent, and they spend more and more money for right-wing parties
and movements (from AfD [Alternative for Germany] and Front National to
the GOP’s Tea Party). The political effect is simple, logical and consistent:
the parties on the left go right, stepwise from electoral campaign to elec-
toral campaign.66 Paul Krugman has rightly called this the ‘timidity trap’
that catches all the former major left parties, which (despite their assimi-
lation and overassimilation to the right) are becoming ever smaller.67
The effect for democracy is disastrous. Democracy is running out of
(in particular, macroeconomic) alternatives—and there is no longer de-
mocracy if there are no longer substantial alternatives. The constituent
power shifts from the political to the economic system. In June 1789,
Emmanuel Joseph (Abbé) Sieyès had declared in the Assembly of the
Estates-General that ‘the Third Estate is the Nation’, and that the Assem-
bly of the Estates-General was therefore the National Assembly. The
three words triggered the greatest democratic revolution in European
history and established the constituent power of the people. It became the
origin of the legal form of the parliamentary constitution, which over and
over again enabled the ‘dance’ of ‘those down below’. Exactly 223 years,
one month and ten days later, the President of the European Central
Bank, Mario Draghi declared on 26 July 2012, at a private investors’ meet-
ing in the City of London that ‘the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to
preserve the Euro’. Again, it needed only a few words for the counterrev-
olutionary act that shifted the constituent power from the people to the
bankers. The crisis did not destroy Europe. It destroyed European de-
mocracy. While European integration advanced, European democracy
crumbled.68
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A SECOND CHANCE?
However, politics is not yet over. The shift from popular to economic
sovereignty comes at a high price. It deprives the technocratic system of
domination of its last legitimatory resource. The Greek ‘No’ at the bailout
referendum 5 July 2015 was the first step to repoliticize the ‘desiccated
public sphere’.69 The German Chancellor’s legally-required decision to
help refugees in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, rightly arguing
that if any country could refuse such help, it could not be the country of a
Federal Chancellor under the German Basic Law, was a further step to-
wards repolitization, even if it came from a leader whose name had be-
come an icon for de-politization and the renewed desiccation of the pub-
lic sphere. By repolitization, I mean, in this case, that what we need is not
only a parochial debate (including renewed class struggle) about the
growing social differences between the centre and the (rapidly growing)
periphery within the rich countries of the Western hemisphere, but also
an extended debate (including a new transnational formation of class
struggle) about the growing social differences between the rich countries
and the global South, and, in particular, the fight for the enforcement of
the existing law concerning refugees, in particular the unconditioned
right to hearing and the conditioned right to settle.70 The neverending
flow of migrants who are reaching the rich countries this way or that
serves as an unwelcome reminder to the Western, especially European,
wealthy nations of their colonial and imperial pasts (‘All Europe contrib-
uted to the making of Kurtz.’71). The time of dispossession of the colonial
past is over. Europe and the whole Western world have to face it. There-
fore, the prevalence of the de-constitutionalized new border regimes will
become the test of whether Europe and the other OECD countries can
come to a democratic solution for a problem that needs the inclusion of all
those affected on this side and on the other side of our borders, or wheth-
er we proceed regressively to the permanent state of siege.
There is not much hope for democracy left, it would seem. However,
suddenly there are alternatives. One condemned alternative returns, and
that is democratic socialism. Even in the centres of the neoliberal empire.
The Third Way is over, but, surprisingly enough, this is not the end of the
parliamentary regime within and beyond the national state. What Greek
and Spanish left populists, American primaries and the British Labour
Party leadership elections, and the new American students’ movement
now show, what, in particular, the campaign of Bernie Sanders, who
speaks the language of rights and not of values, in the US Democratic
primaries shows, is that the existing contradiction of radical public poli-
tics and legislative reformism that was the driving force of the ‘parlia-
mentary regime’ can probably be reanimated. It still seems possible ‘to
play the fiddle’ for the ‘dance’ of ‘those down below’.
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However, only if the centre of real parliamentary power (that includes
sovereignty/statehood) shifts a considerable amount to the transnational
level, will parliamentary democracy have a second chance. Unfortunate-
ly, this seems very unlikely at present, and then the pseudorepolitization
of the public from the far right, from Donald Trump to Jean-Marie Le
Pen, seems unavoidable.
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Jonathan White uses the apt phrase emergency Europe to describe how
recent European leaders have declared a panoply of urgent exceptional
and even existential crises to justify measures ‘contravening established
procedures and norms’ as necessary, unavoidable, and intrinsically ra-
tional.1 The result has been growing dependence on legally dubious top-
down executive measures and a demotion of ordinary legislative chan-
nels. As the legal scholar Christian Joerges similarly notes,
[t]he Union is experiencing a kind of state of emergency in which the
law is losing its integrity . . . [T]he European Central Bank is disregard-
ing its statutes; parliaments are contravened to make fast-tracked deci-
sions that cannot be meaningfully discussed; Greece, and other mem-
bers of the Union are being told that their sovereignty is now ‘limited’;
changes of government take place under exceptional circumstances.2
White infers that one potentially fruitful response to European emergen-
cy government might take the form of popular or bottom-up ‘alternative
emergency politics’, including mass civil disobedience, ‘whereby large
numbers of people decide that the normal rules are suspended’ as a way
of expressing their discontent. For White, politically motivated law-
breaking represents ‘an archetypical form of emergency politics’, which,
if properly conducted, could effectively subvert executive-level extrale-
gality.3 He sees the makings of such alternative emergency politics in
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recent social movements such as the Spanish indignados and the Greek
aganaktismenoi.
My comments here speak to the ‘Euro Crisis’. Not primarily to the
crisis’s underlying causes or long-term roots, but rather to what is at
stake, and what, perhaps, critical-minded political actors should do in
response to the European élite’s top-down emergency response. I invoke
the idea of an alternative emergency politics, drawing on a reservoir of
US political experience, and particularly the iconic example of the US
civil rights movement, that popular opposition to ‘emergency Europe’
will need to probe. Like US civil rights civil disobedients, contemporary
European activists need to take seriously the possibility that their acts of
symbolic law-breaking still need to express fidelity to the law and funda-
mental legal ideals at the heart of European democracy, ideals which
have faced considerable pressure since the start of the crisis, and which,
in some cases, have been systematically undermined. Relying on White’s
suggestive remarks, I investigate the relationship between executive-level
emergency (or crisis) extralegality and popular forms of extralegal
protest.
Why opt for the term extralegality rather than illegality? I do so for a
simple reason. Even in basically democratic settings, both state officials
and militant protestors can be observed violating legal and constitutional
norms in a variety of ways. When doing so, they depend on a rich array
of moral, political, and legal justifications. Since they nonetheless pretty
much uniformly hope to distinguish their actions from ordinary criminal-
ity, the phrase extralegality seems better suited to this ambivalent situa-
tion than illegality, even if, in many cases, the grounds for law-breaking
turn out to be legally suspect. Of course, some types of grassroots politi-
cal illegality purport to be motivated by a fundamental and sometimes
even ‘highest respect for the law’.4 When high-level state officials tamper
with or ignore ordinary legal procedures during a crisis, they commonly
characterize their actions as necessary to protect the constitutional order.
Admittedly, such appeals can mask far-reaching attempts to overhaul the
constitutional status quo: the executive may be advancing sovereign and
not commissarial dictatorship, to use Carl Schmitt’s terminological distinc-
tion.5 Yet the fact remains that executive-level illegality is widely
grounded on appeals to the law or constitutional government.6
As White intimates, and as the Euro Crisis readily corroborates, we
can, indeed, identify a symbiotic relationship between extralegality ‘from
above’ and ‘from below’, with executive extralegality oftentimes directly
spawning and helping to legitimize extralegality ‘from below’. Some
modest lessons can be drawn from a closer examination of this neglected
relationship. In particular, it helps recall some virtues of a specific model
of grassroots extralegality, namely, nonviolent civil disobedience as it
emerged in the context of the US civil rights movement and was subse-
quently theoretically codified by liberal and progressive intellectuals.7
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When we dig a bit deeper, we also find a similar political imaginary—in
particular, parallel ideas about what constitutes a ‘crisis’, and how best to
respond to it—which characterizes the usual justifications provided for
both executive and popular extralegality. Nonetheless, decisive differ-
ences remain. Consequently, it would be mistaken to envisage the two
varieties of extralegality as equivalent. Defenders of executive-level ex-
tralegality should be expected to face a substantially higher burden of
proof than the civil disobedient.
EXTRALEGALITY AS SYMBIOSIS
Countless scenarios can be identified in which the executive declares, by
formal constitutional means or otherwise, a dire crisis or ‘state of emer-
gency’, moves rapidly to promulgate exceptional measures, and, by do-
ing so, probably inadvertently sets off militant grassroots protests. Emer-
gency rule provides opponents with ample ground for pursuing a corre-
sponding extralegal response. If emergency rule entails the abrogation of
the usual legal (and especially legislative) channels for altering policy, or
the suspension of basic rights, why should regime critics necessarily re-
main wedded to them?
In scenarios lacking a formal declaration of a state of emergency, yet
where ‘the normal channels of [political] change no longer function and
grievances will not be heard or acted upon’, or the regime ‘has embarked
upon and persists in modes of action whose legality and constitutionality
are open to grave doubt’, grassroots extralegality is commonplace.8 As
Hannah Arendt once noted, ‘[a]n emergency is certainly at hand when
the established institutions of a country fail to function properly and its
authority loses power’.9 When democracy malfunctions, and meaningful
possibilities for participation have dried up, protestors will often find
themselves engaging in unconventional and legally dubious action.
This helps explain what we are witnessing at present in Europe,
where national governments are forced to accept external management of
their economic and financial affairs, and with those paying the price con-
sequently sceptical of both the legitimacy and the efficacy of ordinary
political channels. With the European Central Bank, working alongside
the Council, the Commission and Court of Justice of the EU, ‘but if need
be also without them’, acting as the unelected ‘de facto government of the
biggest economy of the earth’, nobody should be surprised by the resur-
gence of extralegal activism.10 Making mincemeat not just of democracy
but of core components of legality, European crisis management in
Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and elsewhere invites grassroots extrale-
gality ‘from below’.11
Revealingly, when self-proclaimed defenders of ‘law and order’, like
former US President Richard Nixon, accuse militants who skirt the law of
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contributing to ‘deterioration for respect for the rule of law’,12 they ne-
glect to mention that extralegality ‘from below’ often succeeds govern-
ment and especially executive extralegality. In contemporary Europe, the
specific names and suspects have changed. Yet, the political logic remains
the same.
As we can regularly observe, however, extralegal responses ‘from be-
low’ often function unwittingly to outfit the executive with a convenient
political cover. Violence, or other forms of popular illegality readily por-
trayed as irresponsible or dangerous, can play into the executive’s hands.
One advantage that the executive enjoys is the presumption that its ac-
tions rest on a principled allegiance to the law: it is, after all, the executive
that enforces and implements the law, and determines its everyday
meaning. The executive typically benefits from a certain presumption of
legal and constitutional integrity. Protestors rarely enjoy the same pre-
sumption of innocence. They need to prove their allegiance to the law.13
Not surprisingly, if the executive plays his or her cards right, he or she
can successfully present grassroots law-breaking as corroborating his or
her diagnosis of an existential crisis demanding executive-centred rule.
Though White neglects this possibility, the political backlash against ‘al-
ternative emergency politics’ often favours the executive. The story is
complicated, but one of its traits seems familiar enough: exploiting the
political fallout that often follows mass-based extralegal protest, the exec-
utive funnels mass anxiety to turn the tables on opponents.
I leave it to others to decide whether something like this dynamic has
been unfolding in ‘emergency Europe’. Media reports have been replete
with portrayals of unruly (and sometimes violent) protests in Greece,
Spain, and elsewhere. Such media coverage ultimately works to the ad-
vantage of European élites, for whom it is imperative that their own
emergency actions appear normatively superior to their opponents’.
Where deeply rooted ideas of legality possess a well-nigh universal ap-
peal, the executive not only faces fewer hurdles in depicting its acts as
expressing fidelity to the law, but can readily equate those of its oppo-
nents with criminality. The commonplace portrayal of the indignados, the
aganaktismenoi, and other protestors as unruly and criminal conveniently
obscures the fact that their extralegalities are arguably no more contro-
versial than the top-down emergency measures promulgated by Euro-
pean leaders.14
I make this point because of its potential political but also broader
theoretical significance. Grassroots extralegality comes, of course, in dif-
ferent shapes and sizes. It can be uncivil, violent, and disdainful of the
law, as well as poorly conceived and politically irresponsible.15 In the
recent academic literature, we encounter a burgeoning tendency to dis-
card the once paradigmatic model of civil disobedience as a ‘public, non-
violent, conscientious, yet political act contrary to the law usually done
with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the
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government’.16 In his recent book on political resistance to European cri-
sis government, for example, Costas Douzinas sharply discounts this ‘lib-
eral’ model of civil disobedience.17 Inspired by the experience of the US
civil rights movement, this model now faces a wide-ranging intellectual
assault. The sources of the attack are complex and multifaceted, and,
unfortunately, I cannot examine them here.18 One of them, however, is
the straightforward observation that it clashes with the realities of mass
protest (and militant law breaking) ‘on the ground’, many examples of
which appear to challenge the once sacrosanct idea of civil disobedience
as a civil, nonviolent, and public act expressing basic fidelity to the law.
Our brief discussion of the symbiotic relationship between extralegal-
ity ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ should give pause to those now rush-
ing to abandon the standard liberal model. Whatever its faults, that mod-
el grappled seriously with the possibility of a politically counterproduc-
tive backlash and reflected on how to neutralize it. Martin Luther King
and the liberal and progressive intellectuals inspired by his actions
grasped that politically viable extralegal popular ‘emergency politics’
would need to be perceived as superior to executive extralegality. They
intuited that extralegality ‘from above’ enjoys a (sometimes undeserved)
presumption of lawfulness that could only be successfully countered by
the civil disobedient demonstrating his or her ‘very highest respect for
the law’ in immediately intelligible ways.
King regularly portrayed civil disobedience as a necessary rejoinder to
what, in the US in the 1950s and 1960s, amounted to systemic executive
extralegality. In his view, only massive civil disobedience would be able
to ignite the stalled enforcement of standing US law—most notably, the
Supreme Court’s landmark Brown v. Board of Education ruling mandating
school desegregation—the enforcement of which had been stymied by an
alliance of segregationists and sympathetic conservative officials at feder-
al and state levels.19 Civil disobedience, from this perspective, was essen-
tial to bringing national attention to the shocking fact that rulings by the
nation’s highest court were being de facto invalidated by hostile and/or
passive government officials. By effectively scuttling the Supreme
Court’s decisions, ‘Old Man Segregation’ was getting away with egre-
gious violations of the law, with mass apathy and official complicity
providing the requisite cover.20 Even if civil rights activists openly abro-
gated segregation statutes, or local ordinances against trespassing, they
did so only in order to counter egregious violations of fundamental US
constitutional law.
King struggled to sketch out a model of law-breaking whose differ-
ences vis-à-vis executive extralegality could become lucidly transparent
even to unsympathetic onlookers. The failure of the US political machin-
ery to uphold Brown and other antisegregation rulings was surreptitious
and generally unannounced,21 incurring few costs, and bringing many
benefits to those who complied. In contrast, King emphasized, nonviolent
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direct action was public and open, with disobedients evincing a willing-
ness to undergo psychological and physical abuse, or what he described
as laying down their ‘very bodies’. Peaceful law-breaking had to be delin-
eated from the ‘uncivil disobedience’ of segregationists who committed
terrible acts of violence under the cover of darkness so as to circumvent
legal penalties.22 Disobedients directly expressed their fundamental re-
spect for the basic idea—though by no means the unsatisfying reality of
America’s existing (racist) system of legality—by accepting punishment
even when meted out by segregationist judges and racist juries. The civil
disobedient stood on the side of ‘law and order’, superficial appearances
notwithstanding.
A hard-headed strategist, King’s brand of extralegality generated
massive political dividends. In contrast to many unsuccessful and now
forgotten experiments in militant illegality, it played a pivotal role in
generating radical reform.
I do not mean to lionize King or to ignore the difficulties of exporting
his ideas, the product of a particular time and place, to contemporary
Europe. Nonetheless, it remains imperative that contemporary models of
extralegality ‘from below’ not only cleanly differentiate their acts from
extralegality ‘from above’, but also convincingly evince, as King intuited,
their superior normative and especially legal credentials. Activists can
perhaps draw some useful lessons from earlier European global justice
activists, whose participants (at the Genoa G8 meetings and elsewhere)
creatively reinvented core traits of civil disobedience and generated sig-
nificant public sympathy for their cause and its global significance.23
Notably, King was able to succeed in part because his cause presup-
posed a widely shared legal and political culture along with a common
constitutional system. Given the present state of the European political
order, it is unclear that civil disobedients there will be able to follow the
same path. Europeans, as we know, could not even agree on a shared
constitution. Though EU leaders have engaged in troublesome violations
of legality, opposition has been fuelled, not surprisingly, by populistic
and nationalistic, rather than principled, appeals to common European
constitutional or legal commitments. Europe’s complex and deeply plu-
ralistic legal structure poses sizable impediments to any would-be supra-
national-minded European Martin Luther King.24
CRISIS IMAGINARY
The imaginary of executive-centred crisis or emergency government is
already familiar since it occupies a prominent place in contemporary
political consciousness.25 According to the conventional story, a crisis
represents an unpredicted and perhaps unforeseeable event or worst-
case scenario, in which the community faces a mortal danger or an exis-
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tential threat. Moments of uncertainty and urgency, crises call for looking
beyond the usual legal toolkit; flexibility and the ability to respond rapid-
ly are at a premium. The executive is commonly perceived as best suited
to the tasks to be done. Unlike the slow-moving deliberative legislature
or sluggish judiciary, what Alexander Hamilton dubbed the ‘energetic’
executive alone allegedly possesses the capacity for ‘decision, activity,
secrecy, and dispatch’ requisite to effective emergency rule.26 Predict-
ably, crises represent a launching pad for executive extralegality, if not by
formal declaration of a state of emergency, then by means of other famil-
iar mechanisms (broad legislative delegations, for example, or creative
legal or constitutional interpretation).
The crisis imaginary can take on dramatic and sometimes apocalyptic
overtones: the executive is depicted as operating in a Manichean uni-
verse, where tough (and potentially tragic) choices have to be made in
order to do battle with life-or-death enemies.27 The stakes are high, with
success depending on the executive’s capacity for resolute action. Failure
would mean disaster, while success might bring an unparalleled, and
perhaps utopian, good.
Because this imaginary is readily recognisable, we need not dwell on
it. However, two caveats should be kept in mind. First, as the legal theo-
rist Tom Campbell has argued, it is out of sync with most constitutional
systems, which typically provide neatly codified definitions of various
emergencies (e.g., war, rebellion, natural catastrophes, economic crises)
and proscribe what actions the executive can and cannot undertake. Most
constitutional orders aspire to subject even violent emergencies to bind-
ing legal rules and procedures.28 For complicated reasons that I cannot
examine here, actual political practice, however, conforms more closely
to the political imaginary of the emergency than the law ‘on the books’:
even well-conceived constitutional and legal niceties become spring-
boards for legally controversial executive measures.29
Second, the imaginary is deceptive for another reason as well. It rests
on a tendentious portrayal of the executive, based in early modern politi-
cal thought, as a single ‘unitary’ actor and thus temporally efficient, flex-
ible, and best suited to crisis exigencies. As any face-to-face encounter
with the unwieldy apparatus of the modern state highlights, however,
the on-the-ground realities of the administrative apparatus are messy,
complicated, and by no means temporally efficient.30 Particularly at the
European level, where executive power is ‘fragmented and dispersed by
virtue of the multilevel and polycentric nature of the European construc-
tion’, this point should be kept in mind.31 In the EU, where ‘there is no
single, comprehensive and unitary European executive institution or
body’, the executive contradicts conventional presuppositions about its
suitability for crisis management even more dramatically than do nation-
al executives.32
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The executive possesses some institutional advantages vis-à-vis other
institutions. Yet the traditional picture overstates and probably mischar-
acterizes them. Here as well, the crisis imaginary provides troublesome
ideological support for those who prefer to seek executive discretion dur-
ing a crisis.33 Nonetheless, a disconnection between this imaginary and
the executive’s actual operations remains.
Less familiar is the decisive role played by elements of the imaginary
in sophisticated thinking about grassroots extralegality. Once again, King
provides an illuminating point of reference. He envisioned civil disobedi-
ence as a necessary response not only to executive extralegality, but also
to what he regularly diagnosed as a ‘crisis in racial relations’, and then, in
his later and most radical writings, as an ‘international emergency which
involves the poor, the dispossessed, and the exploited of the whole
world’.34 Paradigmatic for this restatement of the imaginary is how civil
disobedience performs temporal functions parallel to those of the ‘ener-
getic’ executive: it prods otherwise sluggish and slow-moving ordinary
political and legal channels, viewed as creeping along at ‘horse-and-bug-
gy pace’ and forcing them to catch up to the ‘jet-like speed’ of modern
life.35 Even if ‘Old Man Segregation’ was on his deathbed, civil disobedi-
ence alone could ‘speed up the coming of the new age’,36 forcing a recal-
citrant state apparatus to deal with the ‘urgent necessity’37 of ‘our na-
tion’s first class crisis’.38
This idea of civil disobedience as an accelerated crisis response ‘from
below’ turns out to be surprisingly widespread among its proponents. I
limit myself to two additional examples.
In a 1963 call for massive civil disobedience to ward off the ‘extreme
imminence of the peril’ of nuclear war, the philosopher Bertrand Russell
similarly highlighted its temporal advantages.39 ‘By means of lies and
evasions’, governments had irresponsibly downplayed the looming spec-
tre of cataclysmic ‘dangers and catastrophes’.40 Because ‘[l]egally legiti-
mate methods of spreading this knowledge have been proved to be very
slow’, Russell insisted, activists needed to pick up the temporal slack.41
Via conscientious nonviolent law-breaking, they could accelerate the
public’s acquisition of the requisite scientific and political know-how,
perhaps before it was too late.
In his widely read Disobedience and Democracy, the radical intellectual
Howard Zinn echoed King in diagnosing a series of perilous economic,
racial, and social crises, adding that:
[w]henever great crises faced the nation in the past, the traditional
workings of the government, including the decisions of the courts, had
to be supplemented by much more vigorous activity going beyond the
usual procedure.42
For Zinn, as for King and Russell, civil disobedience proffered an ener-
getic or rapid-fire political option that was superior to ‘the slow work-
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ings’ of ordinary political and legal channels.43 Its temporal virtues
helped justify its increasingly privileged status among radical activists.
It is hard to miss some apocalyptic and even Manichean tones here.
For Russell, ‘[a]ny day, at any time, the whole population of Britain may
perish’.44 For Bayard Rustin, a key figure in popularising Gandhian ideas
among US civil rights activists, militant civil disobedience was necessary
because ‘[t]he organizers and perpetuators of segregation are as much the
enemy of America as any foreign invader’.45 One also encounters the idea
that an emergency vividly illuminates a dramatic moral or political
choice. For King, the racial crisis constituted ‘America’s greatest moral
dilemma’.46 Civil disobedience meant that the morally conscientious
could attack ‘the forces of evil, rather than persons caught in the forces. It
is evil that we are seeking to defeat, not the persons victimized with
evil’.47 According to Zinn, the multisided social crisis called for a resolute
choice between radical reform via civil disobedience or the terrors of
‘gigantic uncontrolled violence’.48
What then, if anything, distinguishes the two seemingly parallel ver-
sions (that is, extralegality ‘from above’ and ‘from below’) of the crisis
imaginary? The conceptual and semantic overlap certainly seems sub-
stantial. Both reproduce traits of modern crisis consciousness as skilfully
analysed by Reinhart Koselleck.49 Initially, Giorgio Agamben seems on
the mark: ‘[t]he problem of the state of exception presents clear analogies
to that of the right to resistance’.50
Are we then dealing with fundamentally similar notions of crisis and
extralegality?
For reasons which I outline in the next section, I do not believe this to
be so. Most obviously, grassroots extralegality, at least when practiced
according to King’s model, is nonviolent, whereas executive extralegality
enjoys the possibility of relatively direct recourse to state coercion. This
simple, but crucial, difference, as we will see, proves decisive.
Another difference has already come to light. As noted, the traditional
vision of the executive as a fast-moving, temporally efficient crisis man-
ager needs to be subjected to critical scrutiny; too much empirical evi-
dence contradicts it. In the EU, where executive power is deeply frag-
mented, the traditional view seems particularly far-fetched. What, then,
of the parallel claim made on behalf of popular extralegality’s temporal
virtues? Is it not just as far-fetched—and potentially ideological—in light
of what we should presume about the unavoidably time-consuming
character of popular, and especially grassroots, protest politics? If mass-
based extralegality depends, as it surely should, on slow-moving forms
of free-wheeling exchange, where large numbers of participants engage
in a meaningful (and, ideally, deliberative) give-and-take, what case can
plausibly be made for its temporal merits vis-à-vis ordinary legal and
political channels?
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Many complexities notwithstanding, one basic point should be kept in
mind: in real, existing democracies, conventional law-making is always
shaped—and sometimes obviously stymied—by political parties, inter-
ests groups, administrative agencies, and powerful, organized social
interests. This fact decisively shapes the real-life temporality of law-mak-
ing, typically working to decelerate and even squelch demands for far-
reaching reform that favours the politically and socially excluded. King
and the civil rights movement were right to see the US Congress as a
slow-moving and, indeed, racially reactionary institution lorded over by
powerful southerners who owed their political privileges precisely to
that local power structure that activists sought to destroy. Congress had a
long and sordid history of resisting even modest calls for racial reform. In
comparison, nonviolent disobedience, when capably pursued so as both
to put pressing issues on the radar and to shame recalcitrant institutional
actors into overdue action, in fact possessed some enviable temporal
traits.
The case for civil disobedience’s accelerated temporality makes sense
in contexts such as that of the US, where an outdated institutional instan-
tiation of the separation of powers means that the legislative process is
probably more clunky, sluggish, and resistant to meaningful reform than
in other democracies.51 Whenever legislative institutions ‘creep at horse-
and-buggy pace’, civil disobedience is likely to appeal to those eager to
speed up the pace of change when faced with a perceived crisis, real or
otherwise.52 However, to the degree that elsewhere as well ‘the estab-
lished institutions of a country fail to function properly’, civil disobedi-
ence is destined to garner universal appeal.53 In the present-day EU, for
example, civil disobedience probably offers a quicker way to ignite politi-
cal debate and potential reform than the ordinary venues provided by its
unwieldy and insufficiently responsive political machinery. With ordi-
nary political channels at national level clogged by top-down EU emer-
gency management, and with Europe-wide democracy itself under-de-
veloped, it is easy to see why so many Europeans are not only taking to
the streets, but are also engaging in politically motivated law-breaking.
BEYOND FALSE EQUATIONS
Basic normative and pragmatic distinctions suggest why it would be a
mistake to conflate the logics of extralegality ‘from above’ and ‘from
below’. Despite a shared crisis imaginary, executive-level extralegality
poses perils which its popular correlate can successfully circumvent. Giv-
en the recent scholarly tendency to view executive extralegality as a po-
tentially admirable way to counter dire crises or emergencies, some
words of caution seem apposite.54
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Defending 1960s’ civil disobedients, Hannah Arendt observed that
their actions were motivated by the same ‘organizing principles of ac-
tion . . . from which sprang those voluntary associations’ upon which the
early American Republic once rested.55 Following Alexis de Tocqueville
in viewing freedom of association as essential to political action among
equals, and thus as a linchpin of republican government, Arendt posited
that ‘civil disobedients are nothing but the latest form of voluntary asso-
ciation, and . . . are thus quite in tune with the oldest traditions of the
country’.56 In Arendt’s view:
the civil disobedient is a member of a group, and this group, whether
we like it or not, is formed in accordance with the same spirit that has
informed voluntary associations. . . . The fact is that we are dealing
with organized minorities, who stand against assumed inarticulate,
though hardly ‘silent’, majorities, and I think it is undeniable that these
majorities have changed in mood and opinion to an astounding degree
under the pressure of the minorities.57
Without the novel political opportunities provided by civil disobedience
for equal citizens to come together, republican government could not
thrive. Civil disobedience performs a cardinal function: in an increasingly
ossified political system, it offers indispensable opportunities for mean-
ingful political interaction and exchange.
Arendt’s basic intuition remains sound: democracy thrives only when
citizens can come together and engage in meaningful political action, and
grassroots extralegality potentially represents a pivotal opportunity for
such action. Of course, a thriving democracy should offer multiple (legal)
arenas for participation. However, whenever ‘the normal channels of
change no longer function, and grievances will not be heard or acted
upon’—or the government pursues legally and constitutionally dubious
action—extralegality ‘from below’ can be justified.58 Since popular law-
breaking potentially exemplifies the citizen’s ‘continuing participation in
all matters of public interest’, it constitutes part of the very sine qua non of
popular government.
Executive extralegality seems less amenable to such justifications. To
be sure, executives sometimes legitimize their extralegalities by asserting
that they are buttressing self-government; in some cases, this defence
aptly captures their motives. Yet the claim still suffers from a congenital
paternalism. In essence, the executive is asserting a right to ‘know better’
than the other political actors, institutionalized or otherwise, what is
‘best’ for the political community as a whole. Even when unpopular mi-
norities engage in law-breaking and hope to persuade majorities of the
mistaken nature of their views, their endeavours constitute direct mani-
festations of action in concert in a way that the executive’s actions can
rarely claim. Civil disobedients act as democratic citizens, whereas the
executive can, perhaps, only claim to act on their behalf.
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When the executive steps outside the normal boundaries of the law,
its special institutional status means that its actions unavoidably take on
more troublesome contours. When civil rights activists violated segrega-
tion statutes, for example, their acts did not thereby invalidate the stat-
utes. Segregation laws remained universally binding, even though Mar-
tin Luther King and his allies obviously wanted to undermine them. In
contrast, when the executive pursues extralegality, as the main institu-
tional carrier of the state’s coercive power, its acts immediately take on a
binding character. The executive can mobilize organized violence to up-
hold moves that are even constitutionally and legally bogus. The pre-
sumption of legal innocence often enjoyed by the executive means that it
can get away with doing so. When US President George W. Bush aban-
doned long-standing legal restrictions on state surveillance following the
9/11 attacks, his decision resulted in massive changes to government poli-
cy with far-reaching repercussions. Few dared to criticize the move for
years.59 Executive extralegalities not only enjoy a presumption of lawful-
ness but will be universally enforced, whereas grassroots law-breaking
enjoys no such advantages. It relies on nothing more than the persuasive
‘pressure’ of symbolic (and, hopefully, nonviolent) action and the underly-
ing public justifications provided.
Extralegality ‘from above’ also undermines the ideal of a community
of political equals: the executive ignores standing law and effectively
forces its controversial (extralegal) views on the community as whole. On
King’s model, civil disobedience successfully circumvents this conse-
quence by agreeing in advance to accept possible legal consequences for
its actions as a way of demonstrating proper respect for the law, and,
with it, implicitly the idea of a political community of equals constituted
by law.
To be sure, those who prefer ‘uncivil’ and/or violent extralegality may
also end up violating the rights of other citizens. Yet such violations will
still typically fail to rival the massive impact of the extralegality on the
part of the executive on the political and legal system as a whole. Reveal-
ingly, and in some contrast to the civil disobedient, when the executive
pursues extralegality it rarely concedes the legally or constitutionally
contentious nature of its acts, instead, doing everything conceivable to
avoid legal penalties.60 The executive’s close ties to state coercion, in
conjunction with the presumption of innocence that it enjoys (in part
because it enforces or implements the law and seems to speak directly on
its behalf), are why its extralegalities are so dangerous: political history is
filled with constitutionally disastrous cases of extralegality ‘from above’.
Even well-meaning civil disobedience can be poorly executed and can
get out of hand. Nor would I deny the possibility of crisis situations in
which legally suspect executive action proves tragically unavoidable.61
Conceivably, recent proposals for taming executive extralegality could,
perhaps, mitigate some of its inherent perils. Oren Gross and Fionnuala
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Ní Aoláin call on the executive to pursue open and publicly justified
extralegal measures while promising to accept any legal penalties.62 Like
Schmitt, they believe that emergencies necessarily explode the confines of
ordinary legality. Unlike Schmitt, they offer a liberal model for executive
extralegality, demanding that it pass a series of strict tests. Interestingly,
these tests (openness, publicity, and a willingness to accept legal sanc-
tions) overlap directly with those found in standard models of civil dis-
obedience. In this unabashedly liberal defence of executive extralegality,
the conceptual affinities between extralegality ‘from above’ and ‘from
below’ seem pronounced.
Nonetheless, grounds for scepticism remain. This model still fails to
outline sufficient deterrents to possible abuse, and it never explains why
political leaders would openly and publicly acknowledge the extralegal
contours of their actions in the first place.63 Because of its privileged
institutional status, the executive’s abandonment of ordinary legal mech-
anisms necessarily represents a qualitatively different and more danger-
ous creature than grassroots extralegality, and especially principled civil
disobedience. As one scholar of executive power points out, ‘as with any
first mover in a game where sequence counts, a president’s initiative may
reshape in his favor the landscape on which political actors move’.64 Real
or imagined crises provide a ready justification for the executive to pur-
sue contentious extralegal actions, for example, clamping down on the
opposition, closing down newspapers, or deploying police and military
against internal and external foes. A politically astute executive will have
remade or reinvented the political landscape even before emergency
counterpolitics can emerge, and, perhaps, so as to hinder it from ever
emerging. The executive’s ability ‘to create facts on the ground’—and by
doing so, redefine the parameters of political debate—potentially undermines
overdue political criticism and can prevent an appropriate extralegal re-
sponse ‘from below’ from ever taking place. Even when the executive
faces attempts to check or censure its extralegalities, efforts to do so will
potentially operate in a new political game. Is it any surprise that history
offers so many examples of uncensored executive extralegality? Even
cautious attempts to punish illegal executive-centred crisis rule often face
a hostile reception because they emerge in a novel political universe
which the executive has reconfigured.65
CONCLUSION
After exploring the symbiotic relationship between executive-centred
emergency government and ‘alternative emergency politics’, I have ex-
amined the shared ‘crisis imaginary’ implicit in ideas of extralegality both
‘from above’ and ‘from below’. Despite some semantic affinities, princi-
pled differences remain. Because the executive typically enjoys certain
William E. Scheuerman210
institutional advantages, its extralegal actions pose normative and practi-
cal dilemmas which are far more serious than those intrinsic to grassroots
extra-legality, and especially civil disobedience, as commonly under-
stood. Here, as in some other crucial respects, the overlapping crisis
imaginary ultimately proves misleading. Contra Nixon, ‘deterioration for
respect for the rule of law’ cannot be blamed on the supposedly ‘corro-
sive doctrine’ of civil disobedience. However, it can be blamed on the
eerily commonplace belief among executives that crisis scenarios give
them an ‘inherent right to decide’ on their own ‘which laws to obey to
and when to disobey them’.66 Present-day Europe, unfortunately, seems
to have more than its fair share of political ‘leaders’ who accept this truly
corrosive doctrine.
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THIRTEEN
‘We Could Go Down the Road of
Lebanon’
Crisis Thinking on the Anti-Muslim Far Right
Mikkel Thorup
In the prologue to his novel Elementary Particles, the controversial writer
and attentive diagnostician of the present, Michel Houellebecq, writes
that his ‘book is principally the story of a man who lived out the greater
part of his life in Western Europe, in the latter half of the twentieth
century’. This contemporary life is both ‘one person’ and ‘an age’:
Though alone for much of his life, he was nonetheless closely in touch
with other men. He lived through an age that was miserable and trou-
bled. The country into which he was born was sliding slowly, inelucta-
bly, into the ranks of the less developed countries.1
This singular existence represents the European in crisis. Or rather, it rep-
resents a specific experience of decline, of sinking into the condition of
those always meant to be ‘less developed’. The sentiment was nicely
echoed by the leader of the Flemish Party, Filip Dewinter, who comment-
ed on Arab immigration by saying: ‘It puts at stake the physical survival
of our European nations. We could go down the road of Lebanon’.2
The life described in the novel is that of a man’s experience: ‘The men
of his generation,’ Houellebecq writes, ‘lived out their lonely, bitter lives.
Feelings such as love, tenderness and human fellowship had, for the
most, disappeared. The relationships between his contemporaries were at
best indifferent and more often cruel.’ This experience relates well to the
American sociologist Michael Kimmel’s notion of the ‘angry white man’
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feeling that his way of life, his status and his privileges, are all under
attack. Kimmel calls this feeling, or maybe this reaction, ‘aggrieved enti-
tlement’, meaning ‘that sense of entitlement that can no longer be as-
sumed and that is unlikely to be fulfilled’. Entitlement relates to privi-
lege, not deprivation, and, when that privilege is seen as being under
attack, the drive is ‘to restore that which one feels has been lost’. This
experience of loss can be politicized into ‘an enraged protectionism, a
sense that the threat to “us” is internal, those undeserving others who
want to take for themselves what we have rightfully earned’.3 Unlike
those who have ‘nothing to lose but their chains’,4 people fighting for
privileges have both values and valuables to defend. Calling ‘conserva-
tism’ what I would prefer to call the ‘far right’, Corey Robin says, ‘conser-
vatism really does speak to and for people who have lost something. It
may be a landed estate or the privileges of white skin, the unquestioned
authority of a husband or the untrammeled rights of a factory owner’.5
Or, I would add, the privileges of the European citizen.
This chapter is about crisis perceptions on the contemporary Euro-
pean anti-Muslim right; perceptions, I will argue, which have much to do
with a politicization of aggrieved entitlement, a fear, to continue in Houelle-
becq’s line of thought, of becoming indistinguishable from the ‘less de-
veloped’, of being transformed into something unrecognisable where be-
ing a male, white, Christian, European as well as Dane, Italian or other
nationality is no longer something special, unique or privileged. The
main spheres investigated and discussed in this chapter are those of Eu-
ropean politicians and intellectuals on the far right. I will mainly focus on
the last few decades, although I will also touch upon the history and
transformations of the crisis discourse of the far right. It will be my argu-
ment that, although much of the discourse is recognizable from earlier
periods, and, although I will argue that the thought structure of the crisis
discourse of the far right has deep historical roots, modernity has always
been in crisis in far right discourse. Crisis is both what modernity is and
what it creates. I will also argue that a new intensity and a feeling of an
approaching tipping point from crisis to catastrophe has also emerged in
the discourse. Although there are important overlaps with both Eastern
European and American discourses, this chapter will mainly be about
Western Europe. It will concern discourses which have ‘core Europe’ as
its frame of reference, and, for this reason, I limit my study to the dis-
courses produced within Western Europe.
In this chapter, I will explore and discuss how the fight for threatened
privileges is fought out as a crisis discourse. The chapter operates at three
levels. First, we have the immediate and contemporary event context of
mobilized far right parties and discourse. This exists in a situation of
events and developments summarized under the process phenomena of
globalization, multiculturalization, immigration, and Europeanization, as
well as neoliberalism and a general transformation of the European econ-
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omies from production economies to knowledge economies, with all
these changes concomitantly disrupting existing patterns and redistribut-
ing both possibilities and losses. I will say little about this level and I
make no attempt to explain far right electoral appeal or to make sociolog-
ical claims on the resonance of the anti-Muslim far right message for
various groups. Nonetheless, it is an essential part of the contextual back-
ground and of the source material of the crisis narratives and the far right
ideologues that I do wish to explore. Approaching the subject from an
intellectual history viewpoint, the chapter also explores two further lev-
els to the event level described previously, namely, the contemporary crisis
narrative and its ideational background conditions. I wish to highlight both a
contemporary crisis narrative which is unfolding in contemporary Eu-
rope, and to see how it is informed not only by the events of the day, but
also by longer strains of thinking in the history of far right thought. The
far right is premised on an understanding of modernity as crisis. This
has, in no small measure, to do with a profoundly politicized experience
of loss and defeat emanating from the French Revolution onward. The
experience of modernity is an endless series of losses and defeats. The
historicization of contemporary far right ideological discourses of ‘immi-
nent crisis’ aim to situate these discourses both in the present and in the
actual events taking place, but far more in the realm of ideas and histori-
cally grounded matrixes of thought.
I use the term far right to highlight a complex and significant shift on
the right, namely, what will be termed a ‘hardened’ defence of democra-
cy and human rights and other open society values. This puts the groups
and thinkers that I wish to discuss in opposition to the more traditional
‘extreme right’ or ‘radical right’ positions such as racism, fascism and
Nazism.6 When looking at both the parties, groups and members of the
far right, one is struck by the outspoken defence of not only ‘Western
values’, but also ‘liberal values’.7 Some strategic positioning is most cer-
tainly part of it, but, more importantly, it seems to reflect a shift in domi-
nant right-thinking away from explicitly antimodern, antiliberal posi-
tions, and into a strained and hedged accommodation with open society
values. As described next, the history of the right is one of endless defeats
resulting in splits between stalwart but dying-out ‘antimoderns’ and the
reformed ‘moderns’. After WWII, the majority of the European right
went Western, that is, it adopted a small version of liberal democracy
subscribing to a pro-market, pro-Israel,8 anti-Communist allegiance to
‘the West’. A stalwart minority went anti-Western, against NATO, the
EU, the US, continuing to adhere to biological racism, anti-Semitism, and
the like. The first position exchanged biological for cultural racism,
started to address human rights, identity and cultural rights, and came to
defend feminism, gay rights and other hitherto abominations. It is the
ideological position of this first group which attracts my interest. Mus-
lims and Islam have become the all-important ‘other’ of the far right
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almost to the exclusion of everyone else. This is why I call the object of
investigation the ‘anti-Muslim far right’.9 They are anti-Muslim, rather
than ‘merely’ anti-Islam or anti-Islamist, in their implicit, but oftentimes
also explicit, unwillingness to distinguish between Islam and Muslims, as
well as between Islam and Islamism.
We are presently witnessing a resurgence of the far right in Europe,
one which articulates and profits from a ‘crisis of public power and au-
thority’ (see the introduction, in this volume). It is the latest wave of a
right-wing narrative of ‘modernity as crisis’, but it is also historically
specific and unique. It links up to and makes reference to a number of
European crises from the Siege of Vienna (1529) to the Weimar Republic
(1919–1933) and the 1968 student protests, which are all seen as evidence
of a European weakness caused by the inability to differentiate between
high and low, sublime and banal, right and wrong, and to defend what is
of value. An important thesis of this chapter is that, while there are clear
ideational continuities running from the reaction to the French Revolu-
tion until today in the identification of and the framing and metaphoriz-
ing of what is understood as the present value and identity of the crisis,
there is also something distinctly new. The new feature in ‘far right crisis’
thinking is the alignment of a far right discourse with a ‘democracy and
open society’ values narrative, a development which I term a democratiza-
tion of reaction and a hardening of liberties. Europe is being invoked as a
‘core value reference’ while the European institutions are numbered
among its enemies. Representative democracy is being celebrated while,
at the same time, its practice is being described as aiding and abetting the
‘demographic invasion’ of foreigners. Freedom of speech is being mili-
tantly defended while rights and liberties are denied to groups of citizens
and foreigners who are not deemed worthy.
The resurgence of the far right as well as the ‘crisis of public power
and authority’, not least at the EU level as evidenced in the Euro crisis
and the 2015 refugee crisis, to which one could add the current climate
crisis (although it seems to be of no interest to the far right) may testify to
a broader governmental crisis in Europe stemming from what I would
term the normalization of Europe, meaning the closing of the historical
anomaly that Europe has been since the beginning of modernity, with
productivity growth, national homogenization and territorially consoli-
dated states, but also with a globally privileged position and self-under-
standing. Normalization becomes crisis when the normal is seen as a
state of indistinction between oneself and those deemed to be inferior.
The fear of becoming Lebanon is not just a far right fantasy. Loss of
European ‘privilege’ is evident in the growth of the Chinese economy, the
dismissal of Europe in Washington and other capitals, the inability to
restart growth and productivity, the gridlocks in the EU, the weak re-
sponse to the Ukraine crisis, and so on. The ‘far right crisis’ narrative, in
which normalization means loss of privileges and a sense of superiority,
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will not resolve the loss of European status and identity, but it does have
the potential to change seriously what Europe is, and it will, ironically, if
given the chance, accelerate the ‘Lebanonization of Europe’ by stirring up
ethnic hatreds, dividing groups up into different clusters of rights and
liberties, and by tribalizing the state. Reinstating lost privileges, compen-
sating for lost birth rights, subdividing people into hierarchies of rights,
will be the end of (the idea of) modern Europe.
In what follows, I will start with some historical and theoretical reflec-
tions on some major issues related to understanding both the deep trajec-
tories and the identity of the far right, namely, a defence of privileges and
a sense of a world adrift. In the second section, I will explore the contem-
porary ‘democratization of reaction’, the translation of aggrieved entitle-
ment into a ‘battle for democracy’ by far right anti-Muslim writers. In the
third and final section, I will illustrate the argument with readings of two
prominent anti-Muslim texts which demonstrate how a ‘far right crisis
narrative’ works in practice.
THE WORLD IS A BATTLEFIELD
In an article on Friedrich Nietzsche as a reactionary thinker, the French
scholar of racism, Pierre-André Taguieff, has outlined what he terms the
anti-modern argument, which consists of four propositions which I will cite
and comment upon. My basic supplement to Taguieff’s list is an observa-
tion on the ‘modernization’ of anti-modernity, or, as I will call it below, a
‘democratization of reaction’. The first anti-modern proposition is that
the ‘modern world is in itself a process of decadence’. In my reading of the
far right, this means that modernity is a perpetual and unfolding crisis,
that modernity’s core is a self-subversion. Modernity is crisis accelera-
tion, and modernity’s core principles are the motor of crisis. The second
proposition is that ‘decadence is, essentially, loss of supreme values, dis-
appearance of absolute norms, whence it follows that no authority can be
established and no hierarchy can be respected’. Decadence is, to use the
language, a process of losing (cultural, national and religious) privileges.
Suicidal modernity is established through ideas which question its own
foundations, mock its idols, and tolerate difference. Third, we have deca-
dence manifesting and accelerating ‘through the general progression, in
every field, of the discussability of principles and self-evident truths’,
which, in Taguieff’s reading, is mainly religious ideas, but which, in the
present context, is ‘values’, ‘culture’ and the ‘nation’, in its stead. To
discuss is to question is to disbelieve. Equality is indifference is self-abne-
gation. And, finally, the ‘modern process of decadence is irreversible and,
because it is abnormal, untypical, or pathological, necessarily tends to-
wards its own end, the fulfilment of a process of erosion and decomposi-
tion’.10 This is where we must add the most, because while the direction
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is rightly observed—in that modernity is heading towards disaster—the
catastrophe never really materialises. It is decadence, decline, rather than
the ultimate collapse. The modernity of their anti-modernity is to inter-
pret decadence as an ongoing, deepening crisis, rather than the ultimate
(and redemptive) catastrophe.
The anti-modern argument has modernized and has substituted the
ultimate break with the endless downturn. And, most importantly, irre-
versibility has been substituted for politics, promising a reinstatement of
the difference between the worthy and the unworthy, the ‘in’ and the
‘out’, friend and enemy, and the like. All the constitutive differences
belied by modernity are being pursued as policies and can be countered
by resistance. Taguieff teaches us that anti-modernity, or the far right,
understands modernity as a process of dissolution, of equalization of
qualitative difference: ‘Modernity,’ the argument goes, ‘erects the in-be-
tween and the “neither this nor that”, the neutral and the mixed, the at-
home-nowhere and the at-home-everywhere, the nomad and the cosmo-
politan as normative types’.11 Or, to speak with Houellebecq and Kim-
mel, modernity is the accelerating (threat of) reducing the differences
between immigrant and citizen, Christian and Muslim, man and woman,
first and third world.
Briefly historicizing this ‘decadence fantasy’ reading of the right, we
can locate its first and constitutive expression in the Counter-Enlighten-
ment understanding of the philosophes as an anti-Christian conspiracy.
This had strong and path-dependent consequences for the right’s under-
standing of the world from thereafter, always reading the world as being
dominated by aggressive and always nearly triumphant forces of dark-
ness. The nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of Communism as
the internal enemy abated by weak liberals, only to be supplemented by
an external enemy after the Russian Revolution. The twenty-first century
saw a shift in character but a remarkable continuance of thought struc-
ture, when Communism was replaced with Islam, local Communists
with Muslim immigrants, and Moscow with the Middle East. The inner
enemy is now doubled as an alliance between the liberal do-gooders
(‘halal-hippies’) and the Muslims; an alliance named by two Danish far
right anti-Muslim agitators as ‘the naïvists and the islamists’.12 In the
conspiratorial tract, Eurabia, of 2005, which alleges a secret cabal between
European and Middle East leaders on the islamification of Europe (an-
other instance of Houellebecq’s third-worldification), the story line is one
of:
Europe’s evolution from a Judeo-Christian civilization, with important
post-Enlightenment secular elements, into a post-Judeo-Christian civil-
ization that is subservient to the ideology of jihad and the Islamic pow-
ers that propagate it. The new European civilization in the making can
be called a ‘civilization of dhimmitude’. The term dhimmitude comes
from the Arabic word ‘dhimmi’. It refers to subjugated, non-Muslim
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individuals or people that accept the restrictive and humiliating subor-
dination to an ascendant Islamic power to avoid enslavement and
death.13
The Europeans are weak, subservient peoples, who trade life for freedom
and no longer believe in anything, whereas the Muslims are ascendant,
conquering, marching.
In the current far right anti-Muslim agitation, the war narrative is
dominant, making even the most trivial objects—such as a Christmas tree
or a shower curtain—into all-important instances of invasion, islamiza-
tion. The war is portrayed as ‘another phase of a very old war’ on the far
right blog titled ‘Gates of Vienna’. It is a ‘very old war’, ‘a long war’, ‘the
third world war’ or ‘the third Turkish siege’ as the Austrian leader of the
FPÖ, Heinz-Christian Strache, has termed it,14 turning historical refer-
ences into an eternal condition of conflictuality. These and other suchlike
phrases are symptomatic of a thinking that views the world as being
constituted both by and through war and conflict.
The ‘invasion’ can only take place because the West has lost its will to
survive. This is another oft-repeated trope, one which I will illustrate
with just one example.15 In June 1978, the exiled Russian writer Alek-
sandr Solzhenitsyn gave the opening address at Harvard University.
While the text itself, ‘A World Split Apart’, is one long antimodernist cry,
almost a reactionary rant, it also summarizes core notions of a far right
crisis discourse. Western democracy, Solzhenitsyn claims, is unable to
withstand the evil of communism and the degeneracy caused by its own
values. The East and the West are but two symptoms of the same materi-
alist, godless celebration of man, but while the East is gaining spiritual
strength through suffering, Western man is progressively weakening
through legalism, the free press, democratic politics, individual freedom,
and material well-being, manifesting itself most prominently in a lack of
the will to defend itself: ‘A fact which cannot be disputed is the weaken-
ing of human personality in the West while in the East it has become
firmer and stronger’.16
There is, Solzhenitsyn observes, a ‘decline in courage’, ‘a lack of man-
hood’ causing the West to implode: ‘Must one point out that from ancient
times a decline in courage has been considered the first symptom of the
end?’17 The values of the West are what doom it against forces adhering
to evil: ‘To defend oneself, one must also be ready to die; there is little
such readiness in a society raised in the cult of material well-being.’18
Solzhenitsyn takes his place among the long list of thinkers who have
portrayed the modern West as weak and unable to defend itself, risking
its existence in the face of determined, non-Western foes. The fear of the
inherent irresponsibility of liberal democracy when faced with existential
threats has been seen in a number of different historical expressions, most
notably in the Weimar Republic (which is also a constantly evoked
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‘proof’), the confrontation with totalitarianism in WWII and the Cold
War, and now in what is perceived by some as a new totalitarian threat,
Islamism, which is portrayed as both an external and internal threat. The
claim now is simply that the liberal democratic preference for discussion,
tolerance and proceduralism exposes Western countries to an existential
threat in the evident shape of terrorism and the more hidden threat of a
sneaking islamization.
The right fights battles of threatened privileges. If there was some-
thing akin to an explicit Enlightenment project, it was the abolition of
privileges, which, in the words of Abbé Sieyès in 1788, ‘are unjust, odi-
ous, and contrary to the supreme end of every political society’.19 Chris
Thornhill’s pertinent observation that modernity ‘depended upon rights-
mediated inclusionary processes’ replacing privileges (see chapter 7 in
this volume), goes a long way towards explaining the foundational ‘mod-
ernity as crisis’ and its opting for various privilege arguments in opposi-
tion to a fully-fledged modern project of equal rights to all. If anything,
the political right is characterized by the fight for threatened privileges,
whether it is the aristocratic privileges of the conservative right, the relig-
ious privileges of the antisecular right, or the compensatory privileges on
the free market right. Rights and entitlements are rarely privileges in the
eyes of the beholder, but ‘the way things have always been’. They are the
‘natural order of things’, normality, or, when questioned, one’s birth
right. Privileges, at least in a postfeudal era, were hidden in normalcy.
Only when challenged by those not included, who call them unmerited
privileges wrongfully reserved for the few, do they get verbalized.
The major difficulty for the right is to preserve privileges in an era of
equality and democracy. One major answer to this difficulty has been to
include the less fortunate in the ranks of the privileged. Modern biologi-
cal racism developed in no small measure as an attempt to include the
white underclass among the privileged. ‘Making privilege palatable to
the masses,’ Corey Robin writes, ‘is a permanent project of conservatism’,
adding that each generation of conservatives ‘must tailor that project to
fit the contour of its times.’20 When losing battles for privileges, one
option is that of nostalgic reaction. The other is the reconstruction of
privilege under a different name, for instance, the preservation of proper-
ty in the name of human rights or the preservation of power in the name
of representative democracy. And it is the attempts at the reconstruction
of cultural and national privileges on the contemporary far right which
will be the focus of the rest of this chapter.
THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF REACTION
The right, and the far right in particular, is a ‘party of losers’. Put slightly
less polemically, it is the ‘party of loss’. The development in right think-
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ing has very much to do with accommodating what they recently
thought and defined themselves against. And more than the left, who
think of themselves as the protectors of those who are ‘losing out’, it has
been the right which has thematized the sense of loss, not least the loss of
privileges and status, but also the loss of certainty and truth. This accom-
modation is evident from any brief look at what the right has fought
against and is now supporting, including: secularism, human rights, evo-
lution, the sovereign rights of colonies, democracy, as well as equality
between sexes, races and classes, to name but a few of the most signifi-
cant ones. Each battle lost against modern society has resulted in a split
on the right between the few adhering to the old values and the many
finding an accommodation with the winning side, finding a right lan-
guage within what used to be external and foreign to its ideology.
Importantly, such accommodation is not assimilation. Values and
principles are adopted and accepted in redefined forms, mostly in
hedged, minimalized and guarded forms. This is what I call a ‘hardening
of liberties’, their redefinition in the form that Edmund Burke called ‘a
manly, moral, regulated liberty’ versus excessive, uncontrollable ‘French
liberty’.21 To understand this hardening, we should observe the remark-
able shift in perspective that has taken place in the last decade in the far
right description of the values of open society. In the last decades of the
twentieth century, these values were often portrayed as problematical,
suicidal even. The values and ideals of open society, mobility, openness,
conversation, tolerance, human rights, rule of law, international conven-
tions and suchlike, were cast as problems which jeopardize our very
existence by opening up European countries to mass immigration and by
disallowing robust action against threats. The open society values were
not described as positives or strengths, but rather as weaknesses, expres-
sions of surrender and appeasement.
This is evident in the rambling tract of the Italian writer Oriana Falla-
ci, The Rage and the Pride, written in 2002, where one reads:
The more a society is an open and democratic society, the more it is
exposed to terrorism. The more a nation is free, the more it risks the
massacres which . . . have taken place for so many years in Italy and in
the rest of Europe. . . . As blinded as you are by the myopia and the
stupidity of the Politically Correct, you don’t realize or don’t want to
realize that a war of religion is being carried out.22
Politically correct being one of the preferred terms with which to smear the
open society values as inauthentic, oppressive and dangerous. Open soci-
ety was both in and of itself an accelerating crisis.
However, another prominent discourse has come into existence, or,
perhaps one should say instead, a doubling of critical discourse has
emerged, whereby critique is still directed at a supposedly weak and
defeatist version of open society values, but is now supplemented by a
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positive and affirming adherence to (most of) those same values. They
have been turned from problems into weapons. In 2004, Nick Griffin, the
leader of the British National Party, a party which has housed Nazis,
racists and anti-Semites for decades, said: ‘You can have Muslim funda-
mentalism or democracy. You can have Muslim fundamentalism or wom-
en’s rights. You can have Muslim fundamentalism or peace. But you can’t
have both’.23
Feminism, gay rights, freedom of speech, tolerance even, are now
repositioned as positive values against the ‘medieval values’ of Muslims
(and, by default, also against the left allegedly not defending such values
against the ‘Muslim threat’). These are now hardened concepts (see
McCormick, chapter 5 in this volume). Liberality does not mean critique
and change of what exists, but, rather, its affirmation and continuation.
Rather than positioning itself against the prominent and dominating val-
ues of society, the far right has now opted to confirm them by redefining
them.
In a comment on artists and culture, the then leader of the Danish
People’s Party, Pia Kjærsgaard, said: ‘It is great to be controversial.’ The
artists in question, formerly accused of being provocative and disturbing,
are now repositioned as ossified parts of ‘the system’. It is politicians like
her who are the real provocateurs: ‘[anyone] who dares to step forward
and say that faeces in a glass, stuffed puppies and cut up horses—that
has nothing to do with art’.24 The status as controversial is now a posi-
tive, not as a challenge of normality and the petit bourgeois, but as their
confirmation. The positively ‘controversial’ is the one challenging ‘politi-
cal correctness’, who says what everyone presumably thinks, who speaks
for the silent majority, who talks ‘plain common sense’, who says what
others consider ‘racist’. Liberty is rebranded as the right, the incontest-
able privilege, of the majority to say ‘no’—or something a lot worse—to
the minority. When publishing the Danish Muhammad cartoons in 2005,
it was with the disclaimer that the Muslim minority should learn to put
up with (accept and tolerate) ‘scorn, mockery and ridicule’.
Freedom of speech is the most prominent example of this turn in
discourse. In a commentary on the Swedish artist Dan Park, a Danish
philosophical think tank, Centre for Vild Analyse, has interpreted the
‘free speech’ turn in far right agitation, as the cry: ‘It is fucking not pos-
sible to be a white racist anymore!’ Dan Park and all those defending free
speech as the right to say racist things see themselves as a persecuted
minority who no longer ‘can say what you really feel if you are a white
male’.25 The racism and obscenities pouring out from under the cover of
‘free speech’ is aggrieved entitlement talking: ‘They are invading our
country. And I’m not allowed to speak up. Fuck it. And fuck them.’
White privilege is eroding, so it feels for some. All that is left of it is white
talk, and any accusation of racism becomes a confirmation that white
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privilege is truly in danger. The accusation of racism is turned into an
indictment of the people for whom ‘the racist’ speaks.
This hardening is the first dimension of the ‘democratization of reac-
tion’. The other is populism, which serves to link democracy and equality
with hierarchy and exclusion. An essential part of ‘right-wing populism
is a democratic claim: right-wing populism today can easily identify with
“we, the people” of the bourgeois revolutions—as long as “the people” are
seen to be distinctly different from other peoples’.26 Populism is appeal-
ing to the masses in the service of inequality by including ‘the hardwork-
ing ordinary person’ within the ranks of the privileged, or, more precise-
ly, within the ranks of those with threatened privileges. By turning the
nation into the principle and source of privilege, populism becomes a
robust, even aggressive, confirmation of democratic credentials, and
thereby an instrumentalization of democracy for reactionary purposes.
Populism allows the far right to speak the universalistic language of de-
mocracy while defending privilege.
Populism is also a crisis discourse. It is dependent upon a civil
war–like division between a treasonous élite and a ‘pure’ people. Politics
is war, and the crisis identified by far right populism is a war waged
against the people by an élite using subnational or nonnational groups as
shock troops. The doubling of the nation in two, the authentic, hardwork-
ing, honest, decent, historically grounded, versus the rootless, corrupt and
treasonous, is really a singularization of ‘the nation’. It is not a coexis-
tence, but an occupation. As Jan-Werner Müller remarks, the ‘opposite of
populism is not élitism, but pluralism’.27 The conception of ‘a one true
and undivided people’ is an antiplural and antiliberal idea. It enacts what
Ivan Krastev, speaking of the Hungarian government of Viktor Orbán,
has called a ‘democratic illiberalism’, which does not, as a classical far
right, ‘represent a challenge to democracy, understood as free elections or
the rule of the majority. . . . What they oppose is the representative nature
of modern democracies, the protection of the rights of minorities, and the
constraints to the sovereignty of the people’.28 Democratic representa-
tion, the populists says, is broken, subverted, ridiculed, while populism
is the promise of the restoration of the primacy of the people. The existing
democracy is undemocratic. It is, in actual fact, an ongoing attack on the
people. The existing democracy is ‘decadence in the making’; it is indis-
tinction accelerated; it is the inability to separate foreigners from citizens,
Lebanon from Europe.
In a move earlier identified by Hannah Arendt, the state and democra-
cy are transformed ‘from an instrument of law into an instrument of the
nation’.29 Human rights are now rephrased not as universal, but as na-
tional, rights; rights that we have as citizens, not as humans. They are
defined not as individual protections against the state, but as the state’s
protection of national privileges. Human rights are repositioned as a de-
fence of national privilege. It allows a transgression of both the rule of
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law and international conventions by reference to those higher principles
of national survival and popular sovereignty. Law and order does not
have to abide by the rule of law. Populism allows for a ‘democratic’
protest against the checks and balances which disallow the free expres-
sion of ‘the people’s will’.
THE RHETORICS OF REACTION
In this third and final section, I want to offer short readings of two signifi-
cant, but also quite different, versions of ‘the rhetoric of anti-Muslim
reaction’.30 What they demonstrate is how urgent the crisis is thought to
be and what an all-out far right crisis narrative looks like. We start with
the ‘moderate far right’, if such a thing exists, and with a journalistic
piece, before turning to a more extreme version of the same basic story
line from a controversial and powerful politician.
Londonistan
Starting out on the left, the British journalist Melanie Phillips is now
firmly located on the right (denying climate change, which seems to be a
purely right-wing thing to do), and, in 2006, she published Londonistan:
How Britain Has Created a Terror State Within. ‘Londonistan’ is both a
place, the third-worldification of London, and ‘a state of mind’ with
‘deep roots inside British culture’. It has come about through two ‘lethal
developments’. The first is ‘the arrival in Britain of large number of Mus-
lims . . . radicalized by a political agenda promoting the conquest and
Islamization of the West’.31 The second development is the, by now fa-
miliar, theme of the enabling inner enemy. Britain has become ‘a moral
and philosophical vacuum that was ripe for colonization by predatory
Islamism’. The former so proud, manly and self-confident ‘Britain has
become a decadent society, weakened by alarming tendencies towards
social and cultural suicide. Turning upon itself, it has progressively at-
tacked or undermined the values, laws and traditions that make it a
nation, creating a space that in turn has been exploited by radical Islam-
ism’.32
The idea of a moral vacuum is generalized to a ‘fundamental loss of
national self-belief’ and to ‘a debauched and disorderly culture of instant
gratification, with disintegrating families, feral children and violence,
squalor and vulgarity on the streets’.33 Violence and disorder spring from
any relaxation of repression. Decadence theorists have always been ex-
tremely adept at collecting ‘evidence’ and turning that ‘occasional feeling
that everyone has of a world adrift’ into a system: ‘At an abstract level,
such moral relativism destroyed the notion of objectivity, so that truth
and lies were stood on their heads’.34 This is decadence as indistinction. It
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is, in her account, not only Muslims, but also ‘militant gays, feminists or
“antiracists”’, who push this policy of nonpreference. While the élites
have ‘allowed and even encouraged Londonistan to develop’, or, maybe,
have just been ‘sleepwalking into the arms of the enemy’,35 the result has
been that Britain ‘has drastically weakened from within’ as a result of the
multiculturalist ideology which ‘holds that Britain is now made up of
many cultures that are all equal and therefore have to be treated in an
identical fashion’. It ‘promotes the radical deconstruction of majority cul-
ture, the idea of the nation itself and the values of Western democracy—
in particular, its understanding of morality and truth’.36 What she means
by the latter is not clear—what understanding of morality and truth does
democracy have?—but its meaning is clear, namely, democracy as our
nation, not yours, and us as non-Muslims, non-gay, non-feminists, non-
critics of majority power. General uneasiness or confusion is given direc-
tion and address. The sense of drift, or of insecurity, is the result of the
unequal being treated equal, of values overturned, of preference out-
lawed.
The answer is to be found in a hardening of values, ‘absolute consis-
tency’, ‘moral integrity’ and ‘strength of belief in values’,37 which appar-
ently can only come about by denying others the right to their beliefs. A
‘properly motivated nation would set about the remoralization and recul-
turation of Britain by restating the primacy of British culture and citizen-
ship’. It would ‘halt the drift towards social suicide by ending the culture
of equal entitlement’.38 Privilege and undeserved entitlements are what
the others are receiving. Our birth right is what we want.
The Fall of Rome, Again
On 25 March 2011, the Dutch politician and leader of Partij voor de Vrijheid
(the Freedom Party) Geert Wilders gave a talk in Rome on the failures of
multiculturalism.39 He begins by pitting a shared European ‘Judeo-Chris-
tian culture’ versus multiculturalism, which is ‘a specific political ideolo-
gy . . . that all cultures are equal’. Cultures are, however, not equal,
Wilders says, and it is wrong to disallow the state to promote and to
prefer one culture over others. Wilders is advocating a privileging of the
Judeo-Christian culture against ‘the multiculturalists [who] try to destroy
our roots’. Multiculturalism teaches a policy of tolerance which is, in
actual fact, indifference, if not self-loathing, saying to immigrants: ‘You
are free to behave contrary to our norms and values. Because your norms
and values are just as good, perhaps even better, than ours.’ Moving on
to explain this alleged multicultural policy, he narrates a history of the
Fall of Rome into the hands of barbarians as a metaphor for contempo-
rary Europe: ‘Rome fell because it had suffered a loss of belief in its own
civilization. It had lost the will to stand up and fight for survival.’
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This is Solzhenitsyn updated. Rome had, to put it like this, lost sight of
the world as an endless battle, because it ‘did not perceive the immigra-
tion of Barbarians as a threat until it was too late’. By not believing in its
own superiority (endlessly reiterated in this kind of discourse as the ‘will
to war’) ‘Rome was sacked’. Today, the same plays out between a multi-
culturalism which ‘has made us so tolerant that we tolerate the intolerant’
who is an opponent ‘keenly aware of our weakness’. A common theme
running through radical right discourse is the ‘will power of the other’,
their endless drive for domination, their understanding of real politics,
whether that other is a philosophe, a communist or an Islamist.
The ‘barbarian hordes’ are now invading a defenceless Europe which
is ‘islamisizing at a rapid pace’ facilitated by a ‘multiculturalist Left’
whose exponents ‘are aiming for a repetition of the fall of Rome and want
to use exactly the same methods’. This ‘historical explanation’ provides a
narrative of betrayal. The barbarians are always at the gate. Vigilance—
and force—are always needed. Someone is always letting the enemy in,
and they are doing this because they are unable or unwilling to differen-
tiate and discriminate:
Multiculturalists consider Islam as being equal to our own culture.
Sharia law or democracy? Islam or freedom? It doesn’t really matter to
them. But it does matter to us. The entire leftist elite is guilty of practic-
ing cultural relativism. Universities, churches, trade unions, the media,
politicians. They are all betraying our hard-won liberties.
This development ‘has to some extent been deliberately planned’. The
powers that be ‘conduct an immigration policy aimed at the deracination
of Europe. . . . It willingly sacrifices its own people to its political goal,
without any consideration for the people involved’. Multiculturalism is ‘a
repudiation of Europe’s heritages and freedoms. It weakens the West day
by day. It leads to self-censorship of the media and academia, the collapse
of the education system, the emasculation of the churches, the subversion
of the nation-state, the breakdown of our free society’.
Given that it is being planned, it can be opposed and countered. It ‘is
time for change. We must make haste. Time is running out’. The propo-
sals put forward at the end of the talk, freedom of speech, the end to
cultural relativism, and a stop for islamization, relates to the ‘hardening
of liberties’ described above. Or, more precisely, to the reinstatement of
privileges, by which cultural preference and discrimination are re-
phrased as democracy and liberty. This makes Geert Wilders end his talk
thus: ‘I am confident that if we can safeguard freedom of speech and
democracy, our civilisation will be able to survive. Europe will not fall.
We, Europe’s patriots, will not allow it’.
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CONCLUSION
‘For the right,’ James Davis writes in an article on right-wing catastroph-
ism, ‘the political advancement of previously subjugated groups and
classes of people represents an immediate threat to privilege and status’,
and ultimately constitutes ‘an absolute threat to the existence of the rul-
ing class’.40 Taking out some of the Marxist rhetoric in this quotation, and
substituting ‘ruling class’ with ‘the nation’, ‘the people’, ‘man’ or ‘hard-
working folks’, is what I have tried to demonstrate in this chapter: a far
right vision of society imbued with a crisis-ridden worldview which
identifies the forces of destruction with the emergence and voice of the
unprivileged, in this case, the Muslims. The leader of the French party,
Front National, Marine Le Pen, has summarized this thinking when she
stated that: ‘if we go on like this, Europe will no longer be Europe [but]
will turn into an Islamic Republic. We are at a turning-point, and if we
don’t protect our civilisation it will disappear’.41
Reinhart Koselleck and Janet Roitman have demonstrated how crisis
in the eighteenth century became a free-floating concept which was able
to attach itself to all kinds of events and developments. It became a his-
torico-philosophical concept which was able to diagnose the present as a
time of judgement and provide guidelines for the future. Crisis is both
diagnostic and prescriptive.42 While this seems convincing, it may be
relevant to observe how the far right, being both part of and in opposition
to modernity, subscribes to two crisis perceptions, the one epochal, the
other pointillist, the one embedded in modernity as such, the other diag-
nosing the present. While crisis, for the far right, is normality, they also
subscribe to another temporal notion, as evidenced in the quotation by Le
Pen, the notion of a turning- or tipping- point. There is, as David Runci-
man says, ‘a fundamental ambiguity’ between ‘the idea of crisis as an
acute moment of choice’, vote right or Europe disappears, and ‘crisis as
an ongoing state of uncertainty or potential peril’ as in modernity is crisis
(Runciman, chapter 2 in this volume). If catastrophe is the fulfilment and
culmination of crisis, then it is always present as the near future, as the
dark possibility of extrapolating the present into the future. But here a
distinctly modern feature of the far right emerges, namely, that it is not
destiny, but choice which determines the future. The spectre being con-
jured is summarized in the title Deutschland schafft sich ab (Germany Is
Abolishing Itself) by the controversial then-executive in the German Cen-
tral Bank, Thilo Sarrazin, and subtitled ‘How We’re Jeopardising Our
Country’, a temporal notion of crisis in process.43 But the thing to notice
is that it is understood as a suicide perpetrated by the inner enemy un-
leashing forces of decay (immigration) and destruction (immigrants).
And it is a development to be countered by politics.
One highly prominent feature of far right rhetoric can be summed up
by a slogan from the Danish People’s Party: ‘Politics Matter’, meaning
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basically: ‘You’re right to feel the centre dissolving, to feel alienated in
and from your own country, but this is the result of identifiable people, of
decisions made, of treasons committed, and those decisions and develop-
ments are all—for a while yet—reversible. It is up to you.’ Crisis is insti-
gated. Crisis can be countered—what is not articulated here but deeply
embedded in far right thinking, is that ‘modernity as crisis’ is a given that
cannot be countered. Political action can slow down degeneracy and halt
immediate betrayal, but crisis is permanent.
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The Reconstitution of Europe
Poul F. Kjaer and Niklas Olsen
The Europe of today is not Weimar. Substantial structural and cultural
differences exist between the Europe of the interwar period and today’s
Europe. Nonetheless, this book contends that Weimar is not as far away
as we might hope, and as we would have thought only a few years ago.
The implosion of Weimar Germany emerged after German society had
undergone several consecutive shocks: the defeat in WWI, the Treaty of
Versailles, the hyperinflation from 1921 to 1924, the Allied occupation of
the Rhineland between 1923 and 1925, the repercussions of the Great
Depression and the breakdown of the international economic system
from 1929 onward. These developments unfolded in a context character-
ized by a highly dysfunctional political and legal system, and by strong
ideologically-charged challenges to both the overall legitimacy and the
everyday politics of the Weimar Republic. Substantial segments of Ger-
man society located both on the right and on the left side of the political
spectrum, as well as core elements of its cultural, economic, military and
political élites became engaged in activities which, step by step, eroded
the normative integrity and functional setup of the democratic Weimar
state. Against this background, one might speculate about potential fur-
ther developments in Europe today. What could happen if the economic
shock of the financial crisis and the subsequent Euro crisis were followed
by another earthquake, or series of earthquakes, of the same magnitude
as the Western-centred but nonetheless global economic system crisis
that had its inception in 2007? Would the European integration project,
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including the Euro, be able to survive another major shock, either of an
economic nature, in the form of increasingly uncontrollable migration, as
is the case at the time of this writing, or in the shape of a serious security
threat, for example, triggered by current developments in the Middle
East or in Russia? Would national democracies and the transnational
institutional architecture, including its key institutions and their norma-
tive fundaments, be able to withstand another push by ‘illiberal’ forces or
increased pressure emerging from popular discontent?
A key insight of the book is that such breakdowns tend to emerge
upon the basis of processes which unfold and gain strength over long
timespans. Deep-seated societal crisis rarely emerge because a few un-
wise decisions are made by policymakers in otherwise well-functioning
societies. Instead, they emerge as slow burning crises unfolding over
years, even decades, before they gain strength and become fast burning
and visible. This often happens in a sudden and complex dialectic be-
tween a multitude of coexisting crises, all of which are characterized by
diverse characteristics in terms of duration, speed and intensity that is
sparked and becomes reinforced due to some contingent and unpredict-
able reason.1 In Europe, as well as the rest of the Western world, slow
burning and coexisting fires have been burning for quite some time now.
Ideologically, fundamental challenges to the setup of democracy and
the rule of law as established in Western Europe in the immediate post-
WWII period have emerged in several disguises. The neoliberal, or struc-
tural liberalist,2 discourse slowly gained ground from the 1970s onward;
a discourse that sought to disassociate economic policy making from
democracy through an emphasis on the ‘objective laws’ of the economy,
aiming, first of all, at efficiency and growth.3 This move has, in many
settings, implied an increased (re)privatization of segments of society
which had, till that time, been part of the public domain, the emergence
of new grey zones of dysfunctionality between the public and private, as
well as a reemergence of paternalistic forms of interaction.4 Moreover,
radical right movements emphasizing cultural and ethnic purity have
emerged since the 1970s. Until recently, these movements were not taken
seriously in most European settings, and the likelihood of them gaining
substantial influence was seen as remote. These expectations have proved
to be wrong. Not only have radical right-wing movements gained power
in states such as Hungary and Poland, they have also grown into poten-
tial governing parties in a string of other European states, including the
Scandinavian welfare states. Finally, left-wing populism as well as both
left-wing and right-wing nationalist movements striving for the creation
of new states in places such as Catalonia, Flanders and Scotland have
emerged throughout Europe. The combinations of these different move-
ments potentially provide a toxic cocktail of ‘ungovernability’5 which
threatens to undermine any systematic attempt to respond politically to
the challenges of European society. This is especially the case in the
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southern parts of Europe, such as Greece, Italy and Spain, as well as in
many postcommunist countries, where the formal setups and require-
ments in relation to the rule of law and democracy have always been
accompanied by the continued existence of strong informal clientelistic
and paternalistic (and often also kleptocratic) networks capable of
circumventing formal rules and procedures, thereby factually short-cir-
cuiting the day to day operations of the rule of law. Here, too, Weimar
might prove instructive as a point of reference. Analysing the causes for
the collapse of Weimar Germany, Franz L. Neumann identified the com-
bination of radical political movements and such clientelistic and pater-
nalistic networks factually rendering the state dysfunctional as a toxic
cocktail that ultimately caused its collapse.6
These ideological challenges to liberal democracy and the rule of law
were formed in and by societal contexts marked by profound structural
transformations. Just as the interwar period was marked by fundamental
technologically induced economic and social transformations related to
the increased introduction of Fordism, modern business management
and the embryonic emergence of mass consumerism, the European econ-
omy has gone through fundamental transformations due to processes of
de-industrialization which have taken place since the 1970s. This devel-
opment has been driven forward by a combination of technological de-
velopments, increased economic globalization and massive increases in
the educational level of the average citizen. Asymmetric effects have been
the consequence, in so far as the composition of socioeconomic ‘winners’
and ‘losers’ has fundamentally altered. On the one hand, one segment of
society has better possibilities and greater resources than ever, while an-
other segment is faced with increasing insecurity and a loss of status and
privileges, thereby increasing the strain on societal coherency. Although
they have not avoided some segments of their populations gaining and
others losing, some states have responded successfully to such challenges
adapting their welfare, labour market and education systems according-
ly, a move which, however, has implied a turn from the ‘welfare state’ to
the ‘competition state’ as the central raison d’être of late modern European
states.7 In 1989, Gøsta Esping-Andersen could still assume that decom-
modification, the immunization of social relations from dependency on
the market, was the central objective of welfare state provisions.8 Since
then, state-based provisions in relation to areas such as education, health
and social security have, in many European settings, been increasingly
restructured into frameworks aimed at increasing the alignment of citi-
zens with the market.9 This development has furthermore implied an
expansion in the bureaucratization of social relationships. Over the past
decades, the most advanced states in Europe have built up unprecedent-
ed capacities of micromanagement which no state has ever possessed
before. The post-WWII Western European welfare states possessed the
capacity to install generic unemployment schemes and other general wel-
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fare provisions but the most advanced European states today possesses
the capacity to develop individual action plans for every single unem-
ployed person, to interfere in the nutritional habits of individuals, and to
regulate working environments down to the smallest detail.10 Thus, it is
not only the ‘losers’, but all segments of society that feel the pressure of
the increased acceleration of societal developments through ever shorter
temporal rhythms which are steadily increasing the demand for constant
adaptation and flexibility thereby providing the basis for individualized
motivational crises to emerge as a central symptom of today’s society.11
Other states, such as Italy and Portugal, have, in contrast, been marked
by long periods of virtual standstill in their state-driven societal develop-
ments, which has led to an increased erosion of the institutional grid
holding these societies together. In some European settings, a new gener-
ation is therefore channelling their disappointed socioeconomic expecta-
tions, as measured against the well-being of their parents’ generation,
into political movements which are challenging or have the potential to
challenge the institutions of the rule of law and representative democra-
cy.
But how can Europe possibly emerge from its current crisis? How can
the region regain legitimate and stable foundations of public power and
authority? To answer this question, a view on Europe’s historical place in
the modern World Order and on the origins of the European integration
project might be instructive.
From the mid-nineteenth century to the outbreak of WWI, the world
experienced an unprecedented wave of globalization.12 One of the many
consequences of this development was that the US and Japan emerged as
central political, economic and military factors, thereby initiating the
breakdown of the Eurocentric world from August 1914 onward. The
interwar period therefore became marked by a highly unstable and weak
institutional transnational architecture. The leading European powers
were no longer in a position to stabilize the global system on their own,
while the US, in particular, did not take up a role that adequately re-
flected its importance in the global economy and global affairs in general.
This first happened after WWII where the US decisively put its weight
behind the construction of a new order through Bretton Woods, NATO
and a host of other international organizations. From the 1970s onward,
another wave of globalization emerged through the modernization of a
string of East Asian countries, the opening of China, and the breakdown
of the Soviet Empire. One of many consequences of this development is
that the Western-centric global institutional architecture no longer corre-
sponds to the reality against which it is oriented. Once again, the world is
at a stage where a fundamental discrepancy exists between the location
and structure of global developments and the institutional frameworks
aimed at stabilising the world.13 As such, the ‘international community’
might face an increasing strain on its capacity to respond to fundamental
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crises. The world economy avoided a complete breakdown in the wake of
the financial crisis of 2007, but even in this respect whether the global
architecture will be able to survive another shock remains doubtful.
In Europe, a particular variant of this development has emerged due
the rapid evolution of the EU in recent decades. The integration project
has, as Jan-Werner Müller points out in his contribution, been driven
forward as an institutional response to societal transformations and sud-
den crises. The internal logic of the integration project has furthermore
been one of ‘functional spillover’, in so far as integration in one policy
area made subsequent integration initiatives necessary. The integration
project advanced through controlled ‘mini-crises’ in which integration in
one area rendered purely national solutions in neighbouring policy areas
increasingly dysfunctional and unattainable thereby creating a need for
integration in these areas as well. For a long time, this worked very well.
The launch of the internal market in the 1980s, for example, led to a
spillover into areas such as consumer protection, food safety and envi-
ronmental policy. The launch in the 1990s of the monetary union without
a corresponding fiscal union and the creation of the borderless EU
through Schengen without a corresponding common migration and refu-
gee policy also followed the logic of functional spillover. However, in
both cases, the result has not been a controllable ‘mini-crisis’. Instead,
both integration initiatives have been contributing factors to the unleash-
ing of fully-fledged and potentially uncontrollable crises which are po-
tentially life-threatening for the Union itself. EU integration might have
overreached itself, due to advancing too fast and producing severe unin-
tended consequences, just as the modus operandi upon which the inte-
gration project has relied until now no longer seems adequate to the
challenges facing Europe today.14 When the Berlin Wall came down in
1989 and Germany was united in 1990, Europe was at a crossroads, either
leaping back into nation state competition or advancing the integration
project. Together with the EU enlargements in 2004, 2007 and 2013, the
monetary union and Schengen provided the answers. But these re-
sponses have unleashed problems of their own and proven to be insuffi-
cient with regard to the question of the stability of Europe. A final institu-
tional response to the earthquake unleashed by the collapse of the Soviet
Empire has not yet been developed. As such, bold moves aimed at recast-
ing the Union, its functions and objectives, are needed.
In more general terms, the ongoing crisis can be understood as reflect-
ing a discrepancy between the structural setup of the social processes
which make up society and the institutionalized mechanisms in place
aimed at normatively stabilising these social processes.15 The world has
changed, but our institutions have not kept pace. From the architecture of
global governance to the EU and European states, a fundamental need
can observed to recast and reconstitute the basic institutional architecture
through which norm-based societal coherency is established. Not only is
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the EU itself, and the global architecture within which it operates, facing
a potentially life threatening crisis but deep-seated constitutional con-
flicts and crises can, in different ways and with different degrees of inten-
sity, be observed in relation to a whole range of European states, from
Belgium, Hungary, and Poland, to Italy, Spain and the UK.
The last time (Western) Europe and the West faced a constitutional
movement was in the immediate post-WWII years and the result was a
dual and simultaneous transnational and national constitutional process.
Strongly backed by the resources and power of the US, an intense level of
transnational ‘founding acts’ occurred from Bretton Woods in 1944,
through the establishment of the UN in 1945, and the GATT and OEEC in
1947 (and with the latter the Marshall Plan running from 1948 to 1952)
culminating with the launch of the European integration process with the
establishment of the ECSC in 1952. Furthermore, from 1945 to 1953, al-
most all the European states that had not succumbed to Soviet control,
gave themselves new, or substantially revised, constitutions, and
launched extensive economic and welfare reforms. All governments (ex-
cept the Danish) of the states occupied by National Socialist Germany
were exiled in London during WWII, and the plans for this reconstitution
of Europe were, to a large extent, developed in this highly transnational
setting.16 Intense cross-national exchanges unfolded both during and in
the aftermath of the war, leading to a high level of ‘constitutional borrow-
ing’. One result of this was that five of the six states which came to act as
the founding states of the ECSC inscribed a commitment to international
and European cooperation and integration in their constitutions (the only
exception was Luxembourg). Thus, Europe responded to the catastrophe
which followed the breakdown of Weimar Germany by reconstituting
itself nationally as well as transnationally. As such, one might speak of a
multifaceted dual (trans)national constitutional process through which
European nation states as well as numerous but intertwined transnation-
al frameworks were simultaneously and successfully (re)constituted.17
Current developments in Europe are far away from the atrocities of
WWII and the Holocaust. But Europe is nonetheless faced with the chal-
lenge of reconstituting itself, and, this time around, Europe will have to
pursue this process without American guardianship and in a move that
includes those parts of Europe which still are suffering from the repercus-
sions of communist rule. The question remains as to whether Europe has
learned from its past and is capable of initiating such a process before a
real catastrophe strikes. The future is contingent and unknown, and, as
such, no firm forecasts can be made concerning the Europe to come.
‘Weimar’ is, however, a powerful metaphor for one possible path which
Europe, in a worst case scenario, might follow, unless it faces up to ongo-
ing challenges and engages in a fundamental recasting of its constitution-
al architecture.
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